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Tbls tflssertntioii d«sls vith t!^ tople of 
l4Kid«r^lp eritit in P«kl8tia, It Is na attempt to 
reviov polities! dovelopnont la PukistiiQ la tbo light 
of louder ship erisls. 
The first ehnpter anlcos <« study of politieiil 
dovelopiBeat in s«a«ral. Tho soeoad chaptot ^  fiiso sod 
Full of Ayah Kh«a, stadios tioriod of his rolo* Th#^ « 
study of hoy Emt Puklst^Sf aov Bfia({l«d«sh| broko 
awiqy froa the eoantry has been atido ia third ohaptor. 
Tha fifth ehaptor studies the Bhs^toirt and fiaslly 
ia coaelusioa %a attempt has beea Bade to pat up a 
coherent viev of politietl deveXopeeats ia P^kistaa, 
Pescriptive aad aaalytieal aethod ha^ e^ beea used to 
deal with the topic. 
Brieflyt I woald like to thaok Dr» Bilframii the 
Chtlrfflaa of the Departaieat of Political Science who 
had eaeoaraged »e to aadevtake this study* His goidaaee 
n^d criticism have been of iovaluable help to ae* I aa 
also thankful to Dr. A,P. Sharma aad Or. Usaaai of the 
same faculty for their enccmrafing and helpful 
coot)@ratioa they extended to ae throughout the coarse of 
this voiic. 
Without the intellectual aad critical help. 
eoop«ratloQ i«n<3 •aeoarqgeiioat ef my superior, I^.A.S. 
Btig, Hetd®; S«p«rtsi«nt of Politletil Sei«ae« vho h«d 
ialtiiUjr suggested tht 9robl«i and l^ter iMlped m« in 
ciTPfiag o«t this study, this atady vauld aot hfsfn found 
i ts fruition, I m «xtr©m«ly hnp^j to qckaowltdg© siy 
g7<it9fula«s8 to his. 
Aptrt froB sy friend, Mr. Raider Ali QASHBI «itd 
Mr Sfifd<ir hghn to whose aastiated help eaeourgvaeat lad 
cooperation. I m grently indebted, I would like to 
t*ike thlg opt»ortualty to record ny thioks to the it^ff 
of the Juvahfirlftl Nehru Uoivereity, Saora House, and 
Aligr«ih Mttsllia University Libraries. 
May I tikt this ooBortunlty to extend sy grateful* 
aess to Mr. S. Hamid, Tiee Chatieellor, Allgrah Univertity, 
for his kind sncoufagemeat extended to ae to pursue this 
progranoe of research? 
IHUIODUCIION I MIAT IS lOLITICAL DEVEL0»!Ii2m 
After the Second world > ^ , mimy s ta tes came Into 
exist^ice, eapeciaily in the area v^lch i s called '"Third 
orld"» Ihese states have been atrlvlng to iiKtd^mlze theia-
selves in a l l f ie lds . In spi te of strong reaetlon to 
ohaiinQs in t radi t ional societies t tfiere have been una(Voidab3« 
cii-mgas In those societ ies, ©spoctally in the pol i t ical 
f ie ld , Ihese chances are called "rrogress''» niodimizatlon 
or clevelopmont. Poli t ical developta^it has beon defined as 
increased differentiation and specialisation of pol i t ical 
culture, Taia definition i s not the only one given to 
nol i t ioal dcvelocHuent, Mjiny \ ^ i t e r s have attempted to defint 
i t differently. C,H, Dodd wote that the coneepta of 
po l i t i ca l develor)ment eEibrace one or more of the foUowingt 
( i ) Pol i t ica l ciiange n^essary ottac the achiev^aent of 
a specific objective! l ike Merictm Liberal D^iocracy, 
a Coraiunlst Society or an Isltaalc 3tate» 
1 Gabriel A. Alaond and G. Bine^am Powel, J r . , QmmM^u 
Pol l t ica . A jjgyalQDBtmtal Approach (Boston, imTTTTW. 
( t i ) A general procege of diange in l^e pol i t ica l spbere, 
closely related to ot^isr areas of societyt v*iich i s 
conceived to coiapriae 
(a) till oxpaaslon and centralization of goveramen'^ CL 
poj&ff find the diffcar-carxtiation and rpecializatd-on 
(and subsequent integration) of politic-ril fwictions 
ciiiii structures? 
(b) increased popular participatloia In politics» 
and 
(c) increased popular Identification %dth tiie 
polit ic ' t l system, 
i i l l )A pol i t ical system's capacity 
(a) to solVG probleias, develoimental and oihars, 
and 
(b) to in i t i a t e (and nuatain) new policies for tkm 
society in %^\i<^ i t oparatea, and to set up new 
structiiroa or rer-ora o3xl ones, to carry out sueh 
aims* 
(iv) ilie abil i ty to learn better ajid better how to perform 
pol i t ica l functlona road to set up pol i t ica l 
structairos. 
Pol i t ica l developliant cannot be separated from 
2 C.H. Dodd, '^o?.^ ^a,9a^ Pfyaft9-am^ (Londcm, 1972), p, 15. 
ocoxKjnic and oocial develorxaento. I t Ig influcaiced by a l l 
Qiifuiges tliat tolie place In a oociety, the main Gontrllwtton 
to poli t ical doVGlopaent comes from pol i t ical ag®icles» 
namely, pol i t ical leMero, pol i t ical a-irtles^ mlii'cary and 
n«K-paucracy, Labour and I r i t e l l i ^n t s i a play a minor ro le , 
oi>ecially in tiie dcfveloptng 3ocl0ties, Our laain coacem 
hcTQ i s tho rolG of poli t ical leadera and how they Influence 
Ix)litiGal develo[)m«mt in the fliird V/orM ccfuntrles. In 
r a-.Icily'-(10^610012:10 countries rule tay arm p&CBbn i s @@ii<3rally 
encountered in one of t;vo situations. One i s \ihmi a t r a d i -
tional BKsnarcIi raaiiageg to aalritain himaelf in powK", The 
otl-ier i s '^hen a colonifil or a t radit ional regiaie. Is <ymt^ 
tTirou^ n "bf force and the suooesfsful l e a d ^ of tho revoluHon 
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asjumes sole poviRa?. 
Tradit ion^ leaders are facing aom^ d i f f icul t ies l a 
playing tiielr role in the process of pol i t ica l dfJS'elofsaent. 
rneir authority i s being undea*5iin©d \3(y Rowing ccsaplexity of 
l i f e and th(?y find 1:^ i®nselves cojipelled to aodemlss their 
countries. In ordar to do so ttooy find I t necessary to moioB 
a l l i e - oM the military i s tlie best dioloe t h ^ ©an get , 
alttiougi tiiey face "ttiQ danger of feecoiaing ^aye te the 
military. In raaz^ caaes In the iHird v^orld, the military 
took over power vh&a po l i t ica l pcrtles failed to i^rovlde 
3 I h i d , , p, l^» 
pol i t i ca l leaa^rahip sM ' ^ 0 trajlltioiiai n i l ^ • bocaa® ymek 
fmd corrupt. In relat ively poli t ical ly de'Velop^ societies> 
th© military coaes to povi^ to ccjrrect the sltuatl<m \^:mm. I t 
de t ^ lo r a t e s aiKi leaves I t to th© clvlllaias after Mi€iy find 
things r l ^ t boeause t h ^ kaow ttiat I t woyld m>t ^ @ai^  
for tliea to Gontiiita@, ©specially #i©r© po l i t i ca l 
participation i s foimi« IJurk^' coiild b€ an ©xaraple of 
•ttiis. In certain cases the aUi ta ry turn tSisBselfes Into 
poli t icians and allow some klM of pol i t ica l partlcl-patloa,, 
Altoou^i t h ^ acliteve soaie- amount of sumess bat th^ 
tail. In the long raa, Egypt isM ?^ i s t im could 1^ a l iving 
•axsMsple, • '*C^tairay la Pakistan In 1959 Ayub Khmt t r i ed , 
and not a t a l l without success to a:'©at0 a ixjl i t lcal base 
in his Basic D0iaoa:*acles Orgimisatloru Md lit la tar p®?altted 
polttlCial partios to organise In ©rd^r "to er@at© a stronger 
liiic between tne nmt ^&BM&itial Gmf^mi^it ani Basle 
iJcjfaocracies Organization*," 
Before ttie Second BorM War I t was dlff le\ i l t to th l i^ 
of lallitary ru le as I t •W&B considweA ummlsaitGl md deviant 
phcHioiieuon* • "A ggveriiiaeat doaliiatei W ^^ « J ^ ^as coasldePiid 
*umiatsjral* not hmmxBQ i t ims a amf pteaiioa^^aa, — I t h^ 
b©8Ji r^cogrdsed Ijy pol i t ical ^llosoctosrs fro© Madiiavelll 
to Mosco — t u t because S^BS socisl sciciatlsts refused to 
accept military r-ile as being as aats^al as c l v i l l s i ru l e . 
k I b id . , p» 52, 
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'ilaia hesitat ion of social sclenttata to steady tli© military 
nas liod a variety of caiaest ranging tram Ignorance to 
h is tor ica l sad poll t ioal facto to ai-itag-aaiom towards ti/iar 
aiid the a i l l t a ry prof easion* As reccmtly as 19^s a 
4:-!ilitary goverammt was Idai t i f led as th© ultimate tyi^e of 
totalitarianism.*^ Thime Is ao Qxamf:>le \A^e x-m can £iM 
a iiare aillitary rule . Usually riiilltary officsra vAm oc®€ 
to m\mt by over-Kir-ovjing a civi l isB govenwaent oiamot afford 
oxciiKitng c iv i l i a i s from Hie governm^it Itiey f4a:^ed 
because ttiey lack exp^ieace wiiich. toey find in ttie 
toure-iucracy of t i e c ivi l services, "AlfeougTi .the |3:*Gsent . 
analysis t rea ts 'iie civtiiari aod rallltaiy spli@:*es of action 
raialytiCcilly as li-Kiep^id,ent variaMe, in conflict oanA 
interaction, UIQ lallitary organization oarmot be ful3y 
tlivorccd from tfee civi l ian sioclal ccmtisat.-feat deterains 
c ivi l ian pol i t ics . In i t i a l ly > fee pol i t ical conualla^sits 
Olid ideologioal positions of the lailitary in the praoteri^i 
s ta te iiTQ sustahi&l e i t l i ^ ty tri© c i v l l l a i pollticisaas %*M» 
encourage t^ie arn^ to ent®* pol i t ics , or hy Hm $m>&rBlt 
sociopoli t ical , c ivl l iaa context** Som© o f f i c e s sliow 
5 /uaoa Perlimitter, "tho Practarkin State >3M 1^@ i¥ectarlaii 
amy ! Tov/ard a faxonoi^ of Clvll- l i i l i tary ^lelatlons said 
DdvelopiiiG Pol i t ics" , iJa Janacm L. Ftr&le aM ^-^idiard W, 
(Hew Yoric, 19? 1), P# 305. ^ ^ 
6 I b i d . , p, 3l§* 
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their wtllingneoo to return to UIQ barracks viien Hxey coae 
to power but in many cases they noYcr fu l f i l their prosisea 
in tJiis regard witii sxceptlon of \i,mt happened In Chile 
in 1924, "The offic-ar.s of tlie aj'laltrator-tyi;)© an^y sre 
c ivi l ian oriented. Even 'whore tl'ia c ivi l ian groups are not 
orgrmized enou>:^  to sst up a sov«jraaent, cM I'stiore officers 
occuiTy poiiitionri in tlie governni«-it, the officers ob<^ the 
Inntructlons ox civilLan po l i t i c i l groups, Thesy do not 
iri,ject tlieir ox^i vie'.-; point. They desire to retuni t» 
nor-iallty v/iiicii raoans that -they accept the status quo. tJie 
arbitxator-tyae ai^ ny return to the barracks because I t s 
oxixcors (ITS av; r e ISiat tliey lack tlie afcills to govern and 
oTc contentsd to avoid further pol i t ica l Involvesacmt**' 
The role of the ^-nllitary in po l i t i ca l develoi^iont 
han boon diocusoed extensively by m;my social aciontists 
\uosQ Views li^ wo been surrraGci up ly Robert Price? 
1 striking charact<aristl03 of the l i t e r a tu re on 
millta':'y rule in dtsvcloptng countriea i s the gap 
between tiiooreticcii expLKstations and polit ical^ 
social and eccaiomlc rea-Uty, On the one harui, 
practitioners of comparative social and pol i t ica l 
tlieory have tended to motjn the lall i tary, at 
leas t in the ncm-Latin /iaerican area, as an 
orgmiination capable of pishing an iaportank 
modernizing^ ro le . On UIQ othor hapad, eapirlcal 
researchers, often the very saiie inilvidualst 
vrho at :i different time wear tiie hat of 
•fcieorotical ^ a c t l t l o n e r , have found the 
7 Ib id , , p. 316, 
p^fonaaade of the a t l i t s r y as pol i t ica l 
agents of wod^nisaticai to have ^©n ratls«» 
Also, some schols 's hoM the vl@w that the a i l i t a ry ©lai act 
as an InstnMoit of natioti-lMlldlng aM 14i^ oonsidered 1^ © 
i^uh regint in r'fiidstaii as aa astraplo of "tills. ^  ^ I s could 
be partly true al-tecftA# Ayub can be oonaid^ed Ksr© as an 
instniiaeat of s tate Gl id ing thaa aatioa teiildiDg b^ause 
of Ills deVGlopraait of a CGntrali2:ad bureaucra^^ ra"iier 
tinm m. ins t i tu t ion of aass appeal. 
We have besn fwttliig mora cai^^asis on military as 
agorit of pol l t loal dev^opiaent bcjoauso <»ir study i s concerned 
vvitJi Paiiietan vti€re a l l l t a ry rule has been fr@qumt and in 
the Gcwmtfy* s pol i t ical l i f e mA has l e f t strong Impact on 
the clvllifsi r-ale, there. I t la isrue -feat In the #arly days 
of PiiklBtaii, inilltary did not play ^a iaportaat rol® as the 
ataos|*L@re was not la IhQir favour. 'Ih© iiaag® -foat Moha;?aad 
/i l l Jirmsii BM Llaqat All Khmi hi^ l e f t in ?ai£lart«i did xy&t 
allow any military tsad^icics to r i s e and the pol i t ical 
parties ar^ pol i t ica l leiKim^s coiild survive teat almost one 
8 ^-iohert M, i:¥icet "A 'XheoretlciLl Approai^ t® Military Rule 
in N©w States", \torld Pcait^fS^, April 19T2. 
9 David W, Chang, "The Military and Natim Building in 
Kor^ , toa aad Paiastan% Mlm ^tgyw, vol. 9, 
no. 12, 1969» W* 827-30| and Ra^ond A. Mcore, a r . , 
pljit- P ^ i s t a n Array aM Nation BuHding", Mp.itary. R@vl^^. 
vol . 49, no, 6, 1969t p. 35» 
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decsie, in spite of their selfish a t t i tude , corruption and 
laefficiens^. Hiis coild bo seen In tha fact iha.t nearly a l i 
tlie c ivi l servrmts v/ho vmre crirrgod viith the task of creatiUig 
the new gover ment of F«dcistr^ belonged to tlie British 
Civil Service, Uot only that but for a quite long tliae the 
nev/ s ta te was rid,ed under tii© Indlsn Act of 1925. Kalis 
ilddlqui w i t e s in fee sarcastic majmer about ttie early 
days of Pakiatans 
Jlnnah himself hod no buUieprint for the 
new state , When he arrived in Karachi to 
become tho ^o^^nor General| h-e almitted 
he had not expected to see Pak l s t ^ l a his 
l i f e time* II Jlnnah had a plm. a t a l l , i t 
xms to re ta in and •develop* t.ho administrative 
struc-tora of the f ollsx ra;J« Ke envisaged 
the retention of a r l t i ah Officers in senior 
posts for a period of ten years. One of his 
f i r s t actr. as Govornor^-Gc^caral was to appoint 
B r i t i ^ Goveniors to three of the four pro-
vinces arid a British Officer Comaander-in-Chief 
to the Pdkistaw Army. I t was not Jirmah* s 
faul t 13iat indepondence caoe -rapped In the 
Govermient of India Act lOT. me Ad; hsd 
been drafted and passed If viestalnster 
Parliamont as a half v/ay house towards 
indeisidafice. I t gave »self-nil©' to the 
provinces but kept the po^©:s of the Viceroy 
and thG rrovincial goverrjors suppema, Ihose 
\3ho drafted 'iie Act in 1955 vKsuld have beai 
horrifiotl if they had realized ttiat their 
ha:idi\,'ork v/as to becorae the constitution of 
a sovereign s ta te . TJIQ Act, ev^i if i t can 
be claimed ti^t i t ^m.s desi ;ned specifically 
for India, was doslgncsd for a h t ^ l y 
centralizcxi bureaucracy run by a Victaroy 
from Belfii '^dth the Congress providing t^e 
Ministers, In 1935 v/hea tho Act reoelvefi 
the Hoyal assent, Jinnah was s t i l l a ' r e t i r ed 
EjigliDh g@titl®kan* 9 In Loadon md "ttie Musllia 
Lerigue laorllaurKi In India* Few had thm 
heard of Flahaat All* 3 •criliaerical* Pakistan, 
By no stretch of the laaa'tn-atlofi cciild the 
Act be said to be relsirant to any of the 
C'-?nstiwitlonal protJlsas facing iAie new 
otate. I t v/as a second himd garra^it liiat 
Jlnriali acquired In n Delii iiop and the 
t a i l o r ' s agait, Mountbatten, dolivered to 
him [JGisonaily In K jraciii on 14 August 19^« 10 
If Jinnah coul,d bo excused because ho did not l ive Icmg 
Lfiou{>^  to solvG t'le constiUitionol probleras of Paiilstan, 
tliG l e a d ^ s .rho followed csamot be excused as they kept the 
country under ttie t935 Act for almost ten years. Hi® lack 
of coiistitutlon.aL developa^its hijaperal the emorgonce of 
sticao tX)litical leadership viiich could count on the 
Constitution as i t s main source of streiigth* Uie cc^tinuation 
of the 1935 ict asde Paltist'onl leadei'o more and more 
deiendait on Uie txireaucracy i*tlch, taking adViintage of t^e 
si tuation, acciuirad vested in t^ea t s* Ihe underalning of 
pol i t ica l autiiorlty and tiie coj:TUi>tlon In the administration 
made -fche situation vKirse* In tiila s tate of affairs the 
only alternQtlvc to the politiciciiis was the arsiy vAilch 
according to Ayub Khan "inherited a great t radi t ion of 
loyalty, seiise of duty, patrtotlfiffi, and coapltte oubordlnatlon 
10 Kallm 3iddlgi l , 9 ^ U 9 | | ^FMn ^ ^BT to ga^lilg^t (tondoi, 1972), pp. 7«H75. 
10 
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to c iv i l authority." However, military could not solve the 
;)roblQra3 of ralcistan \md&r Ayub Khan vho took over in 1958 
iairou{|i a declaration of Martial Law nnd viio inade B&f&ral 
attoiipts to nolvo the constitutionail problems of ttie 
country but urifortunately failed to do so, Al#iou(^ his 
departure v/an v/itaossed with the sane r e l i e f i t vias greeted 
iiioii he €3itera2 into pol i t ics . By March 1969 people also 
f e l t a oeriae of defeat, A gcncaratlon hai passed since 
Poiiistan f i r s t cnerged as a nation, master of i t s OKR 
destiny, and Uic country was again wilSiout a C€aastitutl<m, 
I t s leaders had again failed. Law and ^jr^er had again 
broken down v.dtii ^est. recourse to troops upon tfct© 
otreets , 
Hhe increased populrar participation In the 
pol i t ica l system ini t iated by t^e Ayub regime finally led 
to i t s dovinfall as ihe mili tary, by i t s very nature, i s 
not geared up to sustain such situations, ©le fai lure of 
the regime to solve tSie basic problems of P^ ie tan 
increasingly alienated i t from t^ie masses among v4iich i t 
t r ied to create a base throu.^ tiie Basic Domoorac|r 
system. 
11 Hohamraad **yub ^on* j £ | ^ a @9t ^^ agtSTg (Oxford 
University t^ess, 1967)» 9* 39» 
12 l i ^ b ^ t Feldnian, I^Q-M ^ ^KW\W^ \ ^M§%m 
1969-1971 (London, 19757, P. 11. 
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The cmerg®i00 of Bssigljadeah as a froe nation aM 
tliG subscqueait r i se to power of Z,A, Bhutto gave r i s e to 
Gixiculation that military has ceasM to be determining factor 
in the affairs of Pakistan. However, 1iae dtsaocratic base 
01 iihutto proved to be not large and strong enou/^ to ensure 
f'jrthor develoimmt of m& pol i t ical system on the demo-
cra t ic natli. Ttiis limited t'ae capacity of the system, The 
capaci-^ of a syatsra i s directly relat<Ki to i t s outixit and 
to tliie cxtai t to wliich the pol i t ical aysitem can affect the 
r e s t of the oocioly ixrA eccnomy, •Capacitgr Is also closely 
asi^octated vdt^i to govermaent performance and tiie coMitiona 
13 
•.iiich affoct tlit? performance," A detailed dlficussion of 
Uie .)olitical system under Bhutto end i t s s^ortcoiaincs id.ll 
be discurised in the gsubaequent chap t^ . 
13 Ltacian i>f, iyef "^aie rlearJjiji of i-oli t ical Developuent", 
in Janson .^, Finicle and »«. Oatxlet ed*, n . 5 , p. 87. 
OiAPTm I I 
RISE AND FAIX CF AIBB 
General iliJiEumaad Ayub Khan rode to powejr on the 
viave of mass discontent at ttie aorry s ta te of affairs 
Uie young nation found i t se l f in dui^lng the l a t e f i f t i e s . 
The untimoly demise of uuaid-i-AzaTi Muharmiad Alt Jinnah, 
fatl;ier of the nation, on 11 September 1 9 ^ , and the 
assassination of Liaqat All Khan, Prime Minister, on 
16 October 1951 had creatcjd a leadership vacuum. The 
horde of second and t^ird rank leaders* v^o followed, x^m'e 
unsuitable to the great task of nation building* Ihe 
bick^ings comong thoaselves and the lus t for pov^ er led 
thensGlves to subjugate tiie national in teres ts to -ttielr 
se l f - in teres t . The rampant poli t ical corruption thus 
failed to create an atmoscAierG of discipline and order 
30 essential for the pol i t ical and economic devdLopniOTLt 
of the country. 
The situation drifted forttier in the ensuing years 
and i t appeared laiat Pakistan was heading towards a 
national catastrophe. The nascent economy v/as in to ta l 
choas: per capita income dropped, foreign exchange reserves 
depleted, industrial production slovjed to a crawl and food 
shortage became acute. By the summer of 1958, famine 
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spread as a res i i l t of hoarding, smuggling and blacitmarketing 
furtlier vred^ed whatever semblance ol c i v i l supply network 
was l e f t in the country. Even the minimal control slipped 
and ihe lav; and order s i tua t ion rapidly d e t ^ i o r a t e d . The 
Government watched he lp less ly . Hie na t iona l chaos even 
seeped dovm to tlie l e g i s l a t u r e . In Sept^fiber police had to 
be cal led in repeatedly to separate warring fact ions in 
L;:st Pakistcin Assembly and had to use tear gas a t one 
occasion to r e s to re order. On another frenzied occasion, 
•the spe^il^er v;as assaulted, the deputy speakeff* v/as k i l l e d , 
and the nat ional f lag v;a3 desecrated, Ihe towns in West 
Pakistan were rocked by ag i ta t ions and c i v i l disobedience. 
Dissident t r i b a l chiefs hoisted l i ieir f lag and declared 
t h e i r iMepemlence. 
The s i tua t ion cal led for d r a s t i c s teps and these 
were announced in the Pres ident ia l Proclamation signed by 
G o n i a l Isl^ander Mirza on 7 Octob^ 1958. The Const i tut ion 
was abrogated, cen t ra l and p-ovincial govemments were 
dismissed, ihe country was put imder Mart ia l Law and Ayub 
Khan, tho then Commander-in-Chief of the Array, was 
appointed Chief Martial Law Adrainistrator, The i*resident 
Iskarder Mirza h iase l f admitted in the proclamation: 
1 Karl ^on Vorys, PolJt^iq^ 0^^3,0]?^^^^ 44 Pal?;;>,a1fffl» P. 1^3-
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My appraisal of the internal si tuation had. 
led me to believe that a vast ma;3ority of 
the people no longer have any canftdenoe in 
the present system of the government and are 
getting more and more resentful of the manner 
in viilch they are exploited, IJieir resentment 
and bitterness are jus t i f iab le . The leaders 
have not been able to render them tfae service 
they deserve and have failed to prove "them-
selves v/ortiiy of confidence the masses had 
reposed in them* The Const!twtion ^tdti was 
broiight into being on 25rd Mardi 1956, afte:* 
so many turbulations, i s unworkable. I t i s 
ful l of d-ingerous compromises that Pakistan 
v/ill soon disintegrate internal ly. If the 
inh^ent malaise i s not ressoved. To rectify 
them, the country must be f i r s t taJta^i to 
sanity by a peaceful revoluticm* 2 
Ali±iou£^ I bandar Mirza tried to raaove isiiat he 
sav/ as the source of the laresent Rialaise, but i t i s ironical 
tha t he failed to hold himself morally responsilxle for the 
"dang©:*ous" situation, Hov/evor, his tui^ was not long in 
coming. On 27 October 1^6 he was asked to quit and 
Ayub Khan assumed the office of £^esident. In a press 
statement Ayub declared: "l^e to ta l administrative, 
economic, moral chaos in the country cannot be tolerated 
in these d;mgerous times, Paliistan certainly cannot 
afford this luxury. I t has too many internal problems to 
solve and exto'nal dangers to guard against," 
2 Mas^ Ahmad, Paiastai i A Study of i t s Constifaitional 
History (Lahore, 1978;, pp, £^7-^« 
3 Parraatma Sharan, Pol i t ioal Svatea in Pakii^l^^. p, 59. 
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I - liMiDlATE TASKS 
V'i-tti the tsdceover by Ayub Khan, Pfxklatan's hey 
day began. The well trained arraiy officers headed by Ayub 
Khaa came to pov^ er peacefully. The nevr regime soon 
succeeded in containing corruption and thus discredit 
poli t icians mo were sent into deserved obscurity. The 
c iv i l service became free from iiie influ^ice of self-
interested rainiaters, Hhe econoarf v/as saved and the 
refugees were settled d^.•th impressive speed. Hundreds of 
thousands of refugees were provided \fith reasonable houses 
in Karachi after the misQ:'able conditions in v*iidi t h ^ 
M^ere l iving ^id ttie shanty colonies on th© road from 
Karachi airport to the c i ty , \*iich used to give Prjkistan 
a deplorable look in the eyes of vis i t ing foreigners, were 
4 tacked av/ay. Ihere was a general sense of re l ie f . 
Ayub Kiian* s reign can be divided into t\fo periods. 
The f i r s t period began \'d1^ his coming to power in 1958 vrfien 
he used tiic rd.litory language to deal with the problons 
facing PaJcistL'H. ^ e Martial Lav/ prevailed during the 
period and i t gavo him a free hand to ruLo the country. 
All politicrd p:>rties v/ere ou t la^^ and many leaders 
including Mujib-ur-Rohman, Abdul Chaffar Khan, Maialana 
4 Kalim Sidcliqut, ^miUih ^ r i ^ ? W^J ^ ^ M '^^ i^ t^fWI (.London, 1972), pp, 74-75. 
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BhaJianl and G,M, S/ed were arrested* The seocaid phase 
began after tbe ea^omutlgatlcm of Ccsistltutlai In 1962* giving 
ihe country his o^m. poll t loal syst^i of baalo demoeraoy 
\*ilch in Ayub's \mrda waa "the moat suited to the genius of 
the people". The Hartlal Law was l i f ted &nd ttie ru le was 
relaxed. 
The liamedlate task facing the Oovernaient was to 
suppress the armed rebellion In Baluohlstan* llhe arssy moved 
successfully and established the goveriHB^it sathorlty on the 
firm footing. There was also a challenge frcm the East 
Pakistan Hlg^ Court Judges \iio refused to administer oath 
to the Governor. This was a disturbing development to the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator but he was wise not to ord«p 
the arres t of the judges v^ldi mi^^t have ortated more 
problems especially in the region. On the ocmtrary, he 
i s rued a law acccrding to which martial law i^ould be exempted 
from the ;5ur lad lotion of tiie 3u prone Court and Hlgi Courts. 
There w^e also many probloas. Food shor ta^ was 
overocme by f ooreign assi0tGgioe« especially Jl^ om the United 
s ta tes and Canada. :%maggling and blaokmarketing Mt&ce dealt 
witai firmly b / introducing various martial law regulations 
i^lch gave a free hand to the army officers to punish the 
antl->soolal e lem^ts . But* in spite of that tiie punishment 
was not very sev^e as the new regime was tx*yln6 to gain 
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popultori-ty and remavtt the M«aae ot f*ar from th« aelnds oi 
the people. I t migjit h&re be&a. expected tiiat the pol i t ica l 
developaezit prograsiffles Ini t iated under the mertial lam and 
guided ty a General would rely hecc^ily upon oo^olon, 
Indeed* was not esccXuded. I t was often threatened as a 
corrective measure and was even occasionally applied} 
nevertheless i t nefver was used on a massive seal** VSiat 
i s perhaps even more significant, t^ere was no apparent 
attempt to increase the existing rudimeoitary capacitor of 
coercion. Instead the effort was to promote a pol i t ical 
system that had the capacity to meet social 9ead economic 
changes concaitrating on the modernization of the govona-
mentol capacity to persuade. 
The General did not rule through military command 
but th rou^ c iv i l s«*vants and civi l ian deputies niio were 
appointed advisors to the Chief Martial Law Mmlnistrator 
and the Martial Law Administrators in provinces. 'Ehus by 
giving bureaucracy a major share in power their loyalty 
was i^ilisted. 
II - LAND REFORMS 
The land reforms introduced in 1999 showed the 
nev/ government's z«al to improve the l o t of the coaoon 
man. In Fimjab six per cent of the land o\m&tB held more 
than 20 per cent of the m t i r e cultivable area. The 
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situation was even i.'iorae in Sind» The reason that the land 
reforms had not been Introduced earlier^ was that poli-
t ic ians needed the support of the landlords and no 
poli t ician was hold ®aou^ to antagonise Hiem, Uader the 
land reforms, a ceiling <m buildings was inpoaod* Ho 
landlord was allowed to keep more than 500 acres oi i rr igated 
land and 1000 acres of unirrigated land togethtr with 150 
acres of orchards, ThQ r e s t v^re to be tak©i over by tiie 
governiaent. The government in turn sold the land to the 
landless people on reasonable prices and on instalment 
basis . Although the reform did not cur ta i l the power of 
•tho landed ariatocraqr, as they ^^ r^e ccmsid^red by some 
as not radical enough, ihese wffl:*e adequate for "ttie tiiae 
being. 
i n - DI^ERENCEa >;am ULMk 
President Ayub Khan differed with the Ulema in the 
interpretation of Islam and the v/ay they want^ to create 
an Islamic State, According to President Ayub Khan: 
A sharp Changs had been created betwe^i the 
s ta te and religion and a l l the controversies 
the temporal versus the spi r i tua l , th« secular 
v^ sus the religion reviewed. In laore 
precise terms the esg^it lal conflict was 
between "^e Ulema and educated classes. 
All that was material, temporal and secular 
v/as identified with the educated and a l l 
that was religious and spir i tual became 
the monopoly of the Ulaaa, !!he educated 
classes were regarded as those who had been 
led astray by Western t h o u ^ t and Influence, 
19 
"She Uleiaa yiio in Bomsi cases wsre veraed In 
Arabic and hsd ma^e special study of 
religious ma t t e s v ^ e regarded as l^e 
custodian of Islam, Amcmg thaoa ware ami^ 
who did not hesi ta te to convert the influence 
vtiich t&ey ex^clsed over iiie minds of the 
people into a poli t ical asset« Ihery had 
bu i l t up for themselves a strong poXltleal 
position opposed to that of tfee Western 
educated groups in society. 6 
There was a gaieral agrefflaent that the country 
should have a d^aocratic Constitution vihich should be made 
according to Islajaic principles but ihe probl«B was \ho 
v/ould define the Islamic principles, the Presidaat and his 
supporters had their ovffi ideas v^tich tiie Uleiaa could not 
accept and on the contrary they consid^ed tiiem against 
Islam. They hsA idielr own ideas whidti vmre in some cases 
very dogmatic and against the api r i t of Islam. Presideit 
Ayub Khan chose his owi v/ay and introduced many reforms and 
laws which were v/elcomed by scsae and opposed by others. 
Among tdftesi vt&ce the Mualta FamJ2y Law, the family planning 
and land reforms. 
lY - BASIC DEKOCRiW^iy 
The f i r s t measure of representative government in 
Pakistan was announced on 27 October 1959 in iAx% Basic 
6 M a^mmad Ayub Khan, yr^g^^g nq% % f f ^ S (New York, 
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Democracies Order and coincided with the f i r s t anniversary 
of Ayub* s take over as well as his elevaticm to t^e ra i^ of 
Field Mar^al* In Ayub*s viords ttie Basic Beaocr^eies systsm 
v/as devised to be the ^foundation-stone of a new pol i t ica l 
7 
systea" in Pakistan*' He was opposed to the ^ystea of 
parliamentary democracy as being unsuited to ttiB genius of 
PaleiStan* He \m3 not against the parliamaatary systea as 
such but he f e l t that the factors which led to i t s developraait 
in Britain and else^iitiere did not obtain in Pakistan as the 
country had a low level of l i teracy and ths^e was a lack of 
pol i t ica l sophistication ^iiich made i t easier for pol i t ica l 
part ies to excite, pwr'suade and ejcploit the masses for 
their ovsi ends, ^erefore t he thought that Pakistan needs 
a new system nnhic^ can ensure a measure of pol i t ical s tabi -
l i t y to the nation hitherto miasing complet«3y. He laade 
several statemoita to th is e f f ^ t and undertook extensive 
tours of West and East Pakistan to explain to the people and 
popularise the new so s^tem i^ich was associated with his 
8 
naiae# Even during foreign tours he gave stateaents 
regarding the new syatem* At Ankara, he saidi "Elections 
to Basic Democracies, ••wmjld give our people to work out 
for themselves the way of l i f e best suited to proaiote the i r 
7 HM'bfflrl Feldaan. Hgvolution la P^ ia t an (London. 196?), 
p. 111. 
8 Davaa (Karadii), t6 December 1959. 
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weal ." ' At Belgrade, he saldt "•••we believe we have found 
the answer to our problena th rou^ our eystcBi of Basic 
Democjracies." At Bonn he declaredi "Out- syttem of Basic 
Oaosocracy has l>een devlged to ensiare th i s participation 
( i . e . in iaa;^ or development at a l l levels of work end res* 
ponsibillty)."'*^ 
"She Basic Dwaocracies system constttutwi of various 
t i e r s or levels of representation. At the i n i t i a l level § 
the v*iole country was divided into units of l o < ^ self-
govei*nment on the basis of population. Each uni t contained a 
population of 10,000 to I5f000. In cases of urban areas 
these uni ts were called "to^iais" and in ru ra l areas these wer« 
called ^'unions'*. Is^ch uni t was to elect i t s representatives 
by adult franchise* An elected p^son represented about 
1500 people. Since pol i t ical parties were disbanded earli®* 
every person seeking election had "to coatest i t on 
Individual basis . The elected represeatativea would s i t on 
the union councils for five years and deal with certain 
civic aspects of local self-govemsent, '^e government 
retained the r ight to nominate members on the union council 
but their number would not exceed one-half of the to t a l 
number of elected m^bers* 
9 Ib id , , 18 November 1959. 
10 Ib id , , 13 January 1961» 
11 Ib id , , 17 January 1961, 
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The chatrraefi of these union ooimctls ^ e c t « l ty 
members vrould become represcai'feitive meal^rs of -ttie council 
at the next stage - ^ a n a or Tehsil Coimcil. to this 
Council could be nominated official and non-official mmb&ra 
vjhose number would not exceed tiie to ta l number of repre-
sentative maottbera from the Union Council, In addition, 
the sub-divisional officer or the c i rc le officer under 
\irfioae executive jurisdiction these coiMittees lay would be 
ex-officio memb^ of tiiis Cotmcil* No specific functicaia 
were allotted to the Thana or Tehsil Councila whose work 
was only to caisure a co-ordination of the Unlcai Councils in 
their respective areas. 
Similarly the pyramid of power r i s e s tfarou^ the 
Dis t r ic t Council to the Division Council, the largest 
administrative unit in tiie province. However, the h i ^ e r the 
level goes the power of a4rainistrative off icials increases 
12 
and the power of elected memb^s diminishes. In 'botti ihe 
Dis-ferict and i^ivision Councils only half of the members were 
chairmen of the union councils within the Qif t r ic t or the 
Division, The Distr ict Magistrate or the Division 
Commissioner war-e the ex-officio chairmen of the Dist r ic t or 
Division Council, Hie Dist r ic t Council was allotted tweaty-
e i ^ t compulsory duties re la t ing to hospi ta ls , education, 
roads, agriculture, etc, and seventy optional fiaictions. 
12 Herbert Feldman, n, 7$ P* 106, 
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Provision was also matie for two Provtactal Develop* 
merit Advisory Councils* comprising off icial and non-offlclal 
maab^s appointed by liie President on tSie advice of the 
Governors of the Province* These tv^ o categories were to 
be equal in number %i*iereas among the non-offIclal members 
a t l eas t one-third had to be chairmen of the Union Councils* 
These f^ovlnclal Councils with 48 members eadi were set up 
in May 1960 and were headed by tiie Governor* 
The elections to the IMlon Councils w^e held in 
February i960 and thus 80,000 perstaas were elected as Basic 
Democrats. On 23 January i960 ihese w<re asiced to express 
thei r confidence ly a secret bal lot in Ayub as President, 
The resul ts shov/ed that 75»084 Basic Democrats voted in 
favour and 2,829 against, Thare were 606 invalid votes and 
150 votes were not cast as the seats remained vg«ant. Thus 
Ayub Khan was declared as the f i r s t "elected" Rcesident of 
Pak i s t an , " He was given the oath of office Ijy the Chief 
Just ice of Pakistan, The election was however doubted by 
cQTtaiii sections. I t was ar^ ^ued ttiat tiie Basic Democrats 
oifed ttielr allegiance to Ayub and i t was not possible to 
vote against him otherwise -foey xvtiuld have cc«Tmttted pol i t ica l 
14 
suicide, *^  
13 Dawn. 16 Februsry I960, 
l4 Lawence Zirtng, The Avub Khar^  Era (Hew York, 1971), 
p, «, 
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? - 1HE CC»JSfITUTION OF 1962 
After his eleetlon Ayub Khan appointed a oamission 
of eleven membara \xndtip the ctiaireianship of C3iief Justice 
Mohd. Shahabuddin to help in framing a nev ComatitutiMJ for 
the naticm, !Ihe C<«uaission suTasdLtted i t s report on 7 May 
1961, and after a detailed study many changei were made 
and the final draft Constituti<»i was signed on 1 March 1962» 
The Constitution provided for p:*esidential system of 
government vihile the l¥esident and aiimbers of national and 
provincial assemblies were to be elected by Basic Deoocrata 
i^oae number was inoreas^ to i;^ yOOO. 
fhe Ccmstitution was hailed by newspapo's. Union 
Coiincilst Dis t r ic t Councils and other bodies t o the erfeent 
that the Presld^it himself exclaimed at a meetings "I seek 
•Taulia* (forgiveness) from Almigity God," Such praises are 
enou^ to upset one* s maatal equilibrium. *^  This did not 
mean that there was universal approval of the new 
Constitution. Many Intellectualfi kept s i lent especially 
in the East Wing, The editor of Pa^kiatan ObgM'va^ of 
East Paltistan was quoted as sayingi "If I cannot report 
unfavourable reaction, I shall not report anything," 
15 Pakistan Tia^a (Lahore), 28 March 1962, p . U 
16 Vorys, n, 1, p, 232, 
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Poli t ical parties xfeee aLlovred to fimctlon twt 
almost a l l polit icians and eminent leaders sueh as 
Hazimuddln, Suhra\^ardy, Maulana I^a£^ani» Miss tlinns^ and 
others cri t icized ihe Constitution of being undemocratlo 
as i t deprived the people of direct elections» fundamental 
10 
r ights and supremacy of legislatures* 
VX - FOREIGN POLICY 
On foreign relat ion forum, Ayul? Khan had achieved 
some success. Mien he came to pover in t938» Pakistan was 
considered pro-West as she was member of Western-pact l ike 
CH^ TO and SEATO, I t s relat ions vdth Soviet Union, China, 
and the Arab world w^e not cordial* I t was during Ayub 
Khan*s regi i^ that relat ions with a l l these osuntries 
improved, Ayub Khan wrote in his book F r l a ^ g ^ot Maatera 
-Uiat his objective "was to establish normal relaticms with 
•ttie four major pow^s involved in Asia without antagonising 
any one of thera*». His strategy was to "taideavour to set 
up b i la te ra l reuations with each one of them, with the 
clear understanding that the nat i re and completion of the 
equation should be such as to promote our mutual in teres ts 
adversely aif ecting the legitimate interests of "tiiird 
18 part ies" . In fact the early days of Ayub saw a much 
17 mshtaq A h n ^ a9Vfimfga^, ai^ P9;'Tl,1flff8 fa ^aKljIffl (Karachi, 1970), pp, 231-2. 
18 Muhammad Ayub Khan, n, 6j p, 118, 
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sixain in t ^ relaticm betwetssi Pakistan cm the one hand and 
Soviet Union and Cihlna on the other* 
Bie incident of U-2 aircraf t made the Soviet Union 
furious against Psfcistan and Khru^ohev told the Pakistani 
represeitat ive in an Emlmaaiy reception in MOSCNOV on 9 May 
196OJ "if you contimie to l e t the ^ericauas f3y frcaa your 
a i r bases into Russia, then we \ d l l not only i^oot down 
the U.S. planes but will have to aim our rackets a t your 
19 
bases as weH,** ^ Similarly, Ayub's proposal for a "joint 
defence alliance" between India and Pakistan tmAe China to 
protest against i t and forced China to know against whom 
20 the joint defence was intended* As India did not respond 
to the Piiitistani proposal favourably and with the deteriora* 
t ion of Indo-Chinese re la t ions , Pakistan re la t ion with 
China became friendly said cordial, especially after P&kistan 
forei^L mintater Manzur Qadir said in V/aa4iingtons "As a 
matter of principle, what just i f icat ion i s there not to 
recognize Communist China? I do not see how I t can be said 
that &x^ authority o"Qier than the Oovernment of Communist 
China i s the govemmait of the mainland** After U-2 
19 D M I , 11 May i960. 
^ g^e Times of I n d ^ (Bombay), 8 April 1963» 
21 Horning News (Karachi), 31 M^ i960. 
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incident Pakistan foun4 i t necessaiT to adopt more indep«Qdeit 
a t t i tude towards Soviet IMton to coanter the impression that 
America could do tt^at they want in Falliatan* So« in Jgmiary 
1961 the Minister of Pakistan fcr Fuelt ^omp and Natural 
Resources r i s i t ed Moscow to negotiate technical asaistajaee 
for his country and in March of the same year* the Pakistan-
USSR Oil Agreement was sigoed.^^ Two leading Br i t l^ i 
newsp^ers — I^e t i aa s sand Ihe Quydian — considered th i s 
development as a shift in Pakistan's foreign policy in the 
direoti<si of non-aligpafflit# ^^ fhe iBprovaoent of relat ion 
with Russia and Qiinat no dotibti disturbed America* ^to^m. 
Chinese ftreaier visited Pakista» on the invltatl<«i of Ayab 
Khan in Decemb^ 1963» an American off ic ia l said that * i t 
was unfortunate that leaders of Chinese Communist regime 
should be accorded en opportunity to pay a friendly v i s i t 
24 
to Pakistan. 
The at t i tude of Pakistan during tbe Suez c r i s i s 
was not friendly to the Arab world and Ayiib Kkan during 
his v i s i t to Cairo in November I960 tr ied to explain that 
a t t i tude W suggesting that i t was misunderstanding due to 
the clumsiness of Paklstm' s represen ta t ives .^ 
22 Herb^t Feeldmaa, R m l u | ^ m , l a ^ j f e k M J A §Mt Ul 
miilgl hm mM§;^M^9& Jl^ camoni 19&7J» p« 9* 
23 Pavfi. t5 Felxnaary 196% 
24 I b i d . , 13 December t963* 
25 Feeldman, n . 22, p. ^0«^ 
28 
Ayub Khan also tr ied to Improve ralattcoi with 
India but the Kashmir problem was an obstacle and created 
tatision between the two countries and led also to confrcsi* 
ta t ion in 1965 in the Rann of Kudi and in the same year 
to the war betvreen the two countries vliich lasted for two 
weeks. I t was said that Bhutto was the architect of 
Pakistanis foreign polity but i t was voiA&r the supreme 
authority of President Ayub that Bhutto could fraae such 
a foreign policy; i f Ayub would haire not been satisfied 
no body cxjuld have force htm to accept Btoaittx)*s proposal 
as he was supreae. The adiievemaits of Presidant Ayub 
Khan cmmot be denied in a l l f i e lds , especially in providing 
pol i t ica l s tabi l i ty and economic prosperity during iiie 
decade he ruled the ooun-tary. 
VII - IHE mESXDINtiAL Sm;TlDH 
The introduction of the new Constitution, which 
streagthened the position of the President, m&lQ Ayub Khan 
feel secure artd he allowed some fr«edc»B to the opposition 
and the Press* 'ihis was ut i l ized by some ;}ourxialiats v^o 
were disgusted with the res t r ic t ions said res t ra in t s imposed 
by the Press and publication of Ordinance and the constant 
interference of tiie govemaient in the perfonaance of their 
duties - their sympathies w^e naturally on the side of 
the forces fighting for pol i t ical freedom and economic 
29 
;3ustlce»^ Sardar Bahadur Khan, the brother of Ayub Khan, 
wan the leader of the oppOBltlon, His attacks on the regime 
w®re outspoken and t t became clear that "Basic Deoooracy 
provided no channel of cosBaunication bel^ean 14ie rulers 
and the ruled" . ^ This encouraged the students, teachers 
and workers to resort to s t r ikes , prooessicais and slogan-
shouting against the government* In fact , the students 
had agitated even far ends imrelated to acad^iio matters. 
The poli t icians were asking for nothing more than txhat liie 
students were demanding in their pamphlets and resolutions. 
Deprived of -toe opportunity of direct participation due to 
the indirect method of elections, they cempaigned against 
the Constitution, The Universit^r Ordinance infringing the 
autcaioay of liie imivarsities and providing penalties for 
unacadeniic ac t iv i t ies of the unions, forfeiting 
the degrees as punishment for the breach of arbitrary 
regulations and the h i ^ cost of education had produced 
v/idespread disaffectiarx throughout the country. This 
was the beginning of the tr'ouble for ^yah Khan* Then cam 
the 1965 presidential elections \>liich Ayub thougi a mere 
formality on account of the dlffOPfflices betw9«i the 
opposition parties and their la<^ of strong leadership. 
26 Mu^taq Ahmad, n, 17, p» 308, 
27 Kalim "^Iddiqui, 9^Mil9^t Omi-M m M M ^fl^ISM (London, 1972), p . 11B, 
28 Mushtaq Aiimad, n . 17, p. 118. 
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But actually the matter did not tuna up l ike that and the 
elections proved to be disastrous for Ayub Khan» although 
in an indirect v/ay. The apposition parties galSiered together 
and formed a combined opposition party (COP) and ciiose Miss 
Fatima Jinnah, the s is ter of Quaid-e-Azaa, to lead theffl. 
She en;}oyed wide popularity among masses in both wings of 
the country. She toured the country and gathered hug crowd 
around her, Kalim Siddiqui \<rot0j 
Miss Jinnah* s campaign dasioli^ed a l l b ^ c r i ^ s 
against freedom of speech that the regime had 
so carefully erected* Almost eva:'yone the 
au-Kior talked to in Pakistan, indluding acaae 
of the leading supporter's of Ayub, agreed liiat 
Hiss Jinnah* s campaign had effectively turned 
the masses against t^e FresidMit* They a l l 
agreed that had i t beai a direct election by 
popular vote, Miss Jinnah \40uld have vcsi by a 
wide margin, Avub had vron as he vms bound to , 
but Miss Jinnah* s campaign had effectively 
ki l led the regiiae aid doomed t l ^ Basic 
Democrats with the people expecting victory 
for Miss Jinnah, the vo-te for Ayub showed 
clearly that -tiie Basic Domocrats were a 
device not for the expression of the wi l l 
of the people but for the negation of "feat 
v/iH. 29 
VIII - AFfERMATH OF 19® WAR 
Then came the war of 1965 with India, the r e su l t 
of which was 'no defeat and no victoiry* to either s ide . 
The Ayub Khan regime, however, declared i t s victory for 
29 Kallm Siddiqui, n, 27, p. 119. 
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Pakistan and there was a l o t o£ propaganda to that effect. 
So, to the people vatio considered ttiemselvai vlotorlouSf 
the Tashkent Declaration was a humiliation to Pakistan, I t 
\yas denounced by opposition leaders* stud«its aad the 
masses as a v ^ l e . "throughout 1965 and 196? the rumblings 
of revolt could be heard from a l l parts of the country^i'^ 
Olff&*ences between Ayub Khan and h is Foreign 
Minister Z.A. Bhutto had started from 7aahk«it when 
Bhutto opposed the ^Tashkent Declaration" considering i t 
a concession to India given ty % i t under Huasian pressure. 
While Ayub was putting the blame on Bhutto for giving hSm 
a wrong advice about the war as and when he was questioned 
on his crucial decision he assured! "Please do not rule 
in nor weakest and fa ta l point* ** He admitted t$i&t he vas 
greatly misled by his Foreign Minister Bhutto and Foreiga 
31 Secretary Aziz Ahmad* Actually the differences betweei 
the two developed and l e t ultimately to the escit of 
Bhutto from the Ayub cabinet in 1966« And Bhutto soon 
started agitation against President Ayub, Bhutto was 
poc^ar a^ong students and workers and his exit i^om the 
cabinet enhanced his popularity* 
30 Ib id . , p. 121. 
^^  ^?ii?N^^*^!S7» ^ f ^8l? ^ava 9i F^i§%m (x^ndon, 
1974), p. 106. 
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X - DO MFAU, OF ATOB 
The strike ty atudtrnts tn October 1968 led to the 
closure of schools, colleges and -ftie Karachi Universilgr* 
This could not coatadn the steademt unrest and i t spread to 
diff^i'ent parts of the coimtry and on 10 Hovaober at 
Peshawar,astudent* Mashia Umar i ^ i fired two shots %Aiich 
missed iYeside^it Ayub Khssi yino was addressing a pt:^lic 
"52 
meeting,^ hatear Bhutto and Wall Khan mipe arrested with 
some of their supporters under the Defence of Pakistan 
iiules. Some otiier politicians were arrested on tho same 
grounds including llohudulha^ Usmanl* l^i j acrt^on against the 
politicians led to more violence, especially asiong the 
students. "From Ko¥Affl:'a at one ®ad and to Karaohi at the 
other eid tlien to Dacca and (mward to Chtttagcmg* the 
agitation was spre^ing £rom one citgr to ssnoihm' lilie wild 
f i r e , which the govemoffiit found imable to esddjxgulflb and 
control either by persuasion or coercion, \ihat \mB ini t ial ly 
a stud®at ^r^blsa developed into political crisis.*** 
A nm^ element m.8 intro&iced into the iiltaatiim by 
the appearance of Asghar Khan in l%st Pakistan mtd Maulana 
3haaliani in East Pakistan, Bctei of them en^^yed good 
popularity mid clean reputation. %e former had been Chief 
32 Kalis Siddicui, a. 27, p« 121w 
33 Mushtaq /iiia^, n. 17, p. 311» 
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of the Air Force and knotn for his etiioims^ mid orgmizlng 
activities* The latt@r was a peas»it 3.e«d«f of Eagt Pakistan 
aod iiaci large toXlomita^ As#iar Khm @ot larg® r#a|K»ise a l l 
ov@r the country, espeolall^ from tb^ l a s e r s i i ^ offared 
his platform and tlio intallig^at and law respeetlng 
audience,*^ TtiQ nevs^ip^s OQuM not h& mig^eta&eA m& 
tlie ;5oumallst3 started an agitation for ramoval of restr le* 
tlona and resorted to strike in def€»oe of tii^jF rights* 
Haeera Shahidt a journalist freaa Eavalpindlt had Xmea ttoot 
and seriously wounded by one of Ayub* s par% gan^st^s, 
Sher Bahaaiur, \ixo had objected 1x> the journalist reporting 
on the activities of the five hundred thugs^ coomatideii the 
firing on studoit denKinstrators scid ^rkers on strikea* Ttie 
police had not even attempted to charge Sher Bah«d^ m 
they impc in a dilesiaa for he cc»ild easily hsfe heen acting 
on the advice of thB ^ i i t r i c t Magistrate of Rawalpindi vAio 
had encouraged the bcnirgeoisie to prepare Itself f<2* self-
defence* In protest^ the entire joumaliat fraternity 
\/ent on a naticmal strike, and even those in the govems^it 
controlled newspapers reiuctmtJy supported the strike, 
and the govemiaent was powirless to prevent t lwa«" ^ e 
strike wave spread to the industrial sector. Him workers 
vjore demanding hi^ta* -wages m& pErtielpatioa in the 
34 Ib id , , p. 512, 
1970J, p. W* 
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managffiaentf "not only Industrial Isdtoar hit also ^ I t e 
collar wQi^ ers, teaoh^Sy dootors, nuraast oaglnearSi had 
stru^ \fox^^ Ihe railwaysf post asid 1^egra{^8» azjd 
public aeotor projaets were ttir#at«ied iQr a eassatttm of 
i^ rk**.^ ^ Opposition parties joined hand fload forsot thsir 
differ ericas in a mcfve to bring hyah Kiian doioi* ISiogr ^io^ 
never w@ll organl2^ ffiid had no dalra to sima^e 
f ollo\dng, Tliq/ wire aore moctmBatal in ^ast Pakistan 
than in the West Wing where agitations were alaost confined 
to the cities and siaall towis \lilch w@re centres of students 
and lahour unrest n^ile i t was iddespread la the rureOL 
areas in l&e Bast, MushtiQ Ahmad desoribed tiie 3ituati<»i 
in th0 follo'wing -ifordai 
In i^ ie upsurge ttieir p^sonaHties mattored 
l i t t l e and programmes s t i l l less. Ihe deoions-
trationg and proceasiois K*iioh l i t ^ a l l y fill®! 
the streets v/ith a sea of husianitsr wert not a 
measure of their individual or even coUeotive 
popularity. Air Hershal Asghar iChan and General 
Azam Khan ^ Aio attracted the biggest oroiida 
\!&ce no partyg^n wd yet the feriB r^ had acquired 
a big €nou^ stature to be invited by the 
Pakistan Dinocratlc lavement f^ eonsultatiai 
in i ts Dacca sieeting 'where the decision to 
boycott Va» elections vm taken. In West 
Pakistan only the cit ies sneezed. In East 
Pakistan ^ere Dacca meezed -Itie wtiole province 
had a cold. 37 
Ayub Khan found himself in a diff ioult position 
and he rmLlzed that the wave Mma against hia. So, ^ 
36 Mushtaq Ahiaad, n. 171 P* 3t2. 
37 Ibid., p. 313« 
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shoi«ed his readiness to talk to op^sltJUm leaiirs* Sils 
cane in an article In ttte Pakistan Tin^^ of Lahore on 
29 January 1969 but he llraited his ottm' to rosponsilale 
oppositlcai leaders**^ thereljy excluding Bhutto ^lo 
airest, and t^^ih liio was on trial on charges o£ hairing 
conspired vlth India to secure tine secession of East 
Pakistan, ^ t a£t^ some tlaes hyvb in\rited al l opposition 
leaders to meet him in Kawalpindi on 17 Februe^ 1969* The 
opposition leaderst who had foraed the "Deaooratd.6 Actlcm 
Coimittee", accepted i^b*8 invitation* the Hooid Stable 
Conference could not ^ t heoause i o ^ of the opposlticm 
leaders dedizied to attend as at that stage an^ r political 
lead^ ^im even considered talking to A^/vb was politically 
dead and tiie leaders of QAC k&»w this \iiell* Paultma 
admitted that **% the &3& of Januotr ^e began to receive 
reports that Ayub was prepared to talk. We thought i t was 
too dangerous to talk to him and we r^mffed him tar two 
reasons* We otistrusted hisi and we knew i t would f In i^ 
U3.»^ 
Muoib and %utto had beioi released and the A^rtala 
case WES withdraMi* ^ub Khan also declar<^ that he would 
not contest for the coaing election and had siade i t Kilmi^ 
that he was ready to accept direct elections. But these 
33 Pa^|,g^ Ttea (Lafewra), 29 January 1969# 
39 Tariq All, m 35f P* 195. 
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concessions did not help} ai a matt^ of fast thflgr Increased 
the Intransigence of -^e cppoaltltm leaders* theif fe l t 
Ayub Khan WQB losing ground and above all» was himself 
Insecure of his posltl<»i» ^By the middle of Haroh tsore 
thm one million FaklstenlSf inc i t ing Indus'te'ial lalxnir^St 
technlcianst doctorst tele@r^h and tele^oxie englneerst 
teachers and postmeait were (m strike for bettor iforklng 
40 
coi»litiona** 
The Round Table Conference siet and \ma attasded 
by a l l opposition leaders* %utto and Bhashanl %ho believed 
that -t^e negotiations In the C a^Kterenoe were cplte 
irrelevant to the loaod of t^e people and t^o fe l t "iiat 
l^e Confermoe \^ ould md in. failure» and this ma actually 
v^at happened aa ^alidi Hujlb-ul«Hehiaan sressid his six 
point prografisae ^ i ch was opposed bf the West Paklstmi 
political leaders* Th&^Q was dlsagreen^nt also on other 
demands especially that of returning progressive papers 
limited to i t s carigliial owiers \iihlch Ayijb refused to do so 
as this \«juld mean i^ ie return of the progressive papers 
to the leftists* this was a aastrar tcats^ by Ayub to 
divide -ttie BAC into left and r l^ t* ' ' 
1!he situation was getting worse day by dsy and 
Ayub made his last effects to restore law and order* He 
^ "^^9 '^fmn Condon) t 6 Man±i 1969* 
4i ffeiahtat Mimad, n*l7f p* 129* 
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appolfltod Dr M.N. HVAA and tosuf Haroon Ooveraora ot East 
and West Fs^lstan r@apeetive3^. Aittiot^ ihe xmm 
GoTemors v^ ore popular aad* in ari ordinary 8ltaati<m» would 
have hmn acoeptiJ3ls to ttm people» unfortonatd^i' th«^ 
c(HJild not fUXfll th«lr missions as the maaaes liore not 
prepared to aooept anything short of tha exit of Ayu1» 
Khan. 
On the fi^rvnlng of 25 March 1969» %uto Kh«i 
addressed the nation in a IroaiiSoast in %hiQh he deolsred 
that i t wuld he his last aiSilress as ttm Preaidast of 
Ps^istan. He alao amid that the altuaticai in th* eountry 
hM detoriorated to the point \iiere aelf-aggrahdlseQent ia 
the order of the day. %e mobs sre resetting to gh^raoa 
at will and get their d&amada ^^oepted uad«r duress and 
no one has the coixrage to proclaim 1 ^ trutSv. Ihire is 
no one vAio can ohall^ige t^is firensor* the eeonoffly of the 
country has \>em, crippled» factories are closing doMi 
axid production is d^dndling every day. He addadt "The 
security of the country demands that no iapodlsKnt he 
placed in the way of defence forces. In view of "MiiSp 
X have decided to relinqul^ "texi^  ttiQ office of i^esidait." 
He expressed gratitude to the country and to a l l i ^ hwA 
served the nation during his period of office* Xn a letter 
to General Yahya KhaUt he saidit "I tm left idth no option 
tsut *»> step aside and leafve i t to the DeCezice Forces of 
X 
Pakistan which toda^ represent the only effectiim and legal 
instrueomt to tske over £ull control of the affairs of 
this oountry. Accordingly t f^artial Law «as declared at 
7.15 P«si« the 3m:i0 ev^ing and for the second tiiae since 
independence the people of FaWLstan witnessed in sfvery city 
of their country troops in battle order, patrolling the 
slTeets as sole responsibility of tiieir duty to aiaintain law 
and order in 14ie mich troubled Republic of Paklstm*^ 
X • COKCLUSION 
Ho doubt Ayub had certain qualities ^tiXsh, were 
eiihanced by propagandat tSirough government ocaitrolled radio 
and newspapers, to mention some of his qualities Feldman 
irote abcwt himi 
St i l l t viiatev^ his limitations» Ayub Khan 
t#as l3y no means without ability. He had a 
f lair for political manocajver and the force 
of his perscmality v/as dea r , as also his 
gift of leadffl:»^iip. He could run people to 
his side and did so* His ultimate fa l l 
cannot be attributed so such to his liiai^ 
taticm as to an inherent weakness in his 
character and this brings us to the darker 
aide of his csreer to which his doiafaH must 
be traced, Pow^, sucoess and flattery 
spoiled him. Taken together, t h ^ form a 
heady nectar and Ayub Khan drank deep of 
it» Looting ov^ eveants as tfatiy took shape 
and traced t*teir courset particularly in the 
l a t t ^ years of his adBtnistration, One may 
well ask, if i t ims possible he knew nothing 
of t^e cc»iduct of those people, sone 
42 J&thaiaaad Ayub Khan, n, 6, p, 27t« 
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oormeotei closely by family tlosf itiOf im^cr 
his protection^ defied the law and lIzMd Urnir 
podiets ¥11^ l&aatlablQ ^r^d? Xs I t possible» 
he knm^ nottiliis o£ tiio rising t ide ot 
corruption In &wery branch of the public 
service 0n& at enf&py le^^vl? Is i t possible 
he was Ignorant of ttie large growing seiose 
of despau* aisaong the ed^ated classes p 
helplessly wltziessing l^t methodical wippresslcm 
of a l l l i tera te thou^t? I s i t possible he 
did not know tliat the political instltu'^.ond 
he had devised and in v^ hida. he toc^ se such 
pride iiad deg^aarated into instnsoents of 
oppression and imla^ful gain the hands of 
his party bosses md their henohiaffii? Is i t 
possible he had become so dlstosit f2*09s the 
people that he b<Alev^ a policy of 
repE'esslon could prevail so long as he 
cored to pursue I t . tliat the tuneless latislc 
discoursed l]y his inept political ^E*^estra 
full wi1Si ever growing sweetness an ttie 
public ear and the upsurge vlilch folloiied 
the events of l^ ovts&ber 9f 19631 couM tm 
sismnirUy put do«ai liy a b i t of heavy handed 
police v/ork? 4? 
One of the major causes of the doviifall of Ayub 
i s no doubt the corruption by his family especially his 
son Gohar Ayub and the onus was placed on Ayub for al l 
their doings* Ck^ tar Ayubf v/ho reslgpcd as Captain in the 
ars^ ai'ter Ayub* s takeov^S't became a alllionalre oveml^t 
by escerclsing his lnflua:xee in getting the llomses and 
other necessary faci l i t ies from the governiaeat, Gohar 
had already earned his notoriety In the Karachi Incident 
Immediately after the election of Ayub in August 1964 
43 H g ^ t Feldaan, mmOrMsM jnsiu I fi^lgtaai 
ig62>69 (London* 1972h PP. 2g5^t 
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agaiz^t Hiss Jixmalu l^ araged at the shov of oppoaitiosi 
against his father, Oohar I@d a heeaSt of m&ce&ciagpim Into 
tliose sreas of Karaieiil ililcli vot«3d against Ayul}« "Houses 
w^e Ixsmtt glrla were rap«d azxl Gohar Ayuib and hla 
gangsters opened fire on tmarmed peopley klXXing mmn ssoA 
wounding nimy otiiers. Neither the police ner Hie bireaaieraoy 
44 
felt i t th^r duty to lntervme«" Aii^ ougft tfet ijieldent 
was oensored In the press but the »ord got arouz»i the 
\^ole oouaatry* 
By the c l o ^ oi 19^ 6 the corruption be<%sae &a 
ran pant that L ,^^  ioasazlne istrote In Its January isauei 
««»it had been knomc in certain eiristlee 
that fi^v&i* a f aisily and hie cabinet had b«en 
fettlng rich with -^le .^^ oid of govimsi^xt oans ai^ lidensea* How his sofv&rrmmA i s 
unabashedly accused of ooxT t^iQ»*«»»Ck)har 
Ayub» the £*rftaident*s sisoe^ iBsistafi^ ioed 
soit has beoone a millionaire* f i ^ the 
help of ^vemaent financing, ^har led a 
syndicate vhidtk bo\^t cut Qmyepal Hot^ 
shares of an assft&tuy pHaht In Karai^ ii* 
He has Since intended his holdings mA was 
recent3y p'an'ted eKClusif« rights f^ the 
dlstributiofi of lisyota cars in Pai^ istaii* ^ 
1!hls Vim a cosi&on publl^ ^ knowledge in Pakistan* 
2vaa according to dis^osures oade ^ Sr Habbubal Uaq« the 
chief economist of the Planning Coamissiont the Ayub family 
44 Taria Ali, n« 35, P» t29, 
45 Quoted in ^teii g;C M k (^ ew Delhi), 29 Jaii«ary l967t 
P. 7» 
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was among Va,Q ^Incky tymaisy^ Xamllles vttiieh caatroO^ed tlifi 
66 per cimt of iiadus'^lal QapltaO. In BsOcisti^ t^e ^ p«r 
cent of the country* a banking md th« 97 p«r eeBOt of the 
46 
ln0ur^i<^» Acc^srtling to an tSK^fficlal estimate the 
A^^ b family ^^ as ^^rili 350 million rupees besides mm.^ in 
47 
foreign baok accounts, * 
fhe British j^oumal Pri-y^te ly^ gave m detailed 
account of the corrupticm in i t s 29 Sept^sber 196? issue* 
The cyclostyled copies of the a r t i ^ e v;ere oireulated 
c l andes t ine m<mg young Pakistanis* Ihe sr t lc le h i ^ i ^ t e d 
the f ollowii^ points^ 
(1} Ayub* a eldest iKsnt Qohar i^iib i s a aamber of s^rliament 
and has taken over three Isrge industries from 
businessien opposed to the reglae* 
(2) Ayub's second mi& thickest mai$ 3h^^at Ayuibf i s a 
director of tiitrty-tv© fliTas, 
{3) Ayub»s youngest sent Tg^ir Ayubf i s reputedjy trying 
to buy crockford's via a Pakistani businessaaii called 
Fancyt i^ oase "things @o ^ong back boae", 
(4) Ayub has bou^t a farm in Sardinia Zar "better 
da^a"# 
46 Tai'iq m, n. ^ , p, 152. 
47 As quoted in hiak (New Delhi), 19 May 1968» p, 35* 
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(5) Ayub has a Icrge bank balanee in Gezievmt acquirtd via 
a Jewii^ arnts ddaXcr %jho s^ la arras to t ^ Faklstail 
goTsmment at dU>uble his umial rate ajid pits tim 
balance into Ayub* a account. 
(6) Ayub* 3 d a u ^ t ^ t Naslni* ^ o married Into the Swat 
royal family guarantees "ttiat her husbai^ esa& his 
cous:lns c ^ grow ophm in Sveat atate and suKiggle I t 
Into Afgbanistan» 
In tlie absence of a free tress \sMch oouM verify 
facts > sudi reports got ciarency tijrougti the word of 
moutii. I t created a gemral sense of d^peratlon aiaong the 
people that the rarapant otaruptlon eating at the very 
fabric of national l i fe eismiates f^ om ttit top and Ihsre 
could be no hope of putting the things r l g i t as long as 
the present regime continues* This coupled v/ltli othar 
politiciil f e t o r s deiaolis^ed the pift>lic confidence and 
the goodwill the regiiae m^oyoA and -v i^ch was witnessed 
in the f i r s t few days of the takeover by Ayub« Iftien 
Gohar Ayub \fas appointed chainaiin of the co^jrjinatiiig 
council of the ruling Hualiii X>easuie rumoiirs wore ripe 
that he was being Roomed as successor to Ayub* I t led 
to such ov^ rifjhelmjjfig puiblic resentcumt ikmX Gohar had to 
4 Q 
be finally removed from tiiat pogt« ^  
48 As quoted in Tariq All, n. 35» PP» 151-2, 
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Ayul>* s systtfot of Basic XJomocraey also proved to 
hQ controversial* Xt drew him Iiiui:^ls abroad Dut mm 
star<mgly criticised yy political leaders a t hoae* F^aous 
hlatorian Arnold foynbee wrote In i t s favotiri "I t does 
suggest a possible ve^ in \^idi politically and e^momlcally 
backward coimtacies can aarrive at aelf-govanfimait on our 
western lines* So I should asy that the Pakistan 
expai'infeent In so-called Basic iJesoera^ deserves our 
sympathy and supix>rt eflad certainly deserves our atten-
tion.*^ I t was, howev^t assailed by opposition at hoiae. 
Z«ii. Bhutto saidi '^Pakistan has burr led demoeraic^ by 
introduciiig the so-called Basic B«aoorsecy in i t s place," 
aheikh t'iu;}ibur Eshisan said that '*0aslc Jimtocr^s^ i s a 
nomenclature known not only to the political ttiinkera aM 
philosoph^s but to the iM>st ®;itocratic rulers ." 
Whatever ttie theoretical marita or dsMrlta 
the systea had, ^ s n put to prac^ce, failed to satisJ^ 
the people and earned t^eir mistrust* She ref<B*®idim 
of I960 md HKa^ eover the 1965 election clearly showed that 
smaller -foe isimber of electorate the easier i t i s to 
manipulate it* !lhe defeat of Hiss Jinn^^ surprised the 
people and perhaps sealed the fate of the Basic D^aocrat^ 
systoi. 
50 Arnold J« Tcynbee, "ComsmmlsBi ss^ the West in 
Asian Countries" l ^ ';, .,%f m^^M ^ ^ J g g a f l B f 
Jf^f^M^' 
OIAPTER I I I 
SECES3ICU OF EAST PAKlSfJ^ 
The general situation in Pakistan during tb.e f i r s t 
quarter of 1969 was aiiailar to tUat of th.« third quarter of 
1958 viiei General Mohammad Ayub Khan declared the f i r s t 
Martial Law in Hhe history of Pakistan, I t i s said that I t 
v;as worse because -
when Ayub had taken over in 1958, the 
Parliamentary systoa was discredited» when 
Yahya stepped in , the Presidential system 
had been throwa overboird, 1!he country was 
vir tual ly in a s ta te of anarchy without 
leadership of national stature and national 
organization to f i l l the void. Any man in 
hia place would have been over^^elaed l y the 
stupmidouaiess of the task l^at stared hisn in 
the face. Yet he faced i t with cool detarmi-
nation and sagiuQity of a statesman r a t i ^ r thssn 
with the fighting sp i r i t of a soldier , 1 
Gcsneral Yahya Khan asauined the office of President 
on 31 March 1969 with the explanation that i t was necessary 
to assume the office of head of s ta te unt i l a l iw constitu-
t ion was framed. A Council of Admlnls-tration was formed 
under his diairmani^ip and he Issued an cdrdar that l&e 
country would be governed as nearly as possible by the 
^ ( K ^ ^ i ^ ^ 9 ? D ) ^ ^ ^ P f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^9l.imffg I n ^fij^^ato 
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Constitatlon of 1962 wltti i^e suspaasioii of sosie artleles 
l ike that dealing with ftsidac^ntal r l ^ t s * Th« ftresldent 
also ordered mi iwreatigaticfn of tlie basic d@2K>cra«gr system 
to examine the omxa^s of i%il}li& r^sciiteent a^ilnjit i t and 
on K) April 1969 he gate a« aasuriaicse that elections to a 
ccffistl'teient &&smMy wcwld be held an the basis of diraet 
audit fran<^i3e* He also had taiUts with the ptr*^ laad^s 
on oa!}stitutlafiaL &n& politieaL problciis and proposals ware 
C t^ fcapwird for refop®« ot <jlvil a^rvicdf the poliee» 
labour oonditlon and edueatleau In a natlon-idiie broadcast 
on 28 Koveab<3r 1969 i?residsnt Yal^a Birni annotsiaed f su>-
readiing constitutional dgvolopments* Outlining the legal 
iraaework for restoration of a federal parllaamtary 
ayetefflf taie holding of general eloetlons (m 5 Oetc^®» 1970, 
on the basis of "one man one vote«i the constitutico making 
task of the nm^l^ elected national asseablyt .iiioh \f0uM 
hav© to b© completed ^ t h i a 120 d ^ S | failing' «hlch the 
a0£?embl,y i^ o^uld bo di solved and a new national asserabl^ 
elected9 the cc i^sii^ ticai^ nt of ma^ lsum mitonoi!^ <m i3ti0 
provinces conaigtent ^ t h the aalntmanee of a atrong 
federation; the aiding of (me vmit system for West 
Pskistssn asid the r«8tc^atlon of i t s separate provinces, 
and permission f cr the resuaptlcm of tsssrestricted 
political activities as froa 1 January 1970»*^  
2 Keesiag» s Researdi Report 9$ Pfllii|f!tei firfflil 
i*i«TT;ycM' 
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the deelgratl<m ©f Martial hm W Tahya Kfean ease 
in the rigit UM@ m the eomtry wa® in coa^e-^ meaptib^m 
lim^t&%ei^ law and c r ^ r wir«i restcsrsdt paOidola oollLeges 
and imtvortitles were opmedf fastorles stsrt@d production 
again and normal l i fe In the c<:xafitry wai r«stor«d 
af t ^ tm taonltiis of dlsturbcaices* Ihet^^ Ayub Khan 
freely iiwited Yahya Shan to take the ^b cr he mm forced 
to do so is n^^ QD^ ffu But i t i s believed that A|ab %hm 
ahose cme of his soldiers to re^aee hiia '^ma, he decided 
to step doMi 0V(m id.thout liie knovaedge ot "yMt soldier 
\^o Reita^r in hla speeches nor in his actions ahowad that 
he VK13 iiit®restad in power for hiaaelf* All he did i^^ 
his siting ae a©mt of ^ut to» Ihls can be 3e«i froia fee 
fact ^ a t he refused to accept the result of "Qse electlOTi 
which he conducted and i^ich i.i eoiisMerejl the laoet dean 
and fair election in the history of Pakistan. He did so, 
vti&a he sa\; that i t \ma clear "tSiat i^i^ib wmild be the 
3 leader of bo-tti v/in^ of Faliistai:^ a i t a l l the blase should 
not be put on Yal^ ra Khan because he postponed Hm meetins 
of Ivational Assembly eev^al tisaee because i t mm ^ e ^ 
that Mu;Jib was in absolute saa^i^ily ia the l^ational Aseeably 
and this ^ulci h ^ e enabled him to fraiae '^e eonuititution 
3 Al^iil^ (iCuMidti Hewap@|>er)i no* 2^7$ 29 AprU 19S0* 
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according to his slae-poiat wo^mmmm this wjvOd hav* 
meant ihe virtual separation of Mat Wing frcia th« 
West, 
Yatiya Khsn waa different from Ayub Khaa liaea^use 
\^ l le the l a t t ^ raade i t irmy clear i^id (m imny oeeasions 
that he was not lnta:*6sted to rasaia in pomr eM that 
hi 3 Biain aim was to restore Im and (^^^m- BM traaafer 
ommt to the elected reprtsentatives of itm people, ^ub 
Khan made i t d ^ i r that h« w^ plorming to reoaia la 
po^er. He Introducod his owi Coristltutloa to ooaur® his 
plan« Tahya was not interested in framing a ocsisUtution 
but he wanted the refpr&amtativess of HIB people to do ao* 
He declared that his iiaiaediate taa^ wm "7o put the 
aimlniatration \>&sk fm the ra l la ." Ke added in his f i r s t 
broadcactt to the nations 
I \/iah to m^e i t cleir to ymx that X 
havo no sis^tioa o th^ than the oreatlca 
of €^Miti.<m c<»iducive to His esta^iahaeat 
of a ccmstltutlonal governnieat* I t i s laf 
f ira bolief that a eoisi^t <^eaa and t«mem% 
aBEliainistration is a p'e-'recBilslte for smm 
and constn^tlTe i^liti.oal l i fe and tap th t 
smooth transfm* of poi«sr to Ihe Tepresoatati^es 
of l^e people elected fraaly and iapfflrtlally 
on the basis of adult trmmimm I t «Hi be 
the task of these elected represmtatives to 
give -yie oouBitry a vfCSTlcahle coas^tutlii i SDA 
final solution to a l l otHer poli^caXf 
economic and social p^d^ess that hat* ^eem 
agitating the minds of '^le people* 4 
^ iaaia C^sra<M)ft 27 nm^ 1969« 
m 
Hie Le^al Frsons^ork Order was proimlgatcd la 
mrch 1970 slmltaaaously with ^ e order dtasolvlng Weat 
Fakistaiu I t begm \^ saying that <m ^ Haroli I969t tn his 
f i r s t address to th@ nation* Yal^a Khan pledged himsglf to 
r®stor@ d^aocratic institaticsis. I t go^ on to ^ y ttiat he 
reaffirmed -tola pledge m. 2B Koveaber 1969 ^m. he asirarted 
that polling for a g@na:*al election l^ould ctrnmam on 
5 October 1970 for the National km&^'ky «ad im 22 Oetol)^ 
for Provincial Assemblies** Ayub on the oth®p h«nd easse 
to power %4th the Intentloii to stci;f and a l l mmmtmB he took 
wiTG clear @\rid@ice to ^ i a intention. He i rote a eonstitutiain 
and introduced a political system (Basic I>eBiocraBy) ^i(di 
earned hia a good reputati<m especially abroad, The basic 
democracy tas pr^aised tsy m&^ indiMing the tmmm British 
historian Arnold Poynbee who %rotGt ^It does mig@BSt a 
possible way in viiidi politically and ec»aoaical3y bao^^ard 
countries can arr i '^ at self-govemfii®it on otjr W«itim lines* 
So I i^ould say that the PaliiiJtan ea^^ria^nt in so*called Basic 
Demooraqr deserves our sympathy and support and certainly 
deserves our attentloju" 
I g S ^ i a t C '^<^oni 1975 n P. 62. 
6 Arnold J . Topb^t *Co!S3unim and the \^est in Asian 
Caintt*ies% %f teftLa, 9l i^^mm kMWK 9i ^lU%liffA 
an4 ^^M s^toBfia» ^^^ 
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£he g^wt&t poXlti0aL uitieai^ la the laHter ^a of 
Ayub Khan did not Iring iS^mo&tmsy to Pakistaiu On the 
contrary ff i t brou^t a n^ w military rogimet Isutt t ^ t ^^ ots mot 
im unusual thing In Pakistan as no polltloal Xeatar was 
\!illSjig or aSsHe to tidse the rospcansllilll'fy of Xctming a 
govermiint. 1!he r^ assas also wore not aoxloi;^ to restore 
the aaaarohy %;hl^  was prenmillng during the polltlelaiis 
rule before y^ub Khan* %eir main deniand %?aa to reaiove 
i\yub Khon and itie mly aXIxmatiim mm the arc^« In factt 
the imposttlan of Martial hm was a big relief to the 
ixslltlclane and Ihe people alike £or i t was the o i ^ wi^  to 
sfxra the country f^ om a to^ul deatmotiosi of normal life* 
Ihey (pelltiaal leaders) aeemed to be pleaaed 
that tlie arsiy was called In to taekle a 
eltuatlcn ifyhlch was beyond their 6aloulation» 
TtiQ ccHitre leaders of tiie ]>»A«C« were caansed 
by the rise of esetreodst forees and by the 
etUltants md h l ^ y artleulate expression of 
BrnptH sub»natlflbaliaB« Bhashani end his 
lef i iat fcrees preferred a military reglae 
with xm politiaal base to boiurgeois (xae wiHik 
popular b^ t^lng* For their long^^il^ 
ob5eotlve8» left ist foroet preferred iiit 
militi^ yry regli^ to Hu^ lb* s coising to {tower 
throuili a seeret deal* ^^ I^b was alcK) 
unx/illlng to sake an^ comfroalsef he was 
afraid of the mowing inftuenoe of ^aahenl* 
His strategy in 19^ 9 seomi to be to tarn 
elections rather than to beeoiae Prii» 
Minister imdir any acceptable political 
arrangeiaent for the oountry as a tiiolet 
%ihld^  would tiiean sooie sacrifice of his 
extreme Aesmids for regional autcnosior* ^ t 
although ^fire was apg^r^nt "dissay* Ihe 
political leaders were nei^er surpr'ised 
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nor \mkBpw ^ ttie eisergea«@ of aiiXltary 
x>egiis&« this ci^Xainal iiotfi aXtbou^ i t Diaii 
not \mioomd9 i t ^as s t i l l eee^ptM <itii«l3^* 
i¥oo@3sions and atrUces In irarious psrts of 
the country vanished in a aic^ent* TI10 
behavimir of Hne te^s^^ mm\f&fs of Oaioca 
Uaiirorsity «iad as&isin^ ijxe^ wQr« '^le 
Xoudegt in asking proidsts but vm^e aXm thft 
f i r s t to re^im quietly to their duties. 7 
iMttiou^ there vas a general acoeptance of th© Martial Law 
md the lyhola cotsitry aitsaitted oalisay to i tf lu t there 
v/as also soi^ r^sistanee* In Bacea *'ttie tcsctile ^rorkersf 
to atvoid foisrtecn years imprisonr^nt for s^lkin^t stand 
motionless in frai t of their ma<^nes • every hOMP on Hie 
hair they ms^ ce ^ s t two mffcmmta sm their looaa and return 
to liimoblli%r"« this vmB also 3mn in West FakistaQ 
@sc>acially in wuetta ^ttsfi <* troops ^ o t m& killed a xaMl>er 
oS: strikar leaders***' Yabya Khan in spite of his assuranee 
that he \^ o\ild go hsxk to the barraolcs as socaa as lam and 
order was restored In Idle cotmtry tsas not in a hirry as 
ho declared In his f i r s t press conferenoe that *"the t o ^ 
should not take years f ^ t i t s^iould not hQ ac^oiaplished in 
days^f elections ^»iild be held asi »>on as ** the health of 
CL<^on, 197^ 7» P» *7« 
8 I^ Q I'igtefl (Loadon). 3t Mai'di 1969# 
9 Ihid», 2 April 1969« 
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to 
the Gowitrf waa ranter^** II@ also said tfeat ih&tQ wis no 
censorship cand the only condition ho wt for tSae ^ounaaltsts 
v/as •'respcmslblo reporting" but la £act Itie case JBB not 
Itlte thrit as tlie nmrapapcra ware not £tm to report on 
sir Hies that M&re called In deftouic*-- of i l ^ t l a l Law, 
::'hQr^tn:MdbM§ editor of the a ^ t \imt l i e^^« ims amtmced 
•so one year* e ri(prous laprlnoniiisit 1^ militsry court •for 
critlclsiai?; the ccmldniiatioii of Miartlal Law .^^'ninistratlon* • ^^ 
The labour unrest \mit mi m<Xi tsaler Martial Lav; slt^oui^ 
i t \«is aoatloned in the p'esG due to cens^jr^iip. 1!hls aado 
llur Khtm, a laaaber of "the Cmmcll of Mmialftration*' 
convinced ttiat soao reforms mu^t bG introduced not canlf to 
tlio labair policy hit aL»3 to oducatlco policy^ He selected 
a mmhor of talontod yoim^r mm. utio tiare Icaovii as "^ i zz 
kids". ,lt^ tlie help of these youa^en, he acquired 
ixjcxil-jrity Uilcti iaad« Y^iya Khaa oniiappy* Bur Khan's labour 
policy had alroiM^ created paiiic» Taiiya vjas not prep^ed 
to CO in til© s^o direction to plasato tlio studcssts to mch 
aa absurd ©stent* He ^ s idlling to replace tfeo "Black* 
university ordinaiioeo of ^^ yub m^ give tlie sttMgnts their 
logltlaate r l g i t s , Ijit Nur iihan wm too aabltlous. He 
v/aited to create an laiage for hlasolf as apdUist Ystfiyat 
t^ 0*J^^» 11 AprU 1969» 
11 Ibid. , 29 July ig^» 
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by Introducing "radical" Pefonas* Bo the f i rat ttuisXe 
bGgan in toe rulisg Jtmta betv^eea XsJiya aiid Wic Kheo, By 
"feis tlm© Ya^ya also set up a threo-snai "JlsEmlng C0II" 
ioXloxdns the model of tlwr Khaa* 3 '*\ihizz Kids'^^^ 
ISio bureaucrata sujDtered a set l^ ©k Airing 
th Yahya Khsi reglae for as aerky as 303 csi'rtl s^ri^nts were 
disial^ed fcy th& liia*tial Law Muinistratlon, ISxe net? regtae 
had lltta© faith in the elvil aervlcs x-^ieh. miS ta afa:»ciig 
position during the Ayub regime and y^«as accused of 
corrupticm BM oisbeTiavtour, Pear^ aadat lAo wis th© 
priiicipal Staff uffiosr to the i-^osidintt was r©pca?ted to 
have saidj W^e todt the blame las t time 'Mm. eirerytiiing 
t/as done by the civilians* 'Shis ttoo we i^/ill do everything 
md taiio tiic oredlt too*" " fi.Ven tii@ Cabinet wtiieh t a ^ a 
forraed later %ias rwt giirm SMCh iaportance as Hie real 
decision Eialtlni: body was tlie Fresid<mt and trie imy&r circle 
of the Junta. G, ;. Chaudhury trotei 
I i ever in my i;^•m years aa a aoaber of -^le 
Cabinet did I find m^ real and memingful 
discusolon (m v i ta l iaatt^3 such as dtf@a6e» 
forcti^ affairst aimioiistratlve or political 
policies and prograiisaes. The Cabinet was a 
ceraEaonial hodyi, i t s msahora often towing 
as VIPs i s tile four principal ci t ies ^ 
Kfsri^ihit Lahore, Isliaabad and Deci^ -
inaugurating puolic functionst presiding 
12 ro^l>eet »• ^» P» 51« 
13 Fa2al Fiuqe^Jian, Pa||a1^» g Cf l^gy to ^aJgraUlP (Karachi, 1973), ^ 19* 
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betwe^a the tvm xdngs wap the main ppoblQa i^ ilefe tomd the 
nmt gorernaaftt rmd tlicre waa • l i t t l e hop© to ovmtocmQ llils 
pr obi era ao 'Dr (laljti ^miflklQr, f<»Taa' repres^itatiye oi the 
FcMHi Pouadation in Paliistisi |X)iated out! "At bestf East 
P;ai-:istan dsVelo^ent will bo painftfl.* At irorst* Itie task 
n^ be completely liapssalbie evai vdth a aonuraantal 
effort*" So, I t \m3 aot lii the haads of Ta^a Khaa to 
do <tikt he vfaated to do aa uu^ circuiastaiees and obitacles 
in his way "ultfa l i t t l e scope for raisins Intiirnal TQsoimcQs^ 
pj^ poor prospects iat external aid, Yahya* s hands u'SS'e 
tied in any conirehsnslve scheme ot dlstrlbutlTs jostles. 
Tiiere ooiild be sane "distribution of poverty" but no auc^ 
Gcope for raiaing llie l lvias st^indards o£ tho peogie, ^ I ch 
\ffius the objective as spoHod out ^ Yahya Khan, whm tlie 
Budgot for 1969-70, vMch was already balng made up at 
thQ tiiae Yahya .Khaa ccme to poifier In Msrch 1969» ^MB rejected, 
by th© new regiao on the pounds that i t jmiet laake laore 
aHoeatltm for social justice, the planners' r ^ l y imm 
"iio m>n&y for increased aUocatloa*. 1h@ Flasmlag C<rjalssl<Hi 
17 
f inaUy mad© soiae ad^atai®i.ts« ' 
l a tiie field of fcrelgn affair a, Yc^a Khm did 
not attach much lmportanc<i to I t said this could be seen £tm 
16 From a Review Paper, by Or lalph .^ K^KskXert t6 and 17 
Sept^Dber 1969. 
17 whaudlutfy, n. 7* P* 59# 
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the fact ma t th^& was no Forei|?i Minister In his Qovemmiait* 
Pakistiai imder Y(^ya Khan has boen described **as a country 
v/lltiout ar^ foTGlsa pollqy*# Ihe Interaal pc'oljl^g took a l l 
attenttcm aid time of Yohya lihan* So, he did not plj^ aii 
im[x>rtant rolo In thlo f ield. In the beginning of tliG Yahya 
rule tiie raLatloas of Polcistaii '.dtii UIQ supcjr po^©Ps v/cre 
improved ^ t due to Ydiya^s lacii of diplomatic rasaiomaveri^ 
and far s l ^ t » i^usslane turned against Pdsiatan and 
ultimately porticlpatod in the dlsacaab^paent of the country. 
AB \m have seen, Ayub could vrln UIQ neutral i ty of the Soviet 
Jnlon In tlie war of 1965 ^At^ i India, and re la t ions tdth 
..loscov; improved after the faciiliGnt Declaration, Wim. Yali&^ a 
Khan took over, th© Soviet s^'ailor Kosygla aaiiured him of 
tJiG Soviet support for strengthening Pakistan* s Indepcsidence 
and for developing Paliistan-Soviet rolatlons* ^ In May 1969 
tlosyGli"^  visltod Palilstan ond in tlio ooint statefaoat Kosygia 
'^'reafilroM his coovlctlon tiiat tai ©arly solutlcaa of the 
IMo-Pdiistan disputes viould be in tlie in teres t of K^ie pooplos 
of the sub-continent" tmd ho assairsd Paklstsffi that "tho 
ovlet Union \mild ccmtinuo "bo \jork for ttie consolld itlon 
X friendly t los ;ith Palsistjan".^ Koaygin also saidi o 
""We are cortaiiUy sure that -feJio ooisitries of t h i s reglaa -
IB Ibld,» p, 66, 
19 ^fsm^ 10 A m i 1969* 
20 I b i d . , 31 i'iay 19«^. 
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Fakiatim.t India m^d MgimoXston - ^isuld sake Mim^ to 
resold© aaicaMy Uie prolflL©aii ilnlcfe «ilvS4Q 'ttics»» • Yabira 
Khan liiaself ¥lalt©i Hoseow. 1!lie ^ l u t eocsraJEiicsue ^Mdi 
was IseuM at tlis md of the ^ la i t aaidi *ai.at "tti© i^j 
sidea reaffiraM i^elx siriinijiG to atrengtli^i fyrtb©' tlie 
existing ©aatacts 8«d fej vM<si "fee good aei^twRsrlgr co-
operation**, tliat laoiSi sWes f ^ t -^e nmd tor a l^ wi|*--tena 
•tr^® agpeaaoat bet^^^i tiie iNo eo»itries oovertag a fiim-
ye;ir period i 1971-75)» tliat "ttic^ ^presuM -ttieir fiarei 
GQ'.:iidciice "Biat a,33. ts/ie dispifeible qii@stioas to the rtilatiorig 
'oe'tefem states auat b© oolv^l W peaceful wems io 
o:Ccca*dafiOO id.tii "ttio principlts of ill© UtadtM Hatiofis 
Uiisrtar", ®M tiiat the ^Soviet sid® ciciireasM I t s tim. 
belief that tiio settlerasit of disputatole ciuestioiia in 
itiiistaiai-Irriiesi r^at ioao ttiroiiiJi bilateral ne^tiaticms 
In the spir i t of ^^miiim.t BmloFa^on i/mjld b# boHi is the 
v i ta l int>--r0st ol tlie pt^ples of Pai:d,3t£m and India sod in 
th& iatorest oi peace in the vliole of that ffl»«a*« 
Tlie a©tbacM£ to -tiie relations bete-;e®i Pi^sistsi arai 
•feie Soviet IMJM s t a r t s i-hmi t d ^ a Khas a^ted to lo^gto* s 
^sroposal to Hold a earifs^^axJe at dtpiitj ratoistw*' s lewsl 
for occsoraic eo-oi-^ratloa ciatKig Piitistan, Iodia.t Mgiisiistmii 
•feiie Soviet liiitoi'i and Irm and Him deeltoed to att^sd tlie 
21 Ibid», 1 Jme 19S9# 
22 IMd., 27 J^ me 1 ^ , 
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eoaf^ rcaae© viim, I t was go tog to be aatartal iz^-*^' fhis 
siiaati2i©c«sl^ at all th@ -ttii*-©© Husslai ©bjteti^s In 
.ioutliiena Aslas to e€®©nt I t stgatost C t^nea© |sca@lratlaa 
(iiaiee ^ e IMlm Intm&st in I t) im mcpwA liumiMi^ 
iafluaace la tW.s regtcmi » d to Ijping ao age oM iiussicm 
ciF@am a litta.# ne^®* - a passage -fe th© Sou^tiiia water. »*^ 
als can.ont%^ Y^ya Khan n«l. to. %=<daus « w * » . 
ia his reply to Podgort^* s appeal to put ©fi «5i t9 blood-
shM sEKi repression agalnat isii© people of East Fg^^ani lie 
put ttie MsBiit ©11 India aaS, saldi ^^o eoimtryt teeliidtoc *^« 
;iavl0t ilnloa, ean aHow or liiis tvar allo\f©a aati-uational 
and iMpatriotie Aeicmts to i^ocesd -to dmfttoy I t cr to 
coyiitsnaac0 mitoviirslon," 'Sie « " ^ ^ re«:li©d i t s cliaax 
p*i«i H«iry Klsi;iir*pr visited Chtaa Jtttm Pdcls'tea i0eretid.y 
md arranged liixon* a v i s i t to "toat ©oiaitry.. a i l s tms 
described tgr Bhal^ai Sea C^ p-fca as "ttie biggest dipl^satte 
explosion of our tlia®"* He sal so saldi ••Uie Bimi^im^Mm. 
diploma t ic lareaktnroy/^ ^h car#at@d ld.@fttleal p^cwp^ons to 
(jDurlioa, %Wn > P* S t^ 
24 f¥an Choira. ,feto',g, ,»ml„fell^ittlSiia Cva©lrldg0, 1974), p. 6§* 
a Ibid. . 
3S Mmk» ^ AirU I97t» 
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Onlted .;>tates md Qilaa ttmt i^uld b@ dtreetM a t t e s t 
•n\e Soviet llaicm."^ 'Ihese isir^its ©sp^laHf Kteain^r 's 
v i s i t -fe «hlna mmof^ tbe Ssvlet lead<^s apfi led te tli@ 
IndoScsviet^ 'a'©a%' \iiicfi cjsia as a s^tfp'iae to liie ^ol© 
worM and csreat^ aoafualoti la PMcigtan g«d ctrnfldaace in 
laaia* A Paltist^il newspaper «rot©i 
I t C^ iG lr«ia%) has a f^rful ^^liticmmo 
fca* fela cjoyntry* I t is not a ropo^it ^ 
i^a^lemi ov<s'tiares "to CMfMii I t Is a 
retort to oyr Invocatlcti of th© CSiiaese 
fricmdslilp. I t ^loimts to a d o l l l ^ a ^ 
move -to i r ^ t e a sltemtioa to %*iidi liaAla 
m^ iml Iree to attaflk Pcicistm ^"Si llie 
aseurano© ttoat "tie Soviet oo«ai-tei®at 1^ ^ 
•^ tlie aid ©f .India would iroiride a 
detca^roit t© m^ Cittlaes© Intanrsittcti en 
0-iir bciialf , 35 
Oil ttie 0" i^c^ liaalf the Indian 0^«ie© Mlnlstef* mMt 
" lliG refugees caiM refeiim to Mmir lioiaslaM OBly liien 
i t txaeaae aii it-^epgiKlettt aaticxi** I t ima not ccmiseiTatal© 
ttiat Pakisttm vmvM gp^mt iadepaiiciitoe to Baii.siaaeAt ^ t 
tie %/ill liaVG to ^wilc to^rerds a situation in %lildi Pal?lsta» 
will, be loft viini m ^t&m&tVmm^ .aft^ r^s G@B«2lii*s 
v i s i t to Mosco\^ ;g ttiG 3ovi«t UalQn sf^ m^ od to hm@ ^fm& 
Mie IP'*©®! liiy-it to India to di^ieibsr Piisistcgi, M IIMUSP 
3 Blratf C. Cha»liiri| in Matiis' lidioicmi ©d», S|oq^ 
MmM mjMP^A^ (Loadcm, 1979) i ^"^mmOix 
IVAf p . ^5.» 
5f 
In thB f|j*st plaee *Ki@ Soviet side has stoppii 
ooiweyiiiG ^^ ImpresrAm. of iiatoi@ii1^ tiildi i t 
did bofc^© Mrs G«ctoi*s ^ s i t -k* Mosiso%/» In 
tti© seccwd plmGt toe Soviet eld©, in spite of 
i t s Imo-Wi. md straifjly SEiressed arefa^erac^ 
fw poacot ^ s a©CGpt@d tti© iiioa tfaatt if 
iinairoldabI©i l i^ ia eaa tiis© v^:y f i m steps 
to liast Bei^al tAMiout ^ jng caaaearmea atsewt 
3©vi0t -aiii^ort at ii:^ lm®l • polittealp 
^onofniG or olti«irwigQ« .30 
Sie ladlaws % r^e not o ^ c^iifldeit of *tus£ii«> 0U|:^rt Mt 
t l i ^ w^e sijre tliat ttigr© iias B0 <img«' fipo® Ctiinsb Sit 
Indium *'or#ipi Minister said tfeat •aeeordtog to feis 
asscsaraont, China ims tmlikaly to mmm to ti-# asaistm^x^ 
of vt^istan.** '2ie ^^ian,Minist©f ima not aist^cm i^ 
i-'aliiataa relatioaa with Chiaa wait 'tturotfli soi^ diff imlt ies 
duririg fai^a KiaR r^ iae* Ta& iapro^QQsit ia -fe© Prfi-
sovist r©lation,u dirliig "tee early dc^s of Ysl^a seii liis 
\mloosm ^ Kosygiii* s ^^onoaio s^mm of O0*<j|«rati<m £aa4® 
China isifiappy* In faetg "China €»:^ :res3ad eoni^^ia ov®r 
Faiii3taii»a •Hoolag of #t@ Scnriet lteic» ai^ i t s being espssM 
to the Sc5 i^et hiSlnmm&%*^ Ho^st^, the r<a»aticms v^ iape 
saved because tlie Pdtistcmla a^^^ei itt^ir mttitade 
CEcraciii, I960)p p» "m^ 
so 
Awards (aiiiia« Smrn'ok h i ^ rafiisliig officials v i s t ta l Qhism 
tmS r«5elved i-mtm welco®®» tlor€K>vert P^klstaai nm^pap^s 
criticised t^ie United Matlsi for ds^iag %taa tier mut in 
iiG imrM boc^» '21,0 Fakiataii gJiiQi i^rote In tm editorialt & 
me tl»K» has m3i^ hiirt itself ©mi violated 
ttie spirit of •tie Cn^tasr l^ once agaSja 
refuims to -torow o p ^ i t s portal to. PcfeA«g# 
Ttm note against *-hina is nQlMime Just M r^ 
recilis-a.e| i t i s yet lisatlidr triuaph of 
po\f€r-pelltiC0 aad political @xpQil«ie^ 4a 
•ttie » r M body gaid a Islow to I ts aoral 
sta'fciffe aM r©pres<imtaM.tB Aaraoter, 35 
Yahya v i s i t s China in Hovestb^ 19^ sc^ a Pakiirtaal a@«p(^«r 
reixsrtod %iat the v i s i t **liag i t s om. siipifi©8ii«# aM tliat 
i t io a «reaffiraatioa at Hi© tiigteest l@y®l of Pc^iatm's 
•biding @ood\dJ.l and gpati'toide for i t s sr®at JWsi.gil>our 
pressed W liostil© f crcest ^^iai^mis 6rm no ®3all 
eoEifort apd strmgto fr^i "toe tiiotigit t^at t h ^ liaar© ttie 
'onresir^td cawl imstincting friiaslitiip and support of soie 
73 crore (730 siUton) vigoroust atraigitfor^^i^ peopla,*^ 
But, to fact, China was not in a ixjsitt'm t& ottmr m^ 
Gffeoti^ aid to ^Bkistaa as 'Ki© Soiriet Union had assured 
Ks'; BeHii that sh© irotild ^opjoi a diverslossPF acticm in 
-.ii'&iiaEjg'' in ease China attigBli@d India*^ Mm&Q-WTt i^ 
Qhifi&m if^o not -mty tmcti toteroated in Bast Pakis f^em. 
33 %§ ^ i^M>gM Itejg* 1^Kw®ab«r 1969* 
34 I b i d . , 10 iioiraater 1970*. 
35 M&r%ma,g n . 30, p , 19&„, 
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ra©ir r-iaia Interest xma in tSite west vdiig* "Aip-XE't for 
i-'s^iatai's indeprMaice mad jjtate spverelgi^^ ratrier 
t ian iier natioii;xl imit^ m^d ixsrrltorial intoorl ty \^as a 
vary Gi&ict sttitoricsit of tlie rialairQ of Ctiixiem etoke In 
t-'dciatrm. PeiiiR;j waa deeply concerned for tti© Bmintensrice 
oi' a sta'^ mg aiid iMspeudsit l-lost Vfiiig, B«t %ina tms 
liiterestod in tim Ea&t v lag only as a nerjns of straigtiicmtog 
^aitlataiij and <mly to the erbent that mpport tcsr Pjpeatdent 
ial^a*£3 !:x>sltion in East licsisal -was noceasary i f Irxiia ©^JB 
to be deterred from Intsrvati^tlont and If '^ Jisslega Influeace 
111 loLamabad -w-as to l>e *:ept to a minlr:iuia#*'^ 
In<Iia v/an tti© syr^patliy of tlie M ^ i c a n public 
opinion duo to U^o %^ Tah^a S-ian ha'idlod "to© East Fdclstaa 
problcQ, eopecloll^ tliat of trie refugees* \iiih Hie 
exooption of ifealdent Nixon, vjho hafl a soft eon^r for 
raliiotai from -tie time vrfiai he uaa Vlce-PiresldeEit In fee 
ISSOos tiie State Department, tlie Confess, 1ti0 Press and 
tiie nubile opinion in gcm^al, vme loolciag a t i t ^l*^ 
di f forei t eye. ^^'£imi Paitistau was faood wlt^ -fee 
latcK'nal csrials, illxaa •tolled to c<xitlnue to m.xw^irt Pa^;lst«mt 
l)ut iie 50on iound i t v®ry dif f icul t because of the liostile 
at'fcitade of the .itat© Dep,,a:»tmont said the c r i t i c a l p;2)lic 
opinion in the ooimtry*®" '^ 
36 Itobgrt Jas^ZBOa, % H % jjulm ^fi^Ji, (London, t9?5), 
P* 154. 
37 ai^\«3ni, n, 30, p . 
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f ally a iOian Inherited a dlsualted coiatry ^ t h 
i-.'Olitical agitatiaa raadiiag, i t s sxii'ii md dintisrbiiig 
iior::ial l i fe in tiie country, "The diacipline of the eivic 
l i f e liad bem srodsd t^ p^slongod political agitatiim. 
lesionalism and quasi-natAonsilism raised Uieir heads, ThQ 
polj3i"i2ation [>articiil,ir3^ bet^ -jeesi iiast md west PM-zlstan 
lirilch had Immi allowed "to tafaie rc»t bocaiae para'SoiBit, The 
cui.t b®tvj@en tiiQ ti» parts tt-ireatiaed to grow %?id«* sBsd 
36 deep^," 30 far tliis reascm Yalr^ a iOian concentrated his 
efforts to intcariial proliLoss aiid paid Ims atfcmticm to 
fareign rx>lio5r. "lliere viare tlacee clear and uaaabiguous 
promisQSi Firsti tpansfa:' of popper to th© elcMSted represea-
tatives of -^ le peoplet se©3nd3yt ^o election \^ CMld be held 
Oil fee '^asis of direct cd\£Lt franchise - Ayub's i^staa of 
i idirect election Uiroxx^ Basic Desocrato yao rejected; and 
tliirdly, tiie futur© constitutiosa of the country vs^ xiM be 
frijai^ tjy tiie elected aeab^s ,*^ Yahya Khan "waa sira^sere 
in his [JToaises arid was ready to l2»aiisfa:' pov/ar to the 
Glocted ret^Gomtattves of the people rrovidal ikm^e Is 
no daii^r to tho imity of P&kistaa. to one of ttie specsshes 
Yajiya Kiian statadi 
Cxslaaabad, 1973) f pT35^ 
39 Ghoudiiury, a. 7f p. 73« 
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A3 for i^scM I have aSJ^ -oaB^  Indleatad <m a 
ntfiabca' of occasions ttiat 8^ alnd Is abiKJiu-
tely open <m tiieae subjects mad that lai© 
decision mmt lagr vlth tiie people, Ttm <mly 
requiraaont tliat I vmuM ixiBiat upon la thst 
ai^ coaatitiitlon OT' a?^ fora of gove ra^ t 
tiiat tlie people of Paljlaten SKJOI* for 
tSierascaves auat eater to th^ Ideology and 
i a to^ l ty of FGicistem, W© Eaist tliMi f i r s t 
and f c r ^ s s t In t^-c^ of Pakistan* Hils Is 
not to 8^ tliat roci^ma&le md ;Jw3t dosands 
of -^arloua reglims of Pc^lstan should be 
Ignorod* As Icmc iis theae dcieards are in 
keeping with the IntegerIV of Pakistani ways 
and mQim» shoiAd be f oisid to aoc<^ sQ«HiaP& 
th^i. 40 
ilegava smr^ concosdlons to liait Pakist^ils IndMing t&e 
i33ue of *'on€ man one voW (snd aaxiisura ©jr^noB^ to the 
i^rovincea, Siese concessions \WPQ to meet the demands of 
East raitlstan leaders ine^tidjlng iiiom of Sheikh Mujlbur 
iidisn;an r^ jd to ESIIOV; his slncsBflt^ aM Inteatlfm to res^nre 
doiaoorasy In tiie CDWitry* Ihe ie^'YM'k Tif|eg. \srotej 
Palclstan irosldcaat 4||IQ Kdiapaed Yahya Khoa 
has set a prufi^it ezaaplc for o th^ ailltcspy 
rulors \dth his more to restore deraocratie 
civilian n a e in his country, fhe [principle of 
»one aasHf one vote» will c^ve the r e s t ^ e 
Baigalls of East Palilstcai aa^Jori"^ rejo^seri-
tatlon in the Asseebly consisted wltH their 
niffi^jrlcal strmgtht hi 
ulillet there vtkc. no doubt about Ya^ iya* o sincerity of holding 
free .and f;alr elections and transf<arlng pamr ^ t^ie elected 
^^ -Py^' 29 July 1969. 
41 n ^ Tfflr^ , ^togf 2 DeceabdP t969. 
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raprtsentativos of ^ the psopi@f YaJiya was net raastcr ia his 
awk hoys© as Ayub had been. 'Oiere tf^« olSier €tl«s3^ts l ike 
the AraQT Generals csid th.e politicians* Coixfidonce vms lost 
ije-feefiBi the d if foment parties ai^ no one trusted the other* 
u..i« Ghoudliury xMo'^ms one of fahya*s aslvisir® wote Ja 
^ i^s ^ok 1^^ L ^ Para 9f Willrf!^ PfiKlirtggp 
Mmy questions ra^ be a^cod about a pOLan \iiich 
arous@d sudi strong gspoistatlons* Di& the 
anay - iK>t Yahya aloa© but the ruling Jimta -
really mnt to hand o-yer poiisjer? Did Muiib 
i/ant a settloaent cm the basis of a u n i ^ 
Paltistan or did he aaly intend to use 
doctiona to ea tabl i^ liis cred^ntiala as th© 
sole lealer of on merging Buagplade^? What 
xmro ttie alas of tti© West Pakistani lead^s» 
partimilar Bhuttef vjare the^ prspsred to 
pay the price needed to fulfil the deasMs. 
of Bengalis as pleelgod hy Yoiiya? f^ ie utoole 
plan \*as based on lairee fundameatal {reraisesi 
firstf l^^ib i^xxld Biodify his slas-iJoint piXant 
and imvOxl be satisfied with gaiiilno prowliKSial 
autoaoiiy and not aia at SQCessiaa| seccssdly, 
t^ i© Viest Pakistani le^erSf botti me politicians 
and the big industoi'ialistSi ^ould be t i l l ing to 
i3i>J;e the necessary sacrifices md concessions to 
s a t l s ^ the legttiiaate aspirationst political 
demands and economic dues of iiiQ Dsagalis as a 
conditice for keeping Pakistan imitedi m^ 
i±iirdlyt the ai l i tary Junta sust give up t^ie 
po%jer to ^ i ch I t had becixie accufltoiaed since 
1950| i t mist not ttiink In t^ais of arigr 
"qualifiQd* or "liaited^ trawaf^r of po^er 
of the "'furkiah* type - the turkish model 
soraetiiaes arose in conversati<m with the 
genfrols* I luas oft®i a^ed by soae of the 
,i&im'al3 if I consulted the Ccmstituticn of 
I'urlir/ i^ Fliile ^vising Yahya on the constitti-
tional problfflss of Pakistm. 42 
42 Choudhxiryi n, 7» P* 39* 
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ro isas^ e^r tliQse questions and to smlym teie caim e^ps aim 
'^mvHd undGTstaM l^ ie dtfJtteuIties tfiat faced Yafe^ a Khan 
and thiQ rjresr^ t.a'cg 'that wore tstit on hio from his colleagaes 
in ttiQ ta-ay aiid from tiie politicians of vioot Paklsteai^ 
Beaidea* the doubt tsiat he ^ t from Ili^l^'c manocuvcarlng 
ond tact ics. In otii&c i«?rds, iio was on the horns of 
dilc^ Tsaa» He was confused '4iat to dOg ^^lother to fulf i l 
I:;-!© proalaea ho had o£¥le to hold "f5r©e aijd fair al#ctio«a" 
on UiQ baois of "caie man one vote^ End oiJdan^r the unity 
o£ ti© country or doal with ilu^Ib and hia Ammi Lc^ iguo 
firnly and dm^ him a legal trancwotk to disaeGibsr the 
country. As i t had been said, Yakiyu ilhan las^ -iod diplon^^sy 
md f cjresl#it and In spite si aH iroof s ho got that 
Ju^ib -/as not sincere In his claim aa autonony ifithin 
unitod Pciclataii sid his real aim was to got East Pakistan 
fiopj^ rated "rem Vlost Pakistan, "Yt^ ii^ a iian pres^at^l v/lth 
a tai>0-recortl0d account of tliose tallis of i-^^ih \/ith hia 
close associGtos, Hujib xms clearly hocani to sayi •'% 
aim ta to establish Ban^ade:^! I u l l l tcjsr the I*#F,0. 
(ihe Legal Frfsaet^ ork Ord©r} !lnto pteoes as soon aa the 
elections aro ova:". Itio wou.ld chaHenge mo oias© tb.o 
olections are over?*' lie also hintiKi to his colleaipes 
about ijolp from ''outGlde 3ources**i rresiEaably £roa India. 
Jaan Yahya list<£ied to this * political tmislc* ploj»'Qd by 
his Intelligcsoo scsvicesf he viaa bm.dlderGd, Ho could 
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easily nucognisB Slujil>»s voice arid th© substaEWe Of hta 
rGfC rded ta lk , aio n^xt somlns ^loa Ys^ iya \vas secsa he 
vKxs S t i l l ia a bGi-'ilderiid statei tjut 'le i^as nevar a 
serious aaainislXQfejrf aa lie soon reeov^od from Ills ^lock 
wiil luaentedi "I jinall fix Mu.31b If iio betrays lae*" Y-s^ iya 
vilso see:iod to ha'^ G laore thai'i oiio coatlngei'iasy plan, jus t 
an .lujib soe-iGd t . liave* I t i s Dos'dMs ISiat Yaliya Khaa 
Wij raiolcMi by :ils ^tdvlsors ard '/ae mode to believe tiiat 
no niji:jXQ Par% '.ffjulci got alssolutG aaoority in the olecti.-ns, 
Tliay may aave done so vdtli ipood iateaition tnit they could 
rijt bo (Rxcusol for taioir j^rorii;- advico* One ox Yc^ya*s 
.•yavisQTfs was G,*., Jl'ioadliury vl3.o v/ao from East ^'aklstaa 
and he ni^iit liavo loolied a t tlie aatter fran fee na t tcaa l i s t i c 
point of vi0w« '*ChoiK3hury htx! tiie reputation of beiag csn 
o%p€H*t on count i^t ional aa t te rs r^ '^id since 1^7 had beai 
T/o^kin i^ as Directed General of :^le5e;irch iri the Minlstr7 of 
roreii^w /iffairo. Toliya Krian f i r s t appointed c;houdh:,.5ry to 
•fea ia.inninc Cell aad later mc^e him a Mlniater. I t should 
bo added tliat before lie ^ine<J the Foreign Office, 
.;t.iouf.i;:i;ary had homi t©aehliis at the Uaiversity of Dacca oM 
he h-oyd thofi told sev^a l of h is fricrids, including i±tis 
autlior, tiiat iii Viost i^okiatan tmd abroad he waa a I'^kiatesii 
but In .:-.ast fc'altistari he was a typlccil *inst P-iitstaerii 
Intellectual* » ^ 
43 I b i d . , p . 9B, 
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Elections M^B to be held under ttXB directions of 
the Leg:2l Frfiiaework Order viiidx Tahya Khan issued in March 
t970# Aocordlri{r to iStie U^t t i e Const!tution would be f r a s ^ 
to iirovlde mostiiaum proviaclfil awtcanosisr and a t tJi^ sasae t i s# 
"tlie Federal Govennaetit shall also have adequate poi'^rg to 
dlsdiorge I t s re3|)onsiMlities in rolat ioa to Qxtsrnal ^ d 
Internal affairs mid to pPBsm"^Q the indep®t^ence and 
tcirr i torial i n t a ^ i - ^ of the cjouoatry", "^  Th& C<ai3ti"bition 
v/as to 'je pasr;ed by nie .Wational Ass^ably ©ad then " ^ a l l 
be prG3onted to tSie i^esident for autliejitication asnd to case 
authentication i s refused, Hie Asssfflbly f^mll stand 
d i sso lved" ,^ 
ftiG re^sults of the elections wca*© d i f fa rmt £roia 
yiiat lahya aad iiis Advisor3 hsd visualised* Mu^ib's partf 
'#.m 167 out oi 169 seats tliat ware al lot ted to East 
Pnkl3tim» Mu^ib iimediately declss'ed tiiat "Kone ctiisr "ttian 
the si:s crore (60 million) Bonfpilia :ias the r i ^ i t to alt®r or 
47 
d^'ioxise the six-point grograsEie*" * Ttm^e uea'o ruiaours tliat 
alectiona vrnto largely rigged and -te-iesc njaoure ti&Q 
basod on some logic» "Dv^yone tdth tlio @3K>©pti€Ki of the 
45 isiaffl* 30 Miirch 1970, 
46 Ibid. 
^7 m s ^a^,a^gto Tlifl^ Si 5 January 1971. 
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tali:/a aciiainlstration, knem tiow large nmb&r of bogus voters 
liad their nasos re;;ist0red on eleGt(M*;il rol ls» hm/ tjiousarais 
o£ iiidian spies iiod Ijeen inf i l t ra ted into £ast Pi±tstaBi 
and how f inal ly , oitox' scar In;: o- a l l toetr oppcaients lay 
int iaidat lon ai^ violenoe, the Awa-ii Lea{pG rsgortod to 
laperooaation In ^)ollin{| boot^ i^s on a laasslVG 3C(ile as a 
tUQQxis o£ daiaonstratins tHeir popularit3r,«^^ 'Uie traaspor-
tati<m uystom befe/eeu East aod i est i^s^cistan was dislajrbed 
by jjidia \Mcn the l a t t e r d©clorf*d tliat un t i l i'aktstm. mid 
comptaisaticsn for iSie burnt aira^aft (ttie Indian aircraf t 
#iiDii \fas hi^adied by ladla i Ag j^ats to L lior© aad burnt 
tliis'e} i t s cargo, paGS^igep bagsa^s aM o a i l , hof a i r l ines 
f l l ^ i t s over Itidinn apace v^ fould not be allo\*0d to operate.^^ 
On the otiier hs '^id, Zulfikar All lihutto ^lo xma 'hungry for 
potior and whose prjrty wcm 65 seats In the AsacKtuly from 
West Faiilatnn said l^at the A\frKai League had adopted an 
attlteJdc of '^toicG i t or loave i t " and unless th&to was an 
asrrurance tiiat thm'Q '..ould be soae Jinount of reciprocily 
frora Awfiol Leat^uc, membGTs of his p«?rty v/ould not attend 
50 
tile Aascably Jeeoion.-^ I t s©£*:iQd that Y^M a^ Klim liad cosae 
to know -Uie rea l lntentic»i ox l%i^ )ib and \dt^ tli@ at t i tude 
ox Bhutto, he postponed the AascMly Jesaion ^;iii<^ ims to 
40 latiur ilatoan, ii^m/aadeah Todciv (LoMon, 1978), p. 39, 
4'>' Dm&u 5 -'euruary 197U 
50 Ib id . , IG FQbru:ary 1971. 
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iGot on 3 iioroh 1971» lu^lb reaistod csagrlly t^ sayingi 
"at tots critioaL hour i t Is the sacred diity of eadi and 
every Benoali in 0V@ry wcilk of llfCf iacludtog Goipsanaaent 
xiployees, not to cc>-or)€rate %dtti anti-|>«>ple fopcea aiad 
iiiotead do evdr/tHlng In tlielr potior to fa l l th© oon«ptracy 
acairigt Bangladesii. "^ .^lujilj's call found big response £roa 
t^ie people in Kast Fiidstan. According to an lailan 
vrltor: "Frcm tlie 2nd of Harch ontiards civil gov&mumb In 
•wOGt Bengal licid heen selsod t^ 'fee dfialMi (&6i,;,itsir i'taliiaaa) 
-aiid his i>arty \iiih thG co-op<s:'ation :/f t!ie Beac^ili c iv i l 
acilriiaistratiDn tliere wao a de facto seeeasicm."^ 1!hls 
lod fal^Q KJiQii to r e a l l y ttmt l^ ie ccaaitry Is going throui^ 
ijr-oat difficulties mdf tiierefore, he storied a sovs to a 
balf©ce bottv'oefi i^ujlb* s deaando aid tlie necessity of keeping; 
the country united. For this ixirposc he speit three •m^ka 
tr-ivelllni- bet\-^m Hast and .vest Pelilstan meGtliic Mujlb, 
iiliutto mrd oiixm leaders In seardi of a solutltm to the 
c ...iistltiitlosal problems ^iileii tti© country iias facing. In 
t.\e aes^tloie iie mmmmcsd thiat tlie National AssacMy \-x?iild 
QGct on 25 i^^ch 1971 In Dacca, i^i^lb did not respond 
favourably and on the contrarjr "he urged that East fe'Mclatan 
and Viest t^alilstcm adopt separate constitutions and tfaat 
ills folloyere refused to pw taxoo to UIQ Cantral Gov^rsaent 
51 Ibid. , Sllcircti mu 
52 nirad C, Clioutorl, n, 29* ApLsesadijt H i t P# 159. 
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Xihidi Is attiiatod in ttie ue»t»^^ For taore tlion three \mQks 
Y ally a toXorated Hu;Jlb*a defyin,: tiie ipv&mmosit authority aod 
his iwa-coopcaratton aovcracait but on 25 March he deseartl^d 
iujtb'g tnovoaent as "an act of treaaoa"*^ lie ordered the 
ar res t of Mu^lb, outlawed the Awaral Leagae aad lusaded 
over ttie province to ttie army* Altliougli th i s actlc^ xms 
praisQd 1^ some I'rsliistanl leaders Including Bhutto #io 
said tha t "Paljistijn has a t l a s t besa saved" g**^  
fuany did not accept tliQ mllitrTy octlon to bo G soluticei 
of the problaa, 'Dm^ m'':;-to in on editorial i 
TtiQ pres^it phase iri the l i f e of the aation 
i s not fdt^iout grave d^mgors, lie swst never 
forget history'fl lesson tliat in the u l t l aa te 
analysis tlie force vliich brings people 
together imxl Iceops tlicsa toget^ior i s that of 
lovG msl brotliGrhood, and iiiis force ls» i a 
tvtmt 5£3nerated &^ sustiilned bur a GomrnrnXt^ 
of both " opiri tual aiad cjatsrial ia tereeta . 56 
Yj^ iya Khan also ordered that a l l f oroigh joumal ia t s 
oiioild bo Gxpelled froa % s t itifiotan# fhi3 act proved to 
be a big mistalto an "these cxr'elXed vmimm. tumod Yaiiya 
in'crj aiiotlier Ciicriges Khan aM ^il'Iia Khan Into^ 'Butchcsr of 
;'>aiisjal'* ilio foreiiyi informatioa media movBi into India 
aad nalRirally rc0.ied on information nicked up froa Indian 
oGurces (.-sr the refugees fleeing frcia East Paliistan. Hieir 
53 ^G Tiae (lieu York), 15 r-iorch 1971. p. 31, 
56 Ibid.p 33 March 1971, 
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hXipXy colotirod imd exaggerated accotrnto di<2 a l o t of dasase 
to i'akl3taa ajxl i t s arraoti foi*c©3.^' a i t s actloa of te i^a 
Kiim i.'as due to his Inabili ty to jiMgo publte opinion and 
to his Mviacra* vjroiiy egtisiatlon of iaternatlcxial reaction 
towiird.,'t the netfs tiiat cam© frmi ladian sources or fr<aa 
jommaliiitB based in India x^ i^o vmro deported iron East 
ruliloton aiid ,..;Iio y^re rou|^3y handled. Ihese journalists 
b ••eaMQ noati le to rricistaa imdtils led •teiem to reixart 
exas ;eratec! news itcjQ on tho happoning in the unfortusftat® 
i-.mt wi;i2 of rc>id.stan» One of Uim wrote in tlie Bostcm 
'.ilQ:bGJ **'iha deptli of death oM destruction In Dacca ?^as 
obviousj atiMeats d e ^ 1JI tlieir beds» Ixitcii^ed in tiie 
i.iar'kots, ki l led behind tSiolr staUs* vromrni and ciiildren 
lyaiiit to deatli in -fclieir housee, ?^5kist<,inis of Hindu 
r o l l ,ion 3liot s i raasse, bazaars ciod shopping areas razod 
by fii'G',»^ rnGse roDorts l« i to tlio spread of pjaale and 
fGor raong tiie civi l ian ?x>|xil:3tion and masie Qsas^ i^ kist 
i:'a^iistaais to leav;.- their hoiaes aiid ac^i l i ieltar in India. 
/i l-orge mfiaber oi' refugees flg^t to India* Hio nualier ^las 
estimated at 2 liiillions but according to India tli© number 
\/a5 much hlf^er, Kalia Siddique vrote in his bock 
50 11^ ^ Bop^,^ qQl^,9, 31 Harch 1971. 
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In a i l ^ust ova? tso laSllicii pcopile - a l t ^ l t 
•tei'o aillllon t» ciany - croBtmH up* a t <me stag® 
at the ra te of ha l l a ©illton a day. to tO 
mlllicau All attempts Isy Pd^lstan to liaare 
impartial obs^^ers to ciet^:n!ilne tJus iscaxst 
nunfisar of refugees ajod t» h ^ p ^t to "i^dlr 
repatriat ion i /^e tti^arted 1^ India. Mrs 
Gandhi would iwt a@r©e to U ilia»t*s ffer ©f 
U.W. observers on tier or i'oklstan sido of tiie 
bcarder, 59 
India lad boon abl© to aobtllao fee v«rld oabllc opialai 
against Pakistan end tflth tiie refugees [iroblea i^e had 
decld?»d to carry out plan about \-A%ich 'J3if Tiffls^  \j?ote 
lat@ri "Clooxly the Indian ariay has had a long standing 
plan for ttie lavasicm of East F i i i s t a a . " ^ In fact t^e 
Director of the Indijai Ins t i tu te of Defence Staalies \ms 
cjuotod in an editorial of the ^lominE llei^ (Kgrat^ii) as 
sayini; "the l:a*ea[£-up of Pakistan i s in our in te res t , mid 
we have mi opiiortiKilty t^ie l ike of ^ i ^ i viiH n©ver coiae 
agalji." io, Indians after tiy&y won Uie ba t t le <ai tiie 
front of International f^blic opinkjs fflsrmQd csi a plan -to 
create "^on^.D&e^ Mrs Gamtii said that "she \fOUld not 
accept smy soluticm of tti© refugees "iiat VIC^JM mean the 
deatii of Btmgladedh", 
39 Kalim ^ilddiqui, 99n|3L|ff^t ^Vl^Xu mSi Waff Ul MU^ (Londoai, 1972), pTwFl 
^'^ '^ "ho T^t^s (London)* 7 ^©ceabcr 1S7% 
61 HcTfiiiif-': K,6^ (Rarachl), 10 April ^W%0 
62 H ( ^ i ^ K i 3 s i n g ^ , white HoiJLqQ Years (Bostoci, 1979), 
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After the arrest of Mu l^b ty Paktstaaa army cm. 25 
Msrch 1971» the r e s t of the Awarai League lesKlers ran ammy 
to Calcutta whore they f crmed a gcfvermaeat taa exll©» th i s 
fSovernaent v/as not in fu l l control of aI4. the anti-Paiclstain 
Qlcsasits in i^ast Pjikistan especially the members of Kuktt 
3ahlni viho were mfiinly belonging to the l e f t wing and ^ o s e 
at t i tudes were not pleasing Irwiia as ^ e had enougji of th«a 
in West Bsigal. i l t h the passage of time Mie i-ajiktl 
B.ohini grev/ strongisr and ihat v/as bad not only for Pakistan 
but I t \ms also bad for India. "I^e situation had nevw 
been so bad even in East Pakistan before March. The cssly 
\m.y to stop tiiQ revolutionaries from tailing control of 
D^anrp-ade^ In oxilef jmd eventually in East Pdcistacif -srjas 
for the Indian array to taranaplant the Awami League 
• gavorrm&at* from Calcutta to Dacca* And that laearrt 
war." 
Mrs vVaridhi accorded ful l support of l^e Indian 
Pai'liament to help ihe people of East Bengal to adileve 
their goal. This support came tiirou^ unanimous resolutioa 
in tiiG house -.vtiich vias not e a ^ to get as i t was considered 
a secessionist movaaent and i t was t^oui^t that i t ral#it 
create trouble in West Bengal arsi Kashmir, Soiae Indiaais 
$;5 Kalia Siddlqui, n , 59# P# 166. 
Sh u i l i p Hukerjee, "India and Bangladesh", in ;Jubhafi^  
(Delhi, 1971), P. tS* 
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tliou£^it tHat by helping tiie liast rolslntania to create 
:.aiisladesh tlic '^- vmxld. mlVQ some of tLiQ prolalc^a bcti*0«n 
Hindus .ir)d i-lusltoo in India* "Once nanolaflejrfa Ijocoses a 
fact , i t vdll becorae ljsisK>ajiible to liiil^ tlie Indo-ir*d^i3t^i 
ccaiflict a t the nfcite Xevel to the mfoptunatc traditioja 
of lilndii-mslis antagcaiisa, ISils will dGprlve West 
Palilstm of one of ihe stod-: argum^t i t oaploys to oKplain 
away I t s refusal to l ive as a [pod aeii^ibour* But aore 
in|X3rtant i s ttie fact tlxat i t \idll also cut tfiie ©roiasd froa 
under tlie feet of both Hindu m-jd l-Uislla diauvinlsts# Shis 
will he a helpful development in relat ion not cmly to 
lasiimir but tha liiolo subccsitiiient* " ^ 
Yaliya Khan saade asveral atter^^ts to avoid ttie d i s -
maiiboriaaat of tiie country but \sil'ortiaiato3y those attociiTts 
carao too la to as tlie action ^e took in Fiox'et. \ms a sjreat 
blufitler wbidi did not leave raudi Iiope to ^ I v e ihc prol3l©m 
rseacefully. une oi tfiose attemptn xv»as ttse five points plan 
viiich he offered to ilrs Gandhi throu£^ 13ie Indian Aat^ssadcr 
in lalanabad aiid iiidJ included -tiie release of Wu^lb and to 
arrai'ise a ref eremdufa to know tlie idsSies of the ,r)eople of East 
x^aliistan* %iG offer i^s rejected ty !4rs Oandiil on the 
65 I b i d . , p . 4^. 
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;-,rGund that the electl<m of iSlfO vias a rQferai4um and •tti^o 
w'ns no ViQod for a2K)tiiQr rcf^cmdiM. l a fact , tills esDcaise 
\;a3 not valid ac thQ eleotioR of 19K) was aot csi tlie basis 
ox separation of Zastt F^ilstaji but i t vms on the basis of 
iutoiio?^ dotam-Ml^  tiy tho At^ aml League in HiQ six point 
j;ro(:^aaae» Tcsliya Khan also i'^iaaliatoly accepted U ^aa t* s 
c-ff er- to nj©diatQ bet^eaa India aj'Mi Pi-iiiaton but f5rs GaiMfiii 
ropliod afjgatively and reused t^is U!l of trying "to tiscTQ 
12ie military rogtae iti ir'okistan", * He also sent ^ i at^eal 
to U l%tmt in tlie liop© that t^te il< could do 3oa©'ttiirig -^ tdi 
T^OUICI iieip in avoidintii tiie worseaiai:; of tlie sttaation*. 
irideod t^ie 'Unltcsi i'latiotis laade sm^^al attei^ipts .in tlie 
::iocuritsr Coisicil for ceasefires tat a l l attoapts aet with 
fai lure because of the Jovlet vetiies. In isi© General 
Ar.se'ibly, a resolution was adontod l!^ ove3r\iiQltaiMg aa^cirit?^ 
of 104 to 11 for CQaseflre but India did not COQPV with i t , 
?aiB raade the U^  and China bitts^rly c r i t i c i ze both India 
68 
aad tlie Soviet union. 
At l a g t | \hm. tho IML-jn mr^ reached Dacca md 
forced Gssio^al isiasl» tii© Paitistsn C< :^iaaj:ider of tlie Eaatmii 
(yG G, .. CiiOiidhur/, n# 7i PP» '19B-9. 
67 Ib id . , p. 217. 
&3 Ib id . , p. 216. 
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v/jbiy;, to surrend^, liast Palciatan fe l l to Indian arw/^ 
Thus Barigla De^ came Into being and -tiie Awaml Lea^e 
Govemtient tliat vas earl ier viorking from Calcutta liMcsdlately 
shifted to Dacca, Ta^uddint tiio acting r^esident of Banglades) 
demancied the release of Sheikh i^iujib. 
At the saiae time^ after tiie PBklattm array sxirrenderoi 
In iiast Paliistan, i^rs Gandhi offered a uni la tara l ceaaefire 
on V/estffipn front too, Palclstan, 'iiose array had already 
denorcilised because of hmailiatinfi defeat a t the Easttem 
front, accepted tiie ce?iseflre offer and •^us war between the 
tv/o countries came to an end. 
Palclstan* s defeat a t the hands o£ Indian aray proved 
a cr-ushlns blow for the Pakistan* 3 arsy. People lost fai th 
in "liie arsiy and tlius Yal^a Khan decided to tl^•msf or po\«5r to 
l^e c iv i l ian ruler . With th i s nim, he su'ranoned Bhutto* who 
at chat time v/as in UQM York from the UN, As soon as Bhutto 
reached t'rikistan, Yahya Khan trcmsfafred powcsp to Bhutto AS4IO 
became the iVesident of P^ i s tmi , 
After asaiming pov?er, Bhutto released i3ieliGh Mujib 
mio was flo^^ frcsa L^ihore to Delhi. ^Jhetkh Mu^ Jib soon l e f t 
for Dacca from Uevi Delhi and aasisaod the charge of the Prime 
iUnister of Banglade^i, Ihus iiiQ East Pakistan, "ttie erst\jhile 
I5astern Wing of Pakistan, becaiae on independent country named 
Bangladecdi^ 
StmUf *> If 
BWTfO BfiA 
ttk aa iat«nnev vith faooas ItaUan Joaraalist 
OiPiaoa Fallaei tlia Iat« Prlo« Minister of Pnkiitaa 
ZtUflkaf All Bhato adailttadt "Zhare ara nraajr eooflieta 
la Ba* X am avare of th^t. I try to raeonello thani 
otrareooa thaot, bat I do not aaeeaed and I ramalii this 
fitraaga ralactare of Asia and EUrooa. I imv a layataaU 
adaeatloQ and a Muslla apbrlQginK* tty alad Is wastara 
and Bjr aottX i s aastam",^ In tha sase latarviow ha 
dLalnad that *tha ra^ son I hava beaa abla to ovareoma 
the troabla la th»it I kaov tha fteadfMiaatal rala of this 
t)rofa88ioa» Ifhat i s tha rola? v«ll | in polities yoa 
aoBatlmas hava to prataad to ba stupid and nidca others 
believe they are the ooljr intelligent ones**. 
Thsm seened to be personal (malitias of Bhtitto 
bat they also reflected the policies of Faklstin 
Ctoverivseat during his regiaie* He started his political 
l i f e as a ainlster in the Ayub Khan cabinet and for a 
1, Oriana fallaoi, Zntarvlev with History, (lev Xork, 
1976), p«S02. 
2. Ibid., It.209. 
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Xiong tima h« psrfomiod his duty f^ilthfolly, Th«a, h« 
ttiraed against hlg master and coatrit»at«d largely to 
Ayab*8 downfall* B9 was tfabltlous aad hit oaiii aia van 
to eapturo power and to keep it* Ho doubt, he oame to 
power ia the nost critical time in the history of 
Pakistaa which eaa ooly be eonoared with the early day a 
of the eoaatry when i t was created. 2B fact, this 
coiBplex, highly skilled, aad ambitious politieian was 
given the mandate to refashion on Jionah's dream minus 
the east wing. "If we compare Pakistan ia 1947 with 
Pakistan in 1@71 the political tiroblwas appear to be 
almost ideotial. The search for national identity, 
the development of tjolltieal rules of the game, 
consensus • development regarding a new eonstltuion, 
relation between the centre <ind provinces (political 
m& economic), the roles of political parties, the 
siilitary and the c ivi l servies, tmoag others". 
It was a difficult Job for Bhutto to solve all t;iw< 
problems but he was equal to the t»s&# 8e started his 
tenure by freeing Itojibur Hahnan who vas in orison sinc^ 
March 36, 1070 and offered him the post of Prime 
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Minister or tht President if th<«t eoold preserv* tiw 
^onBuena of P i^lristqQ". This vas Jast « Bhatto 
giiamiek betmaso h« kaev thnt 3h«lkh Mujibor Bnlssiiii 
voUXA QOt iGceot his offer. Bat i t vat a clever 
taeticB as i t eohaaced his popolaritjr aaoag the 
Paklstiai masses. There was amther reason behind the 
offer to the Sheikh. Bhatto*s rivals had aecased 
that he was responsible for breaking np the eonntry. 
Ttmfe woold be no fatnre for hia in a noited Pakistan 
bae«)ase his bases and snuisorters were only in Ifest 
Pakistan. Being the leader of tt» majority wing 
Moibar Raissan would have been the fatnre leader of 
Pakistan. So i t was said that Bhntto vorked for the 
break ap of the country, )6ihaiaBad Itenir points oiitt 
<*It i s alleged that Mr. Bhutto was orinarily 
responsible for the cessation of Sast 
Pakistan. In this emineetion i t i s stated 
that as the national assesibly was to sit at 
Baecai Mr. Bhcttto prevented neidiers of the 
national assesbly froa Vest Pakistan froa 
going to Dacca by threatening then that he 
would break the legs of those who went to 
Dacca. He also tore to Pieces the foolish 
resolution in the 0170 which had proposed that 
the two belligerent states should revert 
bo their original position before the war 
had begun, ton on that aide and I on this 
4 yil^ Mffigtgft FOgtf «^tta«ry 18, 1972. 
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sld«| Is another expression oa vhleh Blmtto ii 
Alleged to hnife adressed to Ma Jib t**^  
Thus to get rid of th i s ehnrge Bimtto offered Sheik 
Ifajibar B i^hsaa the Fresideatship of P ik is t ia . 
However, once the Mlijibar issue was set t led, he 
taraed his attention towards internal prt^lems of 
Pakistan* The f i r s t ismie was the l i f t ing of martial 
Inw. There were demands by the opposition that aa r t i a l 
law should be l i f t ed . Bat Bhatto wanted to fu l f i l 
th i s detiiand only If the Interiai constitutions adopted 
bjf the national Assembljr, which was finally endorsed 
in 1073. Although scaae of the luartial law regiaations 
reaain effective t i l l August 1973, I t was foroally 
l i f ted in April 1S72, Martial law was l i f ted only after 
the adoption of the interim constitution according to 
which Bhutto remained the Preftdent. Be l a t e r on agreed 
to retarn to parliamentary form of governinent and a 
compromise was reached by the end of 197S betwewi the 
government «ind the oppositions 
6. Htthawnad m n l r , ffgpB ^Bflflfa $g..aiai (D»lhli 
Akbar Publishing House, 1981), pV85. 
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*Th9 Bsla points of tiecord botw«ea th« 
goveroiseat nad tbm opoositioa werss 
(1) «t feddral tmrllnasatiry systen with H 
Prism Minister na chief exe(»2ti¥« 
naswembltt to th« Nqtioanl Assembly) (11) 
the ^resident would be elected by ^bsolate 
snjority of n joint session of the Senete 
iind the Intional Asseidily mnd tfould be a 
figare he%^  onlyi ( i l l ) the Senate voald be 
oonposed of sixty)three aembers — fourteen 
elected by e«eb Provincial Assei^ly, five 
fros trisbal areis end tvo from Isl«imabnd| 
Civ) the n^tlonil assembly woald be 
elected by the nooulation us e vhole; (v) 
vote of no confidence could be saoved ag«ilnst 
the PriB» Minister only i f the mover gave the 
name of mccessor) and (vl) two l i s t s of 
oowers. federal and concurrent, would be 
established,*^ 
Thus Pakist«!in, at las t , got a civilian constitution 
and the tjarliamentary form of Government ttnd<»r Bhutto. 
The most difficult problem that faced Bhutto 
in the early days of his reign was the problem of 
prisoners of war who were languishing in India, He 
struggled hard to solve this problem and his efforts 
resulted In the Simla Agreement: which he signed with 
the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Qandhl. 
••By tiMf aummar of 1^3. he had cooled 
oassions at home sufficiently to be able 
to travel to Simla to meet Mrs. Indira 
Qandhl. After a week of bargaining, she and 
Bhutto signed the Simla Agreement, which 
6. Robert Lawrte, Jr, , Power and Privilege, 
pp.<?|,1^ , pr).106«107. 
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proffllsed to g«kV« back to T'»iklst»«a both i t s 
tjpisonsra <tnd I t s twrl topy in retara for 
th« acceDt»iace by th^t Qi^ itlon (Paklstna) of 
the priaeiT>l9 of 'bilnterallsn* la d««llag 
with th« probleia cfmceraiag South Asia," ' 
l a fact , Bhtttto took several iD«!iflap« which 
enraad hi» aympathy lad popularity inside the country, 
fired several high ranking officials in the irffiy, 
the navy and the air force and ordered and inquiry 
into the military debacle. He visited several 
Muslira countries where he was assured of their 
aipnort. All these meamires helped hia in his aegotia* 
t loas with India and led to the conclusion of Simla 
agreement and the return of the ''OWs. Kaaaleshwar 
Sinha quoted a pol i t ica l analyst as sayingi 
"Mr. Bhutto aicceeded in getting aa 
endorsement of the Pakistani position 
on withdrawal of troops and reTjatrlation 
of POWs from most of the countries he 
vis i ted. Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Ouinea, Turkey, Iran and 
Marltania clearly stated that the with-
drawal of trooDS froBJ each oth?»r'p 
te r r i to ry and reoatriatlon of POWr should 
take place as early as oossible in 
accordance with the Wl resolutions and 
internatioaal coaaoltations* Tkxrkey aadl 
Iran also laid stress on a 'durable and 
honourable settlement* which the Indo»Pak 
f^ ummit should lead to . Somalia went a 
7. Shahid Javed Burki, fsKUtllll, %^n g^ftttg I?71"l?77i (Loadons The MacMiUaa Press Ltd . ) , o.74. 
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stQD fartiitr «ad «3C9r«8s«d Kspoort for 
*aalty ind Intagrlty of Piiklsti«n', I,»bqnoa 
and Iruq, on the other hand, only referred 
to tho solation of Indo-Pnklst^in Issues 
within the fr^ mewoifc of the O.H. charter, 
or in accord with the Wf resolutions. 
Sthiopia and Migerla merely expressed the 
houe that the Indo-Pak smonit would be 
fruitful ."^ 
Tlie world wide clamour for the saccess of lado-^^k 
StUBOiit pat laresmre on Indlr* Oandhl to r^'^ch an 
accord with ^^}rist«jn. Thus by cawnsiglolag outside 
P(nklst!^a, Bhutto managed to obtj^ln release of im>re 
than eighty thoos^^nd prisoners of war. This enhanced 
his prestige at hoiae as a st«»tesir.«ia mid helpsd him to 
fashion Pakistan iccordlng to his own wishes. 
The nroblems faced by Pakistan when the cess«»tlon 
of i t s eastern vluf took place were eacrinous but in 
a way th i s urav^d advantageous for hlw. The reason 
%ras that a l l the Droblems were creation of his successors. 
^He could not be assocl«(ted in any way 
with the misdeeds of tho atfffilnistratioa 
he had displaced, since he had for long been 
i t s ajost unsT)flrlng c r i t i c . Secoadly, 
ha had cleared-cut ide^s as to the sha^e 
which ^akls t in 's Intarnational relat ions 
should in future assuioe. In the third nlace, 
he had considerable exDerlerjce of Inter-
national dii5lomaey, in which field he had Q 
already won tha rtsoaet of forf=flga statesmen.* 
8. Karaaleshwar Sinha, mU^^H ^ILPUit^gi (Delhii 
Indian School axnuly Stent., 1972), TJ.IW, 
o% 
In 9 brl»»f time Bhutto could est'^bllsh himself us a 
aachfliHeaged polltlel^iti of P«?klBt»ia, who hnd to shune 
the destinjr of the eoaatry. Oace settled at hosei he 
begsQ to t3«y fflore s t teat loa towtrda the foreign policy. 
^ofpim rM'^^ 
•*M«lii ob;I©ctives which Bteitto worked for in 
the fiald of foreign relfltlons werei Firs t 
t o restore the confidence of friendly countries 
in the future of Pqkist^n in order to rnise 
the !aor«ile of the nation. Second, to have 
friendly reT«!tions with the Sutler Powers. 
Third, to secure an honouribis peqce with 
Indt»! on equnl terna. Fourth, to se t t le 
s l l nroblews with B«ngl)^desh. Fifth, to 
restore foreign, econoniie assisttnc® which 
v<?is vl t^l for her future develoBS^nt, Siscth, 
t o iBwrove the imafe of the country abroad, 
esTjecially in the K^at where i t had been 
baldly ^arrl^d.**^^ 
Bro-'dly following th i s fromework in 1S74, and 
due to the iiedl«ition of Huslisi leaders who caaa to 
"jJiTtlcl^jate la the Second IslanJic SuiMit, he re -
cognized Bittgladf'sh and Wijib irisited Lahore and was 
oersnaked to droo his deaand for the t r i a l of 195 
11 
!?rlsonars ^ho were accused of war crliaes. 
The Islamic Suaait, which was held la Lahore in 
10. |b^df^ oo.110.11. 
11, Ib id . , 1)0.119-20. 
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l^?4 vns n alfQiflc«!at eveat for P^klst^a nn^ Btmtto 
ns I t eohsnced his T5opul«rlty Internmlly aad extor-
a«illy. t.P« Rttshbrook Wllliaras so wrote aboot the 
Iffiijortnne© of the Suajsiltf 
"ffiie events connect »cl with th«? I signal c 
Saiamtt DOSSSS n slgnlt'lcsace which did 
not ^senn^! the notice of foreign observers. 
I t wne renspyked both la thq rTF^A nsd ia 
Britain th?!t the focus of influence in the 
anb-eoatlnffnt se«w!9d to bn tEoviae «^w«jy from 
lew Delhi towards Islnm^biid. now secure in 
i t s TJOPltlon laoag tho c^tjlt'ils of the 
brctherhood of Islamic countrles. The 
Onnrdi«fa noted th»it tha Isl'^mle Suimit at L'jhore 
vnn ^ bigger meeting th^^n the B«iadaag eonfo» 
rence which started the non-aligned movement 
in 1956, and the ^oaper described the world's 
newest club ss richer 'ind uotentl-'lly nasre 
powerful th«n nost of the old l ike the jjg 
Coinsionwe!*,?th nn^ the noa-.fili|rnfd club.* 
So, by 1974 Bhutto h?!!d the Sirali agres'BeiJt *iQd the 
IslfiiDic conference to his credi t . ' 'nklst'^a's rslJitions 
with both the suoTjer now^rs h^d consldere'^bly iiroroved. 
In fnet, Bhutto's i5flnsn®5»nt of foreign re l i t iona ej^rned 
grest resDsctnblity for Pnklstqn which w^s in doldruas 
lifter the 1971 wnr. 
^ n g a i c PoUs^ @,g 
While Bi«tto wes busy fmiaing n new constitution 
end «i new foreiRu policy for ^gkist^n, he could not nay 
12. IM^* 
t)e7soa*il «tteatloa to thti B&sacmj of tho eoantry. H1X 
1974 tcoaoay wis looked ntt&nt by tbm left fnetloQ within 
th« ^PP* This hud ftr retching effects for Bhutto. Ssys 
Shahld Jived Bafkit 
"^l^le Bhatto busied hinself iaproTlog 
PukistDQ*? ijiifige ebrond nod ProHdiag the 
eonat rjr t iiev set of politienl mtd adtalalitra* 
tive lastitatioasi the left vlthia the PPP 
•dBdoistxatlea asstiaed control of eeonoide 
deelsion*Biilring. 9he left ves able to essasn 
control as i t was the onljr fietioa vlthin the 
party and vlthin the nev adolnistratioa that 
had doTeloped a prograisw of action. It also 
had the leadership that^vas politically 
acceptable to Bhutto.*^ 
Mt this vas not liked by the other factions of the 
Pakistan People*s Party (PPP)i 
"fhe power that vas veilded by this faction 
was far oat of proportion to the political 
sttptJort that i t could claia within the 9Vf 
constituency* fhis beeaise clear as the 
groups that were hurt by the left 's econostie and 
social polici'^s b«gan to rally against i t . 
Within less than three years of the left 's 
ffianag<Hsent of the oountry's eeonoaic oolicieSf 
»iffieient counter oressures had built up for 
Bhatto to ao?e against his socialist cabinet 
^lleagues. In the now Cabinet sworn in 
by the Priiie Minister in October 1974. the 
left lost several key positions. At this 
stage, an effort was made by the Priine Minister 
to depoliticise economic decision making bat this 
effort for reasons that had to to a great deal 
with Bhutto's personality as well as with 
political dynamics generated by left oriented 
policies, did not succeed. In tto automn of 
1971, Pakistan entered Into a phase of decision* 
making without constiraints.*!-* 
13. Shahid Javed Burki, Mtft^S ?ffto ilMtlfli 
ou.cit., p.108, 
14, Ibid., P.109. 
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So tho nsatg«B0Qt of PfiklstitiU ecooomy during 
tli« Btaitto 9rtt eiia bo dividod lot© two owlods. First, 
•conoBic vmmgewmnt uador the left fnctlon of the t*PP 
(fros tiio tiao Btmtto msaaiaed power to Obetober 1074 
when Bbutto reooved left fro« bis e^blnet). Second, 
eeoQoaile Banageaieat aoder the direct stipervlfloQ of 
Steitto hlKseif. Bat why did Bhatte tlloved the «»? left 
fflctloa to t«ike Isdeoeadeat ehnrge of tt^ Pikltt^iQl 
eeoaooy end what did wlieaste the left froa other 
sectloas of the PPP? Amoag the reescas for the sweeping 
success of the Paklst^a Peoples* Purty la the Puajab sad 
aiad la tlM 1970 electloas WAS the progrimae of soelsl 
sad ecooosric refers which i t hsd put forwsrd aader the 
leadership of Bhutto* fhls progrisBse asde It deepest 
appeal to those parts of the eouatry where 1 a<&istria 11 sa* 
tlea had aade aost progress? bat i t also weat far to 
coaflra the lalsglvlags weiy real If less articulately 
expressed la other areas, that there was soawthiag 
radically wroag with the way la which thiags had beea 
IE 
aaaaged la Paklstaa la the past". 
The prograBBse of social aad eeoaraiie reforms oat 
forward la the PPP aanlfesto had raised topes of Pakistaal 
people vho, after Bhutto caae to power, expected sooe. 
thlag froB his adaiaistratloa. Sloce Bhutto had to 
16 t.F. aishbrook Willlaias, nUtm ?fffl^ g (JkMfmft 
Stacey Xateraational, p«151. 
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coasoXldnte his position, idaaing slectlonsi he hud to tak> 
cettnisk uoftsares to fulfil asDlr^tiona of th9 eoanoQ nan. 
Aad, this vnB tha r««8oii thqt Bhatto g97e ehmrge of 
P«kist9B*s oeoiioiqr to tho PVP left vhleh took eertnla very 
mmviag ise«iaare, ullea^tlag other s«etloas of tho P?F« 
However, Bcotamiei OQasures tskoa by tha Bhutto 
e^blaet cin broadly b« divided into throe headst (1) 
Qfitlonalisitloa of ladustrias a^d fiti^ineliil inatltatioaS| 
(11) luboar rafortas l^ad; (Hi) land reforms. Darlog 
tha aleetioa eant)«lgii Bhatto hid aeeased 22 blf ladast-
rial fflmllles of Paklstio for tha accaoolatlon of vaalth 
in few hnads. To iMprova eoadltions of tha naopla of 
Pnklstna ha had proalsad to antioitalisa basie iBdastrles 
ftndi 
"••«vithia oaa noath of tssaaing eoatrol 
of tha admlolstration, tha l>Pt> had folfIliad 
tha assaatials of this pronlsa. la Janaary 
1972, the goverooeat aaaouneed a prograaiia of 
natloaalisatloa aioed nt the pablie takeover 
of thirty-one large firma In tha 'basic* 
indastries. Tha iadagtrles affected by this 
deelsioQ InelQded iron aad steel, basic metals, 
haftvy engiaearing. notor vehicle assenbly aad 
ffiaaofactare, tractor assembly and naaufactare, 
heavy and basic cheBic^ls, petro^ehendleals, 
cesf^ at and public utilities* Ibmestieally 
owaed l i fe inauraaca cospanias vara also g^ 
brought under the eoatrol of the govern&ent.** 
Ifi, Shahid Javed Burki, MJUlmJaSsOlKJlifi* 
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To farther ve^kea tho hold of the iadastrinllsts 
on ecoaoogr, the Bhatto ftdminiatratloat 
'^••.aader *mqosgiiif egeaejr «iid eleetioii of 
direetors order 197S*...«aaoaae«d the abolition 
of mnn^ging ngenef systeffii tenaiofttiof th<» 
^g*ats* ^urefficeatfi «ad coatr«cts without 
eoerpeasatioB. (The order similtiQeously 
Abolished sole selliQg efeaeies). Control of 
co?(m«>aies Drsvioasly wielded by the »«i!itgitif 
agencies v9|-tr')Q8ferred to the directors of the 
^xnl^ining the !a<iQ<igiag Qfeacy systea tr ie QQst«}f8oa MfBt 
•^ trader this systei8| the aimagcHBeat of » 
eomnny i s given over by i t s directors to a 
isnnagiag agent, a separite eorpornte entity 
vhieh then has a relatively free hand ia 
running things. The opportunities for 
siphoning off profits mid patting then where the 
shareholders of t l» actual operating company 
have no control over then are obviously 
eoasldt>r<)ble. Sole selling agents have the same 
convenient property, goods produced cnn be sold 
to the sole selling agent at artif ic ial ly low 
ttrices, thus allowing the profit on the books of 
selling agent and i t s control rathar than under 
th«jt of the operating company.*^° 
8r, Mab^ sMr R>isan, the then Finance Minister of 
Paklst'^n dabbed the managing agency systea ns "one of the 
worst institutions of the loot '^ ad plunder through which 
the creams of profit M^S skiaimed by a handful of oeooleeho 
17, M. ^ I c Oustafson, ffgalgppnry.mM^g, ^ 
MIlJLsai (I.9l<Jenf B.J. Bri l l , 1974), 0.62. 
IS, Ibid,, n,83. 
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%*er« ibl« to coat pel e^oltal worth aboat Rs,50,000 or 
Th«s« two Boasares had fsr roachlng effects on 
P«kl«tqn'8 •conomlc Ufe. The aost iaportaat iKuact 
of the aationalieatlon prograame was that a sease of 
tmcertaiQty grlpoed big baaiaesit hoases of Pakiitatt« 
"The orivate eaterpreaaurs were confused aboat the real 
latentlons of the govermieat and the adalalstratios wee 
aot directed t^ nrovld© concrete assarince to thw*. 
By iatroduclQg the concent of nationalisation, Bhatto 
aot only r?,aieked the ladastrlalist but also gave a 
cornnletely !^ w turn to the economy of Pakistan, 
After nationalisation tf^ Bfntto adBialatratioa 
tamed Its attention towards th» labour force of 
Pakistan and Introdaeed a amaber of lab«ir reforns that 
radically changed laboar relations In the country. 
In factf there were tHaaber of reasons behind sach a step. 
Shahid Javed Barki reaarkst 
19. Dor. Mabashir HasaUi BaiLlJtOflJSIiSJSt 17 Jaoaaryi 
1972, pp.1-2. 
20 Shahid Javed Burki, MUPBjmV Plfflil^ 9t P»U6. 
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^OrgiQised lodttitrlnl Itboar had clayed »« 
import «iQt role la pott log Ayab ^na oat of 
office. In H mmhat of cities, nurtictilnrly 
ia tli0 iciaastrisl ereas of Lahort »ad 
ttyjillpar, the iadaatrial worker hsd beea 
tlso sigrafic«iat ia getting the ?PP o<»adidnte 
to wia Sntioa i^l «iad Proviadal Asserably se^its 
. . . . Tht WP hnd von the sapnort of the 
some of the workers sad aaioaa on the basis 
of the orofflises thnt iaeladed n 3abst«jQti<il 
i!!ipro7eia«5nt in workiag coaditioas nn well^as 
n sabstqatiil ioereese ia miaiaan w^ ges.**^ "^  
^ t this was aot the oaly ve^ isoa* There were soae 
iiaoort«iat oolitic^1 factors also thit cojipelled the 
P?P iidMiaistritioB to go ahetd with n aev set of Ifibour 
reformsi 
»fhe otttlook ia 1972 wns griia iadeed. In 
aaoy of the iodastriil tre*is...uar«st bsctme 
serious a^d fir-retehiag. Strikes lad sit 
ias dletrupted eatlre iadustriss, la soae 
c^s©S| these iroveraeats were geaaine protests 
«g^iast setl^s of uay nnA coaditioas of 
workiag which were reF r^ded iatoler^iblej bat 
in other crises the aarest vns delibretely 
forscated by pollticd groups which, hJiviag 
failed ia the electioas to secare popular 
sapoorti were BOW Joiaing with sabversive 
elements to upset the govermieat...***« 
Therefore, wlthiag sevea weeks of assumiag no^etf 
the Bhutto sd!aialstr»»tioa introttaced sueh Isboar reforms 
which easured workers' right to form uaioasi their 
right to bargwia collectively aad to go on strike. 
Says Hushbroek Mllliarost 
21* Ifeii'f p.120. 
32T F . Bushbrook Williams, Paki8t,?a gfltitgg Cfe»Ugy>g9t 
fiE*Sil,M P«S5S. 
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'^ProvisloQs of fisr-ro^ehiof eoam'meQc«s hiiv« 
beoa aad« la the lav to ea8ar« tii9 anhiadirod 
ixavth of tmte aaions wad tho 9rot«etloQ of 
th« rights of thelf aenbers* A sajor step la 
this dlreetloa Is tho Mttiog up of tho 
National lodastrial Rdl«tioas Coamtisslon vhleh, 
botide8 bolag vested with Jadlei^l powers to 
deal with e^ses of anfair l^bouf pfactlees and 
labour dispatoS} has beea assigfied the 
respoQslbllltf of proaotlog the foraatloa of 
trnde onions and their federatioas at loeaX 
as well as i t aatloaal level,"^^ 
Similarly, to leg'flly nrot®ct workers* right to collec-
titraly bargain and to go on strike n nuQber of measures 
wer<9 t^ksa* For last'^neej 
"Tho aatsloysr enn no loiger d*?cl'»r« a lodcout 
in fm»iemenee of a legal strike nor ean im reaove 
any fixed assats fro® the establlahraent while 
a legal atrik«» i s in rjrogress. This prohibi-
tion removes what was once a major weapon 
of the employer ia frastraring l9g«»l strikes, 
farther to strengthen their oosltioni representa* 
tive anions i^v ha ire the right to nosinate 
ahoTs stewqrda and workers represent at Ives on 
the management of the Workers Participation fand 
by me^ ns of which workers Cf^ a purchase shares 
and acquire shareholding rights, fbey can also 
spnoint auditors to check on their behalf the 
•ccounts of factories ew^rf year? 
To check arbitrary dismissal of workers froa: their 
4ob8, the governraant araendcid labour laws in workers* 
favour. ?he labour force was giveai Hhe right to t?ike 
natters to the labour Conrt on their init iative) this 
Move h«id previously required the consent of aanagement*,^ 
2i Ibid., pp.154-65, 
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To further pleas* the labouf force aom& other aeasaras 
wofo also aanoaaced* **?s3n3i®iit of bonus was Bade 
cofflpulsoryi proftt sharlof vas apped from tvo to fear 
por ceot} the Dayrasat by the workers of tw3 pereeat 
wages for medical f ac i l i t i e s was abolishedj provision 
for old-gg© mansion was announced| and emnloyers were 
required to provide education UTJto watrle for one child of 
encfa worker**. 
After anooaaeiag such radical measures, Bhutto 
warned workers tsi grave eotiiseiaeaees i f they continued 
to resort to unwanted str ikes end unrests, la an address 
to the nation he dselar^di 
"'Qheraos and galooa' ( s i t - ins and processions) 
seeass to have becooe order of the day. th i s 
unraly and rowdy practice, negative l a i t s 
Tiurrjose, anarchist in i t s approach, n i h i l l s t i e 
in i t s resu l t s , has been endured regrettably by the 
goverment and the t»©oole for over seven weeks. 
I t I s a self-destructive orocedare. The Btjority 
c^ tfc^ Deoole have shown their disgust over t h e n 
demonstrations of ^looliganisn... National leaders 
have st50kea against i t . . . Taking a l l these factors 
into acc(nnt now I want to make i t clear that 
the strength of the street will be met with the 
strength of the s ta te . (This) intolerable fora 
of threat and tlKinder Bust stei>#''3S 
1?S, Tbid.y t5^.85-86i 
as . Z.A. Bhitto, gak^st«?n Ttrees. 2 Hoveraber, 1072, 
pt3 . l * ^ . 
S4 
Tims Bhutto's laboQr policy c^a briefly b® sainissdl 
ttp AS the policy of carrot gad st ick, l a order to 
coasolidats i t s buse within the working forc« of ^^klstani 
the Bhtttto led PP? OoverEiaent taoouac^id » niiffiber of 
rsdl.cil labour rsfofss which were unheard of l a tho 
history of Pakistan, 
After lidanlng over indust r l i l worl^ers Bhutto 
turned his s t tentioa towards rurnl noor which forced 
iBflfjorlty in th@ country nnS WRB » mtf lianort'^Qt 
ctsnetltU'ncy from th® ®leetor«l noint of vi©*r. "Ws ©<9Qi»t 
laave thf? fnts of oar peasnatry entirely to the aa«rchy 
of our T>riv*!ta Tjoasissioa, ThBTB mast be bold «Bd 
laaglaative Rpr^jri^n r?rofr«^ inm© wiraud Bt r®fcrra«tlon. 
the r«iafliuiag vestiges of feudalism rerpire to be 
roBovfid. Stflte Isads will be given to the l«Qdles8 
o@gsnutS| cooperative fsralag iri l l be Introduced oa a 
?Qluat'^ry b«!isis. the an^ll laud owaers will be exs^ipted 
fros! the isayraeat of land ris-veaue tad 3©lf»ealtlv«tioa 
will be l*iia dowB as a prliaelole of l«ad policy'*. 
87, Z.A, BtKitto, Ipggt^ea ia#^«^t^?ff^ffi B«%wlpiadi, ( Inlr t ry of Iwroraatloa), p .es . 
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So h>)d Z.A Bhutto promised to his rttral voters daring 
the 1970 election eaapsigas, Oace voted to oower, he 
in i t ia ted such land rdforms vhich no ear l ie r «<Mini8trn«> 
t ion had even thought in PnkistQa, Though Ayob Khaa 
had introduced the eoncopt of land reforms in t N ctoantrjTi 
Bhutto*t? l«jnd r-'forir. tsegcuras ware much more vadieal 
than «yub*s, "Previous att«!nr»tr> at l«(id reforms failed 
to h<5lp the fficgll farmer, because the ceilings imposed 
on inditrida^l l»nd-holdings were too hlght to s t t r t wlth| 
flud wore further relaxeed by exemptions covering 
orchardS| storof farmsf gtme preserves nnd g i f t s of 
jjgriculturnl land to female rel^tivos so that family 
28 
oroparty remained int'sct". 
But thP Bhutto idmlnistration "cut the l imit on 
holdings n«r indlvldu'jl (not p^r f%nill7) from 60C to 160 
irrigated »er«s ^nd from 1,000 to 300C unirrlgqted acres* 
tends »bov<? the celling wers t'^ ?cea irithout compensation 
«»nd i t v«*s ipncn3e«d thnt they ^otild b9 given free to the 
pe«8«intry. Inst^lF-^ats flue froin f^ rffi-r^ rs on account of 
the 1059 rfflfofr^ s v^tn e«ino<*ll0d, m6 ifbltrary ejeetioa of 
28» mshbrook IflLUisms, ^^1^1*^0,.^!^? ,Q^fiiU^n^i 
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tenants from the Innd ynu no longer pemlttedf they could 
be ejected only for non-payment of b«jtsln (the landlord's 
29 
share of the eron)". Tlo plag loopholes In the leglela* 
tlOH) the Qovernment Introduced eert^tin sieasares thnt atede 
i t alBost iBrornctical for Ifludlordij to eirf^aveat r e f o n s 
in their fiTour, These isoiimires weret (1) No coneessioa 
or e3«fflptlon grKinted under the 1959 reforms to be retnined 
• ••(2) transactions in land in excess of tiwi new ceilings 
after 20 Dece9!b?>p 1071 (the d«»te of Bhutto's t*ike over) 
were vo id , , , , (3 ) c ivi l ian off ic ials were required to 
surrender a l l lands in excess of 100 ^leres '^cguired during 
their tenure of service or in course of retirement, (4) 
land on tha ^nt Tt^ad^r Cgn^l In Baluchist^ia, the «>Qre« 
of laich bloodshed because of I t s anrjarent distr ibution 
to Oovernment favourites, Involvifig Inti^raal t r i ba l 
strufprles, vns to be rasixmed in I t s entlr'-^ty vithwit 
30 
ccwBpensation nnSt distribution to poor f'^rtaars", 
Me laad regulations also took care to protect 
tenants ' iataf^ssts. For instance, "in the n<BV Isndlort-
teaaat rel-itioasljip the burden of the taxation i s now 
©atirely oa the landlords while previously, in most . , , . 
30. Ib id . . P,8?. 
OR 
famixta now h»»v9 th« f i r s t ootioa to buy th© luad on 
which th«y nra working if i t i s put up for «« l9« ,^ 
In « eouatry wh«i*« ngrieultai'e fowsa the oajor 
shiire of •eoaomy, contributing 30 par cent of th« Oross 
SoBwstie Product tad accounting for about 40 p«r cent of 
th« country's exoort, l«ad reforas w«r« sore than a 
iMcessity. Secondly, oore than 60 per cent populatioa 
of ?Qki8tHn l ives in villsges ^nd to ooaaolldsta the 
F^? following ABiongst the rural poor land reforna were 
needed, Kaeniog nil those factors in his alnd, Bhutto 
Introduced meh land reforms which int ro^ced new elwaents 
In ?n!!<:ist'^ ri'.c flgr??ri«n relritionis, 
3c si do t-^king a nusibor of eccnonic dftasures, Bhutto 
alac s^ w to i t th^t various 'power blocs' operating in the 
country did not throw «ny chi^llenge to his Qcv9rn^.ent, The 
arjay hgd «»lw«ys be^n a r ivsl of © civilisQ Govera-uent 
in the country. Bhutto, nn sstute nolltlci^^a, took steps 
to ch?ck th« array thre«>t. There w r^'5 number of pol i t ical 
which h«d Ti^ ds the qrmy a competitor of c ivi l ian pol i t ica l 
21. Rushbrook Williams, H.iiUg^.a, ?ftt3Q?' <?^ ^^ U?flW» 
o p . c i | . | . p«160. 
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partios for oov»7. 
"thirtMn ynrt of rolo had l«ft tlw l>akist«ii 
afB7 an anpradietabla political foreo. Sonlov 
offieafa had gfown aecttstonad to paftielpatiag 
la and inflaoneloi aveiita that had Bothlag to 
do vith tholr Johf • lUfoetorahip of govarn-' 
Boat eorporatioaa, aaibasaaitorihipa, alletnoat 
of agrieoltaval land at givo avay prleos aod 
a vholo hott of soeeial privllagos had boeom 
aa aoeeptod booafit of offleo. Tho TahjTa Itbaa 
JnotKi ia paftietaafi had osEOOodod idl pravlous 
B07BI8 bf pradietiog olaetloasf aogotiatlog 
idth politieal partieaf aaaoaavrlag aad pltjrlng 
off OBO politleal group agalaat tho othai, aad 
ao oa* All th«8« eitlsloatod la Tahfa Khaa's 
proposal la ti^ oarky twilight ^ hia dtjrs ia 
povar that a eooatitatioa bo dvaftod ^oaariag 
tho araqr a peraaaoat ahara of poirof,**' 
Boiag vary aaeh eoaseloaa of M11 thaao f >ietof a, tho 
fif gt«tfdag Bhutto did aftor aisaaiag tho tolas of 
poiref van tho roshaffliag of tho an^. 
"Oa asauKlag of fleo aad ia his first broaden at 
to tho aatloa. oa tho 20th of Daoambor 1971| 
Bhatto appointed Xiiaateooat Ooaoral Qol Hasaa 
88 CoiBaaader.la»{%laf of tho arvy, aad air 
Marshal Bihia Khaa as OoBmaadar.la-Ohiof of tho 
air«>foreo« Ia tho sa»a broadetist ho aaaoaaead 
tim renoTal of six *fat aad flabby* goaaral 
foUowod by a Prosidoatlal ordor Issuod throo 
days lator la vhieh ha ronofod aaothor throo ndnlriils, 
thifoe aa4or«goBor»ls aad tvo air eooaaadorsy 
brlogiag tho total aasbor of saeked ap top brass 
to foartooQ.*®* 
*^ ?^«» gaygf Jtei^g, i QgiiUgiX nnmhYi 
(Bolhli Vlkas Pablishlag BoB8o}f p*148. 
33* IM&-t Pt»»l48«49. 
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Th« 798iiaffl« broaght ia Bhatto*8 loyal wmn in 
koy QositioQs of tbo nray aad th« )ilr«.fore«, 7et Bhutto 
hud im trust la tho gooor^ls ho had od'soiiall/ appointed. 
I!hi8 was ovldent fron his qetioa steklag Iiimttoaai^ 
(baeral Qui Hasaa and kit MafShal Bahia Khan* **Oi tho 
afteraooB of 3rd Kareh 197S tieutotiant Ooaeral Qui Hasan 
and Air Marshal ftahis Khaa wore saaaoaod to Baw<apiiidl 
and told to hand oror thoir r«8lgEiatioa8*.«,7bs tvo 
seoior offieors wort roplaeod hf iuMmhitioas profossioaal 
soldiers, Oeoeral Tikka Khan and Air Marshal Zafar 
Chovdhery**, At the saw tiiM a series of steps vore 
taken so that anqr stayed ia barracks. 
'^Strnetoral ehances were organised in the 
arsed forces so that the Chief of Staff's 
toor of Aity veold be fixed. With no esrtension 
allovedy varioas para-ailitary forces under 
indkipeadeot eoBnand were set up in order to 
balance the aray'a power. Under Article six 
of 1973 Constitution! i t was enacted that (attempt to conspiracy *:o abrogate or subvert 
the Constitutioa by use of force or by other 
uaeonstitutional swans, or aiding and abetting 
for the »fm9 a^ill be an offence constituting 
high treason".*® 
Ia spite of all these precautionary ^asures, 
there was an attenpt by the arny to overthrow the Bhutto 
Qevernment. "On 30th March 1973 the Ministry of Defence 
announced that a saall group of oilitary officers had 
3&. Ibid., P.149. 
36. Ibid., ti.150. 
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eonaplrttd to t«lso powsf. IkurlEig tha emxxm of tr ia l , 
presided ov»r hf n l l t t l * knovrn Brigndier eallsd 
}bihmmA Zla-til-Ha ;^, Biaitto personally •jesulMd th* 
roletant trial papers and iatslligenee reports aad beld 
discassioQS vith proaeeatioa lavyets. The officers vere 
foaod gailtjr and senteaeed to heafy terns of IsprisooaieQt^ 
fhia forced farther steps to diffuse the aris)f*s poverf 
therefore Bhatto took soae other aeasires to eoataia the 
army threat* 
"On Sth February 1076 Bhatto created a Jolait 
Chiefs 0^ Staff Ooaaittee. ostensibly to 
iategrate the defetiee systes* The Ceaaalttee 
was headed by Lie'iteoaot Qeaefal Hohaaraad 
Shareef, a person soeevhat renoved froe the 
other three services chiefs. The retiring 
Chief of StaffI Ceoefal Tikka Khan, vas 
appointed an advisor to the l>riM Minister 
mi national seeority^ with Bhutto personally 
retaining the defence portfolio* The 
^^ectlve of all ttmn^ changes vas to diffuse 
the army's political power.••^ 
Bhatto had once saidf "The people of Pakistan and 
the anted forces theaselves are equally deteraine to 
wipe ottt Bonapartic influence in the araed forces. 
Bonapartisin i s an expression which sieans professional 
CMS 
soldiers taming into profefisloaal politicians. •••" 
9S* ^bld, 
38. z.A. Bhatto, (poted by SolDaa Taseer, 28.*i^»t P«160. 
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Th« Btasufes Blmtto took to eontiiiii th* iray In btrracks 
eoaTlaeed hia of viplog out of *boBapftrtlo* laflaoaeos 
froa tlio arnod foreos. But tiio fosolt v«s far froai vhat 
Shatto iiad laagiiiod. 9oiio ^ his aetieaa was to holp hia 
*8tafo off the arny eoap la 1977. BhuttOf the astate 
politieian of PaklstaQy flaally mot his Waterloo at the 
very hands of the aray itself. 
'*Bhatto was a man of paratexes".^ The statement 
i s act meh off the aark i f seea ia the context of bis 
attitttde towards the opisositioa parties of Pakistan. 
Bhutto firaly believed in electoral processt provided a 
eiviliaa constitution to the eoaotry and tried his best 
to strenfthen deowcratie systea in Pakistan. Bnt he eoold 
never tolerate any kind of optjositien to his party role. 
His attitude towards the civilian opmssition parties of 
Pakistan was highly undcaioeratic and sutiutrltarian. 
"Ifhen first eaae to pover he had l i t t l e 
coapetition froa civilian opposition parties. 
Hsne had any rational appeal, and Bfantto's 
doHdnation of the d<»e8tie political scmne 
9Mm»6 eooplete. 7et he acted towards thea 
with an authoritarianiw that was anaeeessarily 
intolerant. Coercive aetheds were need such as 
withholding of newspaper advertising, the 
arrest of dissenting Jonmalists and %b» 
breaking ofpnblie aeetiogs (particularly those 
^ Asghar Khan) by P«»P toughs. The opposition 
39. Salaan Tas^ Mr, gp.e^t.y D.193. 
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WS8 glv«& no fieeess to tho aedia tmA nmi9pmp9Va 
and brefli(3e«stiag orfsiii8|tloas prootgated only 
The three Tsroadaeat opBosltloa groups Wnll Khan^ s 
UatloQil Awami league Party, Axgfatr Khan's Tthrlk-e-
Xsteqlal and Xslaii *patand* parties like Jamaftt»e*Islaml 
had to hear the brunt of Bhutto's wrath against his 
political optionents. though Bhutto had himself lifted the 
baa that Tahya Khaa had isiposed on the Rational Avasi Party 
{HP) and had allowed the KAP and Jasial-e-Olena Iilaa 
coalition to form gcvernments in North l^st Frontier and 
BaluchistaUi he disaissed the optsosltion ministries in 
these two provinces. 
'*Bteitto. for his part used his pover in the 
centre to underarine the authority of provincial 
goverriment which, in their turn, refused to 
eo-oper^te with the central gofernment. After 
continuous tansion and harsh^iofighting the 
National Awami Pmrty and JeBffiiiat«e-t71eB8 Xslan 
coalition in Frontier, the Vationel Awasi Party 
siinistry in Baluchistan were disaissed, and 
Ck>v#rno'*s rule ioposed in both the provinces. 
She assii^nation in l@7fi of Hayat Muhiaaed 
Khan Sherpao, tl» young ?P9 Governor ©f 
Frontier and Bhutto*s prii^ipal aide in the 
province gave Bhutto the excuse he needed to 
ban ti% national Iwaoi Party and shut i t s 
leaders in jtil."*^ 
40. Ibid., p.151, 
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Simllsrly, oth«? opposition parties lik« T9hrik*e» 
XftnqlaXi Jaaaat-o-Ialffisi, Jiia«iaat.fl-in.«Ba, Markail 
JaB8i«t«.AhI« Hadis ate* vara also the tafgat of Bimtto's 
authoritafiaa ptdieiaa. Aa aaiitioiiad thalr imblie 
naatlnga V9t9 diattirbad by tb» PPP toagha aad thay vara 
deal ad aeeaas to tha aiadla. 
While Biiatto harissad th© Satlonal hvnmi Party 
aad 7aiiric]»e«Isteqlal leadership by Illegal naaQSi ha 
fought Xal^m 'pasaad' parties oa politienl plane. 
''Bhutto*s t!ictlcs ag«»iaat thaa wara slapla 
but effactiva. Re aotieipatad aad folf lUed 
nny deaaad before they could rise and r^ise 
I t . Within a fev Booths of eoaing into pover» 
he allovod a record mtrsber of peraona to go 
for *Baj* — th§ annual pilgrlaaga to Ifoeea* 
Sabaequentlyf in the 1973 eonstitntion, he 
spQclfleally provided that Idl^is would be state 
religion aad the head of st«te a'*Mnslla. 
la deference to conservative Mnslin opinion 
he lictpiesced in 1974 in banning the Ahoadiyai 
i^uasl-Ialaiaie sect. . , .Be Bade Friday into a 
national holidayi founded variona governaent 
organisation for propagating lalaaie teaching9 
encouraged the Arabic laagaage and iotrodnced 
the Koran into school eurricttla.**" 
Bhutto*s dislike for dissent was not confined only 
to the opposition partieS| even his oirn party aeni who 
vera 'independent ainded and did not l ike his anthorita* 
rlan functioning had also to soffer. By 1974 he had 
42. Ibid., 0.152. 
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Aiienstod hlMsdlf from tb» l e f t i s t s of th« V1»P aad men 
like Dr. Mubashlr Hasan end A .J. Bahls vere not oaly 
foreed to resign but were even pushed to quit t i^ p«rtjr« 
Salmaa Taseer rightly points outt 
"Bhutto saw eneaies where aoae existed. In his 
ymiB of pov9tf he treated his political 
opponents as dangermiSf subversives, and suoeeeded 
in making then so* The Idealists and independent 
minded who ;}oined with him in the earljr days to 
make the PPP an instrument la Pakistan's 
regei^ratlon had al l l e f t him by the end. Some 
derarted hirni most were pushed. And however they 
departedI they were often hounded by Bhutto and 
his men....Be eould vkt bear equals and ensured 
that even within the l»P?, en slternative leader, 
ship never emerged. After his third arrest under 
the Martial Law government in September» his 
Wife Susrat was made partyleader. Even at this 
critical time he preferred a surrogate to a 
potential rival. He directed an incredible 
amottt of energy and skil l in attacking his 
enemies • And like Ooa ^^xots he often attacked 
iraafinary monsters, "^ ^ 
i^ ffffU9^g >1^ thf ft^ll 
This was the general political atmosphere in the country 
when the former Prime Minister of Pakist<tn| z.A. Bhuttot 
decided t b g o to the polls . "On 4th January 1077 he 
44 
announced elections for tim following March", Apparentlyi 
he iras in full command of the politics and was confident 
^2. JM&a.f P»193. 
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of sQother resoutuiiiig vletory at th« poII| ytmn h« 
anaoaneftd gemoinl elections tmSot the coastitatioa of 
1073, He veat to the polls *a oonfldeot aeai a stroog isaat 
arroKftst in his exercise of poireri and ful l / eoavineed 
that Pakistaa did not haee a leader of ecjaal detej»iiiia» 
tioa to ehalleage him, let alone reaove hia, la Janaai^ 
1@77| Pakistan did mt sees to have a viable alteroative 
4 S 
to Bhatto or his People's Party*. 
Aad there vera reasoQS for Bhutto to be confident. 
The reforms he bn6 introduced had &mne6 hia the sapoort of 
two very laport'^ nt segaents of society • industrial labour 
la urban centres and the rur^l poor in villages. Bat he 
had lost support of the alddle class - the backbone of 
the demoers^ tie systsm of a country* His eeonc»Ble reforms 
had seriously hurt this group's interests. T^he aiddle 
Class had been hurt by the eeoncHHie reforms that resulted 
in the tr<!nsfer of incomes from thea to low iacoae groups 
and also by the education policy that resulted in the 
governraent's ti^ keover of the institutions that had sped* 
fiC9lly catered to their needs. Ihe restructuring of the 
adainistrstivo system deprived them of employment opportu-
nities in the sector which had been their more or less 
45. Shahid J^ ved mrki, fafetstiB ?Fl^ gy I^ M^Pt X^'77i 
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oxelailva pf«ierv« for • long tia« sod to «hlcli tlMjr 
had aee«S8 oa th« bdsls of morit**, Besld* •eoooale 
a«ssiiT«t Bliatto*fi diataa^nvd tor civil libeftlet and his 
nQtoerntie ftyl« cf polities ehaekod tiio alddla elass 
tiartieiDiitioa into daeisioa stakiog proeoss. PuriOf tho 
1970 oloetioa and ovaa oaxllor Bhatto had proj«et«d 
m i«ag« of a pelitieiaa vho would involve 9V9Tf aeotioa 
of tha ^eietjr ia 'tmildiiif * a asv ?<ik:istaa. latoralljr 
this had attracted the e^eated aiddle elass towards 
the Bhtttto«>led P?i> and the class had bjr and large rallied 
behind his party* After assoaliic povery Bhutto turned 
an autocrat and the siddle class had to have a very 
different exoerience doriog six years of his role. 
Mtoy of his political actions like the i l l treat-> 
stent of the opposition nartles, the imposition of heavy 
censorshin oa nediaf snarieasiott of fundamental rights, etc. 
were far frcsm what Bhutto had oromised during the 1970 
election campaign. Ouring his six years of stewardship 
of Pakistani the middle elass felt suffocated and help* 
lesst This again became another important reason that 
"for th» elections of 1977 Bhatto went to the polls without 
^* lkld*f n.l84. 
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support froB Inrge s«ga«tit of tho slddlo elass^ la 
o^rticai^r froa thorn sovornl groups thut hni boon hurt 
by his eeoooffllc reforms his stylo of oco^nile Bsaafoneiit 
nad his p)irty*s Inability to straeturt n political systes 
that woQld havo brought th« mlddla elass loto aotlvely 
47 Into dl«cl8loii»makiiif rolos". 
Aftor the dlslUasloamoat vlth tho tvo saeeosslvo 
Rillltiry govermaeat8, th« f irst lod by Ayab Khaa and tho 
other by fahya Khan, Intelllgantla of the eoantry vas 
attracted idth Ihatto, Bhutto's aoderolst apt^ roaeh with 
K>clallst bleadlag la polities had a vldeapoeal for this 
group of society. Shahld Javed Burkl says that the 
lutelilgeotla of Pakistan <*had been attracted to Bhutto 
by his socialist leaolags and the close t i e s that he had 
48 
cultivated during the Ayub yenrs"* But after essuBlag 
the charge of the Qovernneat Bhutto even failed to Balotalu 
)»ld over this group, there were tvo reason for the 
dlslllusioament of Intelligent la with Bhutto. First, his 
authoritarian taaperaseati and seeood| his break with the 
socialist eleoeats of his own party. Burkl joints outs 
'nAien Bhutto purged his cablost of socialist elaawnts, ho 
47. I^^d.y p.187. 
^ * V^lt^f f P*1B6. 
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49 lost the support of this s«gm«at of tto alddXo olssi too. 
Tlias hf 1977 ho loft sapnort of «fioth«r verjr isportsat sad 
foeal s^etioB of Pnkigtnni soeldty. 
BimilnTXff mat other teotloms of the aiddle class 
like goveriffieat esployeesy bafeaacDiejr sod indastrlsllsts 
were also aohappir with the polleles of the Bhutto goTora* 
Bent. The rensoa for diseQehsatneat of the (tovernseat 
flisployees vns the "eaeoaragenent provided to the aa^lUed 
vorkers to sigr^ite to the Middle last sad the decision 
mit to profide cost of llviag eoBpeasatloa to goYernaieat 
workers",^ Owlag to new reforas Introduced by the WP 
Ooverrssenti the powerful el»ss of civilian bureaucrats 
felt diserisiaated against* 
The natioaalisatioa prograame of the Bhutto*s 
governn»Qt vas a major grouse for Industrialists of 
Pakistan* The programae eofering thirty two eoapanies and 
ten categories of basic inctostiyi including steelf 
4^«BicalS| heavy engineering! cesent, biaksi insurance 
eoapaniesy shippingi vegetable oi lS| rice hu^ing| cotton 
giniing and flour »IUs, vas sore than a blev for this 
group of people which weilded substantial influence in the 
mmmmmmmmmmmmmiitiimmmmimmmmmmm 
50. |l^|.f I 
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powtr bi^mrehf of p!iklst«ia, Quoting fumous P«klst«*Ql 
•eonoaist, }iniim I.is«y hns polntod oati '^ Hthllmb^al-fiiiqi 
fornerljr ehlftf •eoooiBie adTlser to the Ayab rogloe, h«8 
ch«rg«d thut 22 f ia l ly groups eontrollod, in 1966, two-
thida of iodustrial sssots, 80 oor e«at of baairliig and 
70 007 coat of iamtnnc9 in PnkiBtna, Tho ailitnry 
baroaaef^itie st^te w«8 no thro«it to tlio tm%f QTbaa bourgeo-
61 isle**. Bhutto*8 imtioiDiUsAtloii sehosw altered the 
oat tern of nover stfuetore nod pat the iodustrlsilists in 
n very defensive s t t te . Setor^llyi this eless vna also 
looking for an opoortaoity to strike back. And, the 1977 
elections proved n Ood sent opnortanity for this section 
of society, 
la 1977 political situation had taken an altogether 
different turn from what itwas t t the ttae of the 1970 
polls . Bhutto had lost suoport of Influential segoents 
of society. Minitary, bureaucracy, Bdddle class, in te l l i -
gentsia i governiaent enployees and industrialists all had 
turned into an arch rival of Bhutto*8 Peoples Party* 
When he decided to go to the pollsi he knew that he had 
been abandoned by the social, eeononie and political 
61. Madha Liaaye, •*;rinnah i fhe Liberal", |9Mfi£} 
2-8 May, 1982. Aaand Basar Patrika Publication, 
Calcutta, p.31. 
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groups th«it mad© OT) thi Pakistani middle c l i f s* . S t i l l 
ha was coafid«at of his vletory* H« was d«i3@adiQg oit 
the achleventnts of his goToraaiont. *!• belloTed that he 
had a strong reeord to defend his . Stabllslag Pakistan 
after the tfaama of 1971, prontilgatlng a eonstltntloQi 
liaplemeatiQg a vide range ef reforffiatiTe and legls lat i te 
sieamires particularly in the •eomnaie sphere, the return 
of respectibllitjr in the foreign polioy f ie ld , and perhaps 
the most important of a l l , holding the 1977 General 
saections. . . ." 
Bhntto had sensed the prevailing pol it iet l atnosp* 
here and he had prepared a new tactle for the 1977 elections, 
tfiilike the 1970 elections when he had appealed to every 
section of society, this time he cultivated a *aev 
constituency*. "Fron the sanner in which Bhntto prepared 
hlgrelf for the 1977 elections i t was clear thet he 
understood that the Bost inportant challenge to r eenti^ 
QUation of his rule wonld eoae froa the aiddle class. Be 
adopted two different tactics to broaden the base ef his 
support by cultivating elenents froa both the aoper and 
lower classes* Second, he attempted to prevent the 
53« Ibid*, T>«189, 
53. Sulaan T^teer, S£*s2J^*i o*161. 
112 
•asrgenca of a viablfi eowlltloa «moag tim po l i t ica l 
Qisrtles th^t raiaresentod the v>i;ioas middls elasa ItitefQats". 
This timm his emphasis was to voo the laoded geatary and 
the arbaa and itanl poor. If his policies had htzrt the 
in teres ts of the middle e lass , they had deflnetly benefitted 
the poor, both the iadustr lal workers and the rttr«5l 
oeasant* That was the reason that Bhutto s t i l l maaaged 
to raalatain an ImTsressive following, Tjarticnlarlf among 
the mpal poor. Be andonbtedly increased their share in 
the national cake even thongh the cake may have shrunk. 
Oovftpoment land was distributed to the tHsor, orwJuce 
nrices were subsidised by the Goveroraeat nnA taxps oa 
fiaall holdings ii^re reduced or abolished. The land reforms 
oroaulgated in March 1972 drastically reduced permissible 
individual land holdings frost 500 to 150 acres, and then 
asain i a January 1977 to 100 a c r e s " . ^ Similar was the 
ease of industrial workers. Burki sayst '*Kashar All Khea, 
the editor of the left-oriented Labour weekly View ooint and 
no admirer of Bhutto, claimed that by and large the working 
class continue to support him because they were benetted 
56 
in his regime". Another factor that held the poor's 
64, Bhahid Jaweed Burki, EalU!Sto-ilU3lS&»JJ2l222i 
55* Sulman 7aseer, p,155. 
66. Shahid Javed, p.190. 
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loytlty tov<»7d8 Bhutto vis the benefit i t derived froa 
'the renittaaces seat hone darlag the Bhutto era by 
iaigr»ints to the olddle e^ste*. Precisely, the ooor., . 
sny a ehaoge tor the better in their eeoimaie situatioa 
dttrlKg the Bhtttto period*. fh>it vm the retson thiat 
iQ 1977 election he was desperately wooing poorer sections 
of ttm society. And, "ia « country in which nearly one-
hqlf of the population could be classified ns 'absolute 
poor*, and in a noiitieal systen based at least In theory, 
on one nan-one-vote this strategy mn6m n great deal of 
sense**. 
To conn^naate the loss of the niddle class santjort. 
Bhutto tried to win over the landed aristocracy. Though 
the land reforms had eroded the influece of the landlords, 
yet they c(»inanded respect and awe within villages, ^here* 
fore, in the 1977 elections Bhutto depended on landed 
interests which was "deaonstrated by the selection of 
candidates tha PPP was to supr>ort in the e lect ions . . . The 
Ibors and Tiwaree of Surgodha, the Malik of Nianvali, the 
QuerahlB of Multan, the Bayag of Rawalpindi and Campbllpur, 
the Lagharis and Maearis of Dera Oaai Khan were b*ick in the 
57. Ibid.. P.190, 
58. m6* 
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Boll t lcsl mtman ns WPP ctadid^t^s".^® The eocond tmrt of 
his Ql^etion straietjr w«8 to stop any kinel of aoltjr Mioagst 
opr^ealtioa part ies which \mx9 in di8«Yr««y t i l l th« •loetioas 
were anaotmeed. Bhtxtto*s hopos v(»r« rootad l a th« 1970 
experi«nee« But i t was the opnositioa p i r t i e s which were 
going to give hiii a big shock. "The opr>08ltioQ shrewdly 
tsrojected nn inage of disunity.•..Assured that the 
sqoabblifig opposition would uever coalesce agaiast h is ??^ 
he amiouaeed the elections d^tes. TWo days l a t e r , the 
opposition announced the non-party Pakistan Hational 
60 
Ailiance". The new '*nine optMJSitlon narties th«»t merged 
to firm the H^A included groups both the lef t and the right* 
IBiaa Tuf^ul Muhaomad's J»iiBinat»e»l8laai, Maul«»na Mufti 
HuhaoMad's Jaa'sat.Ulema-e-Isl^ai and Maulana Shah Ahmed 
iloor«»ni's J'iEiatal-Uleisa-i-Pakistqn were Islanic part ies 
i?pr<?featlng various points of view regarding the conduct 
of the affairs of State on Isl«»mlc l ines . Air Marshal 
Asghar Khan's Tehrik^i-Xatiqlal, Plr P«iguro*s Pakistan 
Muslim League «nd Hawab Hasrullah Khan*s Oeuocratic Party 
and Sardar Abdul Qayyum's Asad Kashmir Muslim Conference 
were essenti«illy nartias of the centre, Advocating a 
S3. Ibid.T p.192. 
60. Sharif al Merjabud, "The Pakistan Bltctioas i An 
Analysis'*! P^P«' presented at the demand, i . e . , at 
Asam lateri^t ional Confef»nce, Colurabja University, 
9u i i Hflrch, 
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rotaro of oflrlitimentary Atmoerncf noa nr lvi te •oterorlsA. 
Sardar Sherbai* Msaarl*s Iffitional DeoocMtlc Party and 
Khaa Itohaiamad Ashfnt Khan's Khaksar Tahrik v«r« partiaa 
of the le f t believing in soma kind of stata ovoershlp of 
61 
c%oitiX and decentr*;lljsa4 government. Hot only the 
opposition pnrties of varied shades joined hands under the 
PSA umbrella bat also denonstrated their unity by unitedly 
electing Hawab Hasrullah as i t s President '^ nd Hafiq Bajiva 
IS i t s Secretary aeneral, Ihtis when the electioneering 
began the two rival poli t ical groUBs as the p»p ^Q^ the 
PJfA were challenging each other. Beyond al l exoectstions 
the oHA allience soon began to g»in moai^ ntum. The t ides 
beg*»a to turn and Bhutto had to f'ice a foniidabl© challenge 
froa the PHA which specially t r ied to e^sh on f^^ilures of the 
Bhutto government and the middle class disi i lusiooaent. 
The PtiA attack vna directed at Bhutto personally and thea 
centred on the issues of c ivi l l ibe r t i e s "ind infl'ition* 
E^hey accused the government of ins t i tu t ing oppressive laws, 
and pointed to the «^P*s ble^k record on press freedonii the 
curtdiluent of individual r ights , the masuse of state 
ffl««chinery and the broadcasting media'*. The ?NA strategy 
61. Shahid Javed, T),l9i. 
62. Suliean 7aseer, 0.160. 
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Tirovod 9 suecQSS. TBxm em&'omiga letdlng up to tho «l«etioas 
nroved n formi^nble chiilltoge for Bhatto, He was 
fitsnalled by the vahaoact of the ootiosition •g'iiagt him. 
H@t lifter tlX| VIS the saa of sasses mod the qtii>tld»e» 
A'vnmi tod Deoples* lead#r. ?et his opooneats neetlags 
were t)«cked whereas his pirty mea had to have recourse 
to massive goveri^^at patronage and lodttceseats to eolleet 
63 big audiences. The PUk attack oo the Qoverisaeat * s 
fnilttre on c iv i l l ibert ies , prices, Inflation and law and 
order put Bhatto on defence and in his speeches daring the 
campaign he had to find excuses for his lapses. For 
inst^ncoi in one sTieeeh he saidf 
"In 1970| I promised you democracy. In 1973, 
I gave you dwaocracy. toa aj^ed for particl-
Dacition at all levels of deeision^aaking. I 
provided you with that opportunity. I not only 
asked you to participate in the decisions I 
took, I also a^ed your persrission when I took 
the decisions that affected al l of us. Ton 
allowed me to send Hujibur fiahaan home; yon 
permitted me to go to Siiala to discuss peace with 
Madam Oandhi| you permittad to to go the 
countries of ttui Middle Bast to seek their help 
in our hour of i^ed. You and I have trusted 
etch other. But there are people in this 
country that do not approve of our association. 
These people have attempted to out obstacles in 
our way; to stop us from building a new Pakistan. 
They can do this because we have illmfed them to 
do 80. Should we continue to permit^^em'this 
63. |Hl?" P.161. 
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fr««doa? Host oet we ehurige tb« ral«8 of fniBe 
»} thut 007 Qrog7<inm9 tovirda m aev dyawle 
l»»!klst%n Is tmt coatimioasljr thwurted*.^ 
thaSf the eimpnigii fntt for 4S dny*. The f iv i l 
C1QQ8 contlQued ^ccasiag e«)ch other. Bhutto von 
grounds during the eloseof the e<iBi>fiiga, "Slowly but 
surely the tide beg^ in to turn la his ffivouf. Bhutto*8 
tiersoaal ewBOftlgolng brought musslve crowds on the streets 
even la opT>osltloQ e l t les l ike IC«ir« ML and there was 
grovlog eiildei«;e that while the speetaele of huge 
ODT^osltloa ral l leS | the majority of Punjab foters In 
particular, would settle In the eud for stability and the 
t)opull8t polleles that another term of Bhutto wianf*. 
^ t poll observers had also predleted that the ?{|A would 
mt be nueh behind the P^?* But the results threw a 
surprise for e'vevy one. The results surprised all oartles. 
The PHA lost In three of the four proYlnees. It won a 
sajorlty of seats In only one aajorlty elty, Karachi, but 
souadly beaten In Lahore, Lyallpur, Hyderabad, Multaa, 
fiavalplndl* The PPP*B success In the PubJab were It won 
the 93 ji%i cent of seats, surprised even the party*s 
leadership* The Pakistan Tlaes the paper owned by the 
64. Shahld Javed Burkl, p.181. 
65. Suleian Taseer, p. 162. 
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So\r9roti#at*6 Hntioaal ?r«ss Trust, «dsittod thut tli« 
party hnd *dorMi av«a hotter than «xp«cted ia th» Paajab". 
I'olltleil obsorvers •xpressad ittrgris* th»it th© 
r«*salts* the tfrda Itaifaaite di^ lljr ]l«v<ii Mikkt preilet«d 
th*tt for the ^rlo© Minister the f irst electloa period 
would be « period of trlaatpb but of trli l*,^^ And pre-
cisely tbis was vbfit happened After the eli»etioBs. 
Stunned by i t s defe«t et the pol l i i the opposltloa f irs t 
decided to boycott the orovlaelel eleetioaf. Bhutto 
weat «ihe«id with the provlacial pol l i , where the ?^P raea 
^4ln woa hnodsotaely. Oa 11 Merch, • dnf tfter the 
electloo to the provlaeltl ssseablles, the PSA decided to 
go to the street to protest «g%last the widespread 
8lc!cto74l fr%ad that had beeo perpetrated tt ttm imtrai. 
This led to a impasst, with the P»P prepared to great 
oaly fflicior irregularities aod the PWA demaQdiag fresh 
elections. Pakist'ta was then cleerly headed for s 
major political upheaval". fhe PHA anger against 
Bhutto soon turned into public agitation* P9A supporters 
ot5e!ily bi5g*n to fight police. On 9 April f irst clash 
between the police and the PSA workers took place on 
in tahore. Gradually the law and order beg<tn to deterlo* 
r<tte. After nearly six weeks of agitxtion, Z.A. Bhutto 
66. Shahld Javed Burkl, p.197. 
67. Ibid., P.197. 68. Ibid. 
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Imposed a^rtl^l Isw oa 21 Attril, Knrnehi^ Lahore, 
Hydarsb*id, three of the country *s foar Isrgest c i t ies 
vera placed aader milltiry coatrol. The 0P!:)08ltl0B'8 
aoY<»iiieQt ag«)ia8t his forced Bhatto to invite the allitary 
bnck Into the politieel ureoii. Bat the ersiy's nopen-
go 
rittce did not deaage of cpoosition", 
SeaBla^ the wild aiood of the PSkt Bhatto begin to 
r<)lont. He mede a mvaber of offers to the opoositioa 
vhieh tttrn#d thea down. Finally, the Prlaie Minister 
called for n couatry-wlde rafertadum to be held In 
Kid-Jane to isk the electorate of the coantry i f he 
70 
siiQuld contlf«i9 in office. The o9TH>sition refased to 
oblige Bhatto. There vas no place for a national 
rtfar'^ ndon; In the kind of constitutional system the 
opnosition to Bhutto wanted Paklstin to follow. Victory 
at the rofer^ndoiB would have increased Shatters stature 
encrmoasly. The opposition was not prepated to grant 
hiffi this optJcrtanity, The impasse contirmed t i l l f irst 
week of JUly Itself for street battled with the opoosi-
tlon. All through the movement against Bhatto, his 
sat)t?ort9rs had st'iyed in background.,.. On 8 Jiily, 
69. ybid. 
70. IliiflM P . l ^ . 
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Ooaeml Zii-ol-Haq st^ iged a bloodless coan d'«tqt 
dt8pl«iciag Bhutto iQd the ?i>T» from th« coatr« of T»tkl«t«iiil 
t50lltlcs,,». Thus eaddd P«klst»ia*s s«cond •xtsrlmeat with 
civllitia rule*. 
But th« tirmyU co8i»>bfick iato th« ceatro of polit ics 
did oot detsr Bhutto froa struggllof to r«vlv« his 
nollticfil future* Sorpritingly, oollt ies eoatlmted to 
r»?olv« around his persoaality t i l l ha vns huogcd to 
d««ith oa knTil 4 , 1979. Siya Barkii 
^Uthoogh out of power la July 1977, Bhutto 
eoutlwiad to donluftta ^iklstnu's polities for 
aoother 81 ooaths. ?or nost of this period 
Bhutto rtaslued la prisoa. His f irst iue i^ror*!* 
tioa WIS iQ the astura of protective custody 
ordered by Qeoernl Zin-ul-Hiiq to save hin froa ttm 
neoplo*s vr<ith la a polltienl elinate vhleh i s 
distinctly hostile to the former Prime Miaister. 
But the politioftl elimste begna to improvei oa 
17 July less thsa two weeks after the coup d'et<it, 
Bhutto addressed a large meeting of his foUovers 
oa the lavas of hie isiprisoaed prison* i^w time 
for lauaefaiaf moveaeats such as the oae that hn^ 
removed him vas overi he declared,. Ttm time had 
come for a revolutioo. Haleased frc i^ custody 
K>oa afterwards, he hesitated oaly for « momeat 
before sdvisiag the sup^rters that he would 
participate vigorously ia the eleetioas promised 
for October 1979 by the military regime.71 
He oov hBgna to prepare vigorously to participate 
71. Ibid., p.208. 
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i a the proolsed #lactloaa nad started vlsi t ing l!io*rt«at 
c i t i a s llk« K^mehl «ad t»ho7« wher« he «ittricted l i rge 
crowds. Bat sooa he WQS ch«i7ged with marder of his one 
time pol i t ica l eolleagiie turned ot)t)onent, Ahm^ id Rasa 
Kasari. He was ngnin arrested atider eriniiiial oherges 
na6 vna prosecuted et the tehore High Coart. The eoart 
foaad him guilty and «aooaaced I t s verdict oQ 19 Hsreh 
1978, flading him aa 'arch culprit* l a an aabash in 
Hovsiaber 1974, the object of which had been to k i l l 
Mm^d Bnza Kfisurl..,. The Court ordered Bhutto*8 
execution. 
Bhutto tu>w aooroaehed the Supreme Court and 
oersoaally assisted lawyers to defecui him. Legal efforts 
failed to save hia and on 31 March 1979 the Supr^ae 
Court UT)held the verdict of the Lahore High Court. 
Finally, on Aorll 4 , 1979, 2.A. Bhutto was hanged at the 
^walpladi J a i l . Thus came to an end the pol i t ica l 
career of the civi l lau leader, Zulflqar All Bhutto who 
had promised to build a new and dynaaic Pakistan. 
Chapter 7 
Thft leadtfrship crisis in PaklstAR is aot t r«coat 
ph«aoiietioa| bat i t s origin esa ba tmcdd to tli« dsys of 
Pfikistint soTeniant which vns ctasplttely domlii«t«d by th« 
ch«rl8Batie flgUF« of MohiiBbtd All ^lansh, R« vns Ilk* tho 
proverb!a bAnyma trse ander wfeleh nothing grows. It wis 
his return frois politienl radasn ia Leodoa whieh boosted 
a new Tigour la tht so f%r alagglsh struggle for the 
ere«tioB of Pnkist^a carried oa by the l^aliai League. Els 
public appeal tfioag the I^tislias of the mb^coatlQeo^ was 
overwhelaing and the MUSIIH Hieague leaders were aware of 
i t . fhis i s why Ilyiqat kli Khaa spent days la Loadoa 
trylag to parsaade Jianah to return to India and assone 
the leadership of Maslia League so that he can effectively 
counter the challenge posed by Mahatsaa Gastdhi and 
Jiswaharlal ITehru to the Pukistaa Moveiseat. Under the 
cireuiiistaaees he beeane the undisputRble leader of Pakistan 
•ad laid down the party policies according to his wishes. 
The Phase under which the miveaeat was passing through 
Justified this what could otherwise have been described 
his dictatorial teadencies and the situation could not 
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afford mo/ dlffeveacds of oplalon asong th« lo^dars of 
tho MUsliai Ii«agtt«* Bii t b i l i t j to taekl* eonftltatloaal 
Issaes von tho admlfatloti of hit frlonda and foes aXika 
aad i t was larg^lf t ^ Xcadaraiiio pfovidad hf M B that 
ttada i>o3slblo the cfaction of Pakiitaa OQ 14 Atigtiati 
9ha altuatioa did sot ohaago utich after the nan 
state east* lato being aad Jinnah remained the uaqaestiooed 
leader of Pakistna. His uatiisely death left the isaatle of 
reaDocisibillty oa his seeond«itweoni9ii(f Lifnqnt kli Khaa 
who had proved his capability dnrinif the raoveraeat to lead 
the aav stnte. Mt uafortanateljr t l^ ass«issliiatloa of the 
Llyaqat All Khaa ia 1961 led to *j leadership ricuaa as 
there vere QO proBioeat leaders of the aatiotial statare 
those who appeared oa the political se^^ vere iaeff icleat , 
laoapabXe aad selfish* They vere more Interested la 
peraoaal galas thaa ia aatioaal laterests. 
The coatiaoatioQ of the QoTerraeat of ladia Act of 
1 9 ^ after the oreatioa of the B«V state also had a 
disistrous effect oa the political developieat i a the eoaat* 
ry. It took the leadars of the oev aatioa eight years 
to decide vhst political systea eeuld be best suited to 
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the t>eople of Paklstaa and flaalljr a«ttled dtovn to th« 
t}4rli«Bentary fora of dwaoeraey la th« CoaatituioB of 
X956| fh« dolay hfimjoro the proeoss of domoeratlMtion 
as th« eftitfial tlM va> lost vhta tht populaf •athaslaam 
van nt i t s hoight ana th« pablle eoold hava booa askod 
to aoald thomselvas to tba aov systoa, fbm ooatiaaatloa 
of the systeii of the British Raj let that opnortsalty 
slip by aod when the Constltutloa vat iatrcdueedi i t 
slffloly t^kea at a plee of legal doemoent and not at a 
testaaieat vhieh deteraioed the destiny of the natloa, 
l^atever value i t had vas lost In the din of oolitleal 
eh^oa that pretailed la the eountry after the assassina* 
tioa of tlyaqat All Khaa, Svea Preiideot Iskand Kirsa 
had to admit In hit Martial Lav proelamation of October 7 | 
1^81 that the present Const it ntlofi i t '*tinvorkable". It 
i t really ironical that aost of the leaders tried to find 
faults vith the Constitution rather than themselves and 
reached the eondasloB th^t the systam eaanot vork in their 
country while they forgot to look beyond their frontiers 
where the system of parliamentary defiiocrsey l^ ake^  '^ •^Pf 
and was functioning stsoothly ia India* 
The sitantion could have been salvaged by Basic 
DeoDCXacy system introduced by Ayub Khan as i t had some 
1M 
iohsroQt stTong poiots and was hailed by imopl9 Xlk« 
Arnold Toyobed aad Jaygpriksish Uarj^ yan. Its gtrengast 
and the weakest polot vas in th« ll»lt«d oaabtr of Basle 
Seiaocrats or the hoopla constituting th« electoral 
college. In a third world country vhere Illiteracy and 
poverty are rampant ooiversal suffrage becomes ae^^aingless 
ss people do not know hov to exercise their deiaoeratic 
rights. In this sense the Basic Offii^ cracy Systeo eoald 
haye T3roved to be an assessts only tiu)se oeople eould be 
elected vho vere conscious of the great responsibility 
endowed upon thea. But the systea had the basie flow 
that the fewer the nosber the easier i t i s to sianipalate 
theiB by the powers th^t be. And for this reason Basic 
!>»iBoer%te eould never completely win the confidence of 
public ^d wore looked down upon with suspicion. These 
suspicions were confirmed in the presidential election of 
1965 when Ayub defeated Patima Jinnah whose victory was 
thought to be a foregone conclusion. Hhas the eonstitniion 
of 1962, which introduced the presidential form of 
deBiocracyt eould also not work. When ttm eonstitutioa 
was framed Ayub had declared that i t i s "best suited to 
the genius" of the oeople of Pakistan but his final acts 
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flAtov»4l that ho too h^ d last fi lth in i t . Whoa handing 
0V07 pover to Goaeral fthjra Khaa ho ignofod tbo eonoti-
tatiooaX provlsioiia vhleh providod tot apoiitcoar of tho 
Hatiooal Ass«Bblo to hoeoso latotla Proaldont, la easo 
of tho p7osldoat*s oxlst trmB. tho tooao* 
On hit tnkeovor Tahya Khao followod tho pToeodoat 
aot hf Ajroh, saapoodod tho eoastltntloa ai^ lapoiod tho 
Martial l»av. Bat ho hold on to his proatlso to hold 
eloetloas for tho Satloaal Assombljr. Oa Sovoobor 29, 
1969 ho Issaed tho PToHm« of West Pakistan 
(Qlssolatlon) Ordor vhleh said that for tho pttr^ oso of 
i^lding oloetlons and for dollmlnatlon of eonstituooolos 
i t was "noeossary" to dissolve tho WOst Pakistan Prorloco 
and sot ap oov provlneos • Punjab, Slad| Balnehlstan 
and MWPP « la Its plaeo« It Is highly donbtfol hov tho 
dissolution eoold faellltato tho holding of oloetlons 
oxeopt for solving sooo toehnleal or atfislnlstrativo 
probloss« It was hardly roalls^ thon that tho ordor 
whloh appoated ro Innoeaos voold soal tho fato of naited 
Pakistan and rosolt In split of Bangladosh. It was first 
In tho sorlos of aajor blandors Tahya Khan eonaitted of 
vhleh tho Avanl toagno took tlw advaotago* Iho dlssoltu 
tlon of West Pakistan province thns ended tho esdsting 
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dttlieat* parity betiw«Q th« Sast and th9 \»§t Wing 
of t ^ eoatitrjr as la tii« mm of aajr •laetloaa oa th« busls 
of adolt ffanehlM, vhleh vas declared la ths lafal 
fmisevork Ordor of 1@7G, Sast Paklataa woold hitfs a 
sttpreaaey of«r th« profloeos by vlrtaa of I t i poimlatloa. 
Aecording to th« first tehadta« of th« Ordo'r} oat of 
31 mats la th« Katioaal AtMsiblyi i&eludiag thoso r«ser?9d 
for woffi«Bf 169 V9at to Sist Pakistaa vhil« tb» roaaialag 
144 wore distribated aaoag tho proviaeoa aad e«atrally 
admiaiatrated aroas of Pakist^a, Tbaa by aigaiag tbo 
two Ordors Yabya Khaa ia faot algaed tho deelaratioa for 
the disiotogratioa of tho eoantry, 
Tho ovoats that foUovod, tho gdaoral oleetiOBSf th« 
victory of Awaol toagao aad tho rosoltaist erlsis , the 
massaero of thoasaads of pooploi tho igaomioas defeat are 
oerhapi the blackest days la the history of Paklstaa, 
It appeared at that tine that Pakistan us a aatloa was 
reaehiag the ead of the road aad i t vas speeolated that 
eessatioa of Bast Paklstaa voold eaeourage the divisive 
forees ia BalaehistaB| VMFP aad Sia|^ to resort to t 
sinilar eoorse, la this itoor of Inpeadiag glooa the oaly 
hope vas the eaergeoee of Aolfiqar All Bhatto as a aatioaal 
hero, a gravitatioatl force, foree for a aatloa ia upheaval 
aad a leader in vhoa the oeople eoold trast to solve the 
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problens atuflog at vh«t vas left of PsfcJLstun. Th« 
situitioii was very bud and thare vara no politieiaa who 
could stand iQ tha v«gr of Bhutto la splto of tlia allaga-
tioa agaiast his (vhleh vas not without basis) that ha 
was to m>m9 axtaat raspoQsibla of what had happaoad* 
W%9a tha al act ion raMlt easa out, Bhutto vaaliKad th*»t 
thara vara no hopa for hin to ba tha laadar of tha vhola 
of Pakistaa aQd« tharaforai ho would aot allow tha 
Sational Assaiiblj to ba hald la daoca as i t was planaad. 
Ba threatanad tha naabars'of tha Assa&bljr froa Wist 
Pakistaa that "would broak tha lags of thosa who waat to 
Daeca". Hot ooljr that but ha also thraataoad to aaka 
strikes **froR Fashavar to Karaehi", *You oa that sido 
and X oa this sida" i s aoothar oxprassioa vhieh Bhutto 
was allagad to have told Ifojib. But vheo tha people lost 
faith iQ the angr aad eould not trust the politielaasi 
they fouad their oaly hope la Bhutto and, therefore) tha/ 
forgot what was aeeusatioast if ^ t facts* 
la the early days of Bhutto at the hela of affairs, 
i t appeared th^t he eould deliver the goods, fhrough a 
sariaa of legal, eeooomie and laud rafozns he tried to rais 
the national aornla from the pervasive glocai and boost 
a national eonfidsnfie that the new Pakistan can take care 
of i t s probleias without the Sast Wlag and clean i t s 
on backyard, fhe Interia Constitution of 1972 and the 
constitution of 1073 were ained at furthering this attesiDtt 
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fof ttrnf r«tiilQ«d th« posltiT» points of th« eonstitntion 
of 1056 nod 1962. For that siatt*; th* atv eoastitations 
tiQleitt* in astiu^a for i t tfl«d to f«eo(ieiXo th* 
!9retid«{ili*il sod pnrlliiaoatary font of govwrms^ nt. From 
tho p«0t 03ro«7ioae« Bhotto ttnov voll •oougli not to 
fopoat th9 p«8t Blstakos tod adopt a eomrtltatloiial f7«o* 
vork which proved to bo unworkftbla. for soao tino things > 
ii»v«d oa wall bat thon th« dict^tori^ strank ia Bhatto 
C9WB into plajr. Although tha paople had shown in hln 
thalr nassiva eonfidanea, ha could hardly trust any oaa 
men in his narty, and thus startad cutting tha roots of 
tha danoer^tie procass which anablad hia risa to tha 
highast office. Ha startad eoneantrating all power ia 
hla own hands rather than decaatralising than and 
aneouraging the daaioeratie iaetltutions. Corruption in 
the party and bureaucracy bacasa raapant and i t aptjearad 
that Pakistan was sliding bxick towards the past, The 
general elections in this situation were a good opportunity 
for Bhutto to reassures that the people s t i l l had 
confidence in him despite his failings. But like all 
great Shakespearean tragedies, his too was a tragedy of 
Bi&bition. la order not to loose a two thirds majority. 
Bhatto went in for a aassive rigging. !l!hee much of i t 
was his own &3ing or a handiwork of over^enthusiastie 
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offieltldoQ) Is a matter of dobat* bat tli« roat of tim 
opnosltloa eoBdilfW Pakistan SatiooaX Alllaae« whodk 
the Tieople^ as th«y vsre ooes by the defeat of Fatisa 
HrninA at the haad of Ayob. The Pakistia National 
Alliatice foaod the sitaatloa ripe for laanehlog an 
sgltatloa to t>xes8 the fOTercsrtefit for frtsh eleetloas* 
All the avenaes of escape for Bhatto vera closed. If 
he called fresh al^ctloas It otant that he was admitting 
rigging and i f he did not order polls ho was losing 
whatever l i t t l e sapTsort he was left among the people. 
As the PlfA Bovesent gathered BotaeatuBj, n situation of 
cl'yil disobedience developed and i t appeared the Pakistan 
was again on the brink of a national disaster. All 
efforts at reeoacillation failed to bring any satisfactory 
results, the Pakistan army once again exploited the 
^r^vallrig chaos and ousted Bhatto froa power. This tliae 
Qener'il Zla»al»Haq played the key role in the conn and 
himself became the chief Martial taw Afeinistrator. 
When one exaaioe the history of Pakistan, one 
feels that the coarse of political developiBent in Pakistan 
has nsYer seen soooth like many other third world 
eouatries. Svery popolar Oovernisent| after a brief stinct 
in the office had to give way to the Martial taw Adminis* 
tratioQ* Pakistan like nost of under developed countries 
has failed to sustain democracy. 
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fho failure of ooa nftor th« otlwr l««d«r 
Is glv9a II elsar cat tfiraetloa to tlio eoaatry aad la 
solving probl«B8 of connoa ni«a has geaeratad lack of 
faith la dcBoeraey aatoag the sassus. This has also 
vtakaoad all daiBo«ratie lastltatloa aod tha coaatry 
Booa aftar th« daath of Jlaaah Is wltaasslog a crisis 
of laadarshlp» 
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